| Abstract: | This paper investigates how North Korean behaviour towards boththe United States and South Korea is influenced by the popularityof the American President. The study applies theories relatingto strategic conflict avoidance and signalling to suggest thatthe American President is able to demonstrate a willingnessto use force when he is unpopular and as such is better ableto coerce Pyongyang. Using a time-series model, I demonstratethat the North Koreans become more cooperative towards the UnitedStates in response to decreases in presidential popularity andincreasing levels of US inflation. However, the study also showsthat the North Koreans do not alter their behaviour towardsthe South Koreans in response to low American President Popularityratings. The research, therefore, suggests that the North Koreansbelieve that the United States would be unable to launch a diversionaryattack in response to North Korean behaviour towards the South.This study provides a clear support for the strategic avoidanceof conflict hypothesis and suggests that the American Presidentsare best able to coerce North Korea when they are unpopularat home. Received for publication August 31, 2005. Accepted for publication December 21, 2005. |
