Technology investment, bargaining, and international environmental agreements |
| |
Authors: | Johannes Urpelainen |
| |
Institution: | (1) Department of Political Science, Columbia University, 420 W 118th St 712 IAB, 10027 New York, NY, USA |
| |
Abstract: | If countries are to engage in international environmental cooperation, they must bargain over the distribution of gains. When
future bargaining over pollution abatement is expected, how should a country decide on public technology investments to reduce
the domestic cost of pollution abatement? I find that while countries tend to underinvest because they fail to internalize
the global benefits of new technology, the magnitude of the problem depends on a country’s bargaining power. Powerful countries
underinvest less frequently, because they expect to reap most of the global benefits from new technology in the international
negotiations. I also investigate the effectiveness of a simple reciprocal technology agreement. I find that it can help solve
the underinvestment problem, and this beneficial effect is particularly pronounced in the case of powerful countries. These
findings imply that changing the bargaining protocol on climate change to the benefit of powerful countries may help secure
the necessary technology investments. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|