| Abstract: | The issue of the impact of tax competition between the cantons has been quite present in the public discussion, especially in relation with the reform of the Swiss system of financial equalization. The connection between the degree of direct democratic rights and the intensity of tax competition ana‐lysed by Feld (1997) seems to be particularly interesting for political science. Differently to the approach of Feld (1997) this research note examines it with regard to the tax policies in the cantons. In addition, a less criticized way to measure the institutions of direct democracy is used and the research period is extended. The analysis shows that there is a trade‐off between the exit‐ and the voice‐option. In other words: those cantons that have well developed direct democratic institutions, are less affected by the pressure of tax competition. As a consequence of the perceived influence, their citizens do less probably move to an other canton as a reaction to a heavy tax burden. |
