Das parteipolitische Paradox des Finanzmarktkapitalismus. Aktionärsorientierte Reformen in Deutschland, Frankreich, Italien und den USA

Addressing the debate over the political dynamics of different varieties of capitalism, this article tests the partisan hypothesis in the field of corporate governance. The state of research on distributional consequences of shareholder oriented corporate governance and on institutional complementarity between corporate governance and labor relations suggests that the center-left should oppose shareholder oriented reforms. In fact, our comparison of reforms during the last 15 years reveals the contrary. In Germany, France, Italy and the US, the center-left turned out the be the driving force behind the reforms, while the center-right parties tended to protect organized capitalism, state capitalism, family capitalism, and managerialism. The comparison allows specification of the impulses that made the center-left push for reforms while making the center-right protect traditional institutional arrangements. We present a conflict model that, beside class conflicts and insider/outsider-conflicts, includes conflicts over managerial control. The recent economic reforms cannot be understood without consideration of the significance of this conflict line.