Normative Modelle, institutionelle Typen und beobachtbare Verhaltensmuster: Ein Vorschlag zum Vergleich parlamentarischer Demokratien

The article proposes a two-dimensional, institutional determination of types of parliamentary democracy, with respect to the proportionality of the electoral system and (quasi-)legislative veto points. Three basic types of parliamentary democracy are distinguished: pluralitarian, majoritarian and supermajoritarian. The typology has important advantages over the approach of Arend Lijphart. It has a consistent two-dimensional conceptual foundation, it can be directly related to central controversies in normative democratic theory, it can be systematically linked to action theory approaches such as Veto Player Theory, and it highlights the characteristics of democracies with majoritarian constitutions, which are systematically downplayed in Lijphart’s approach. The most important variant of this type uses a proportionality principle in the electoral system and a majoritarian principle in the legislative system. It is shown that in these democracies, legislative majority rule can itself contribute to “consensual” patterns of behavior.