循环经济产业集群中核心生态企业链合创新博弈分析及策略选择研究

链合创新是循环经济产业集群在生态链上提高创新响应程度，降低创新风险，实现创新效率的主要形式。文章在提出循环经济产业集群链合创新八个假设的基础上，针对核心生态企业为上游企业和为下游企业两种情形，构建了两层生态结构的创新博弈模型，通过对博弈过程的细致分析，提出链合创新的策略集；并运用MATLAB工具就创新难度系数和生态影响力对策略集的影响进行仿真分析。研究表明：在循环经济产业集群中，核心生态企业链合创新的程度不是越大越好，其策略选择和最优利润与核心生态企业在生态链上的位置无关；链合创新的合作伙伴也并非相对实力越强越好，而是存在极值，且生态影响力越大，其可选范围也越大。

Research on Vertical Cooperative Innovation Game Model and Strategy Selection of Core Ecological Enterprises in the Circular Economy Industrial Cluster

Vertical Cooperative Innovation is the main form of the Circular Economy Industrial Cluster to improve the innovation responding, reduce innovation risks and achieve innovation efficiency in the ecological chain. This paper puts forward the eight hypotheses of Vertical Cooperative Innovation of the Circular Economy Industrial Cluster, and constructs the innovative game models of two-tier ecological structure for two cases: the core ecological enterprise as an upstream one and as a downstream one. Through careful analysis of the game process, a new strategy set of Vertical Cooperative Innovation is proposed. Then the effect of innovation difficulty coefficient and ecological influence power on strategy selection is simulated by MATLAB. The research shows that in the circular economy industrial cluster, the degree of innovation of the core ecological enterprise is not the greater the better, and its strategic selection and optimal profit have nothing to do with the position of the core ecological enterprise in the ecological chain. The relative strength of the innovation partner is not the stronger the better and there is an extreme point.The greater the ecological influence power of the core enterprise, the greater the range of options available to its partners.