Making votes count in parliament or government? |
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| Authors: | Tom Verthé Damien Bol Stefanie Beyens André Blais |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Political Science, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium;2. Department of Political Economy, King’s College London, London, UK;3. Department of Public Governance and Management, Universiteit Utrecht, Utrecht, Netherlands;4. Department of Political Science, University of Montréal, Montréal, Canada |
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| Abstract: | Several scholars have sought to elucidate voting strategies in proportional representation (PR) systems. The argument is that the existence of coalition governments forces voters to consider potential alliances and to vote in order to maximize their chances of influencing the outcome. In this paper, we argue that this vision is incomplete as PR, just as single-member district plurality, also creates incentives for voters to desert parties that have little chances of obtaining a seat in their district. We validate this theoretical claim using two different surveys conducted during the 2014 Belgian federal and regional elections. Our results show that both government and district viability have a substantial and distinct effect on vote choice. |
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