After the Public Interest Prevails: The Political Sustainability of Policy Reform

The prevailing political science wisdom is that narrow interests regularly triumph over the general public. Yet the stunning passage of broad-based policy reforms in the face of intense clientele opposition suggests that the U.S. political system has a greater capacity to serve diffuse interests than has often been thought. Some of the most provocative policy-oriented political-science research during the 1980s and 1990s examined how these surprising reform victories occurred. Unfortunately, general-interest reforms do not always stick; reforms may be corrupted or reversed after their enactment. The long-term sustainability of any given policy reform hinges on the successful reworking of political institutions and on the generation of positive policy-feedback effects, especially the empowerment of social groups with a stake in the reform&s maintenance. This paper explores the postenactment dynamics of three canonical instances of general-interest reform legislation: tax reform, agricultural subsidy reform, and airline deregulation. Only in the airline-deregulation case has the self-reinforcing dynamic required for political sustainability been unmistakably evident. For analysts and advocates of general-interest reform measures alike, the clear lesson is to attend far more closely to what happens after reforms become law.