UNITED STATES COURTS AND THE OPTIMAL DETERRENCE OF INTERNATIONAL CARTELS: A WELFARIST PERSPECTIVE ON EMPAGRAN

E. Hoffmann–La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. concerned aprivate antitrust suit for damages against a global vitaminscartel. The central issue in the litigation was whether foreignplaintiffs injured by the cartel's conduct abroad could bringsuit in U.S. court, an issue that was ultimately resolved inthe negative. We take a welfarist perspective on this issueand inquire whether optimal deterrence requires U.S. courtsto take subject matter jurisdiction under U.S. law for claimssuch as those in Empagran. Our analysis considers, in particular,the arguments of various economist amici in favor of jurisdictionand arguments of the U.S. and foreign government amici againstjurisdiction. We explain why the issue is difficult to resolve,and identify several economic concerns that the amici donot address, which may counsel against jurisdiction. We alsoanalyze the legal standard enunciated by the Supreme Court andapplied on remand by the D.C. Circuit, and we argue that itsfocus on "independent" harms and "proximate" causation is problematicand does not provide an adequate economic foundation for resolvingthe underlying legal issues.