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金融信用缺失的博弈论分析
引用本文:陈燕.金融信用缺失的博弈论分析[J].金陵法律评论,2005(4):34-39.
作者姓名:陈燕
作者单位:南京师范大学商学院 江苏南京210097
基金项目:江苏省社会科学规划项目
摘    要:目前,我国严重的金融信用缺失造成了金融信用资源供给不足,交易成本提高,制约着经济的持续稳定健康发展.本文试图运用博弈论分析工具,从契约经济学和信息经济学角度,揭示我国金融信用缺失的微观机理.要从根本上解决当前的金融信用缺失,必须建立金融信用的整体制度安排,具体包括建立企业声誉机制和完善的信息披露制度、转变政府职能、完善信用立法、实施产权制度改革、引入第三方治理和重构信用文化等方面.

关 键 词:金融信用  契约  合作博弈  声誉机制
文章编号:1001-4608(2005)04-0034-06
修稿时间:2004年12月29

Analyzing the Deficiency of Financial Creditability by Game Theory
CHEN Yan.Analyzing the Deficiency of Financial Creditability by Game Theory[J].Journal of Nanjing Normal University (Social Science Edition),2005(4):34-39.
Authors:CHEN Yan
Abstract:At present, the serious deficiency of financial creditability has caused an insufficient supply of financial creditability resources and an increasing cost of transactions and is constraining the sustainable, steady and healthy development of economy. This paper will try to find the reasons of the shortage from the perspective of contract economics and information economics' within the framework of game theory. In order to solve the problem of creditability deficiency, the paper suggests establishing a whole institution which includes establishing the corporate reputation mechanism and publishing system for information, transforming the government function, improving the credit law, reforming the property right system, introducing the third party administration and rebuilding a credit culture.
Keywords:financial credibility  contract  cooperation game  reputation mechanism
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