战略预期与小国挑战周边大国的策略选择——以菲、越两国南海制华政策(2009~2019)为例

文章提出了后冷战时期战略预期导向下小国(主动)挑战周边大国策略选择的分析框架。战略预期有助于小国明确其挑战周边大国“源动力”的强弱,以及预判具备哪些必要条件才能相对成功地挑战周边大国。小国享有大国竞争赋予的重要战略空间,其面对的冲突性议题不是周边大国的战略重点,采取迫使和诱使周边大国保持战略克制的策略,这些对小国则至关重要。在多个小国挑战同一周边大国时,“源动力”相对强烈的小国,不同的战略预期将催生其差异明显的策略模式。根据大国竞争的强度与周边大国“求稳”偏好的水平,此类小国的战略预期可以依次分解为审慎战略预期、进取性战略预期和修正后战略预期;相应的策略选择为侧重温和软制衡或侧重强硬软制衡的对冲、侧重准硬制衡的对冲或硬制衡以及四种潜在的策略修正。菲律宾和越南2009~2019年南海制华政策的演变验证了这一逻辑。掌控南海敏感争议海域新的油气开发格局、积极应对司法化趋势并探索更加包容的争端解决方案,是中国深度塑造菲、越两国南海战略预期的重要着力点。

Strategic Expectations and Balance Strategies under which Small States Challenge Their Peripheral Power:The Cases of Philippines and Vietnam’s South China Sea Strategies(2009-2019)

This article proposes an analytical framework to explain the strategic expectations and balance strategies of small states which opt to challenge their peripheral power in the Post-Cold War era.Strategic expectations help small states clarify the intensity of their“original motive”for challenging a peripheral power and the preconditions of their relative success.Enjoying important strategic flexibility derived from great-power competition,the competing issues are not peripheral power’s strategic focus,and forcing and inducing the peripheral power to maintain strategic restraint is crucial for small states.When a peripheral power is challenged by several small states,the small states which harbor relatively strong“original motive”can adopt obviously different balance strategies due to their different strategic expectations.According to the intensity of great-power competition and peripheral power’s preference of“seeking stability”,these small states’strategic expectations might be classified as follows:prudent strategic expectation,offensive strategic expectation,and revised strategic expectation.Correspondingly,their balance strategies are hedging strategy that focuses on mild or hard soft balance,hedging strategy that focuses on quasi-hard balance or hard balance,and four potential revised strategies.The evolution of Philippines and Vietnam’s balance strategies against China in the South China Sea(SCS)from 2009 to 2019 supports this logic.Gaining control over the new oil and gas exploitation in SCS’s sensitive contested waters,proactively responding to the trend of using litigation to address the SCS dispute,and exploring more inclusive solutions are the necessary means for China to re-shape Philippines and Vietnam’s strategic expectations in the SCS.