| 地方政府间正和博弈的可能性分析及对策 |
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| 引用本文： | 谢启秦.地方政府间正和博弈的可能性分析及对策[J].天水行政学院学报,2008(1):55-57. |
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| 作者姓名： | 谢启秦 |
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| 作者单位： | 湖南师范大学公共管理学院,湖南,长沙,410081 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文试以博弈论为工具，分析了处于“囚徒困境”中的地方政府间关系，提出了地方政府寻求正和博弈解的两条途径：从外部引入中央与社会两参数，形成多维互动，从内部实现制度创新。
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| 关 键 词： | 地方政府 正和博弈 囚徒困境 |
| 文章编号： | 1009-6566(2008)01-0055-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007年10月26 |
Possibilities and Strategies of a Positive-number-sum Game between Local Governments |
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| Authors: | XIE Qi-qin |
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| Institution: | XIE Qi-qin (Hunan Normal University, Changsha 410081,China) |
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| Abstract: | Using game theory as a tool, this paper tries to analyze the relationship between local governments under the prisoners＇ dilemma. And puts forward two methods for local governments to win a positive-number-sum game： one is to bring the central government and society as two parameters for building a mode of multi-dimensional interaction from outside,the other is to implement institutional innovation within inside. |
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| Keywords: | local governments positive-number-sum game the prisoners＇ dilemma |
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