| Abstract: | Heterogeneous Switzerland is often portrayed as a model of successfulnation-building. Two major institutions ensure the representationof federal units within the federal political system: the Councilof States branch of the bicameral legislature, and the "doublemajority" of popular and cantonal votes needed in constitutionalreferenda. It was expected that both mechanisms would countercentrifugal forces possibly created by the self-government ofsubnational groups. Historical analysis shows, however, thatsince these institutions were established, some important socialtransformations have occurred, with perverse effects on minorityrepresentation and on cleavage accommodation. The Council ofStates has come to amplify the influence of established politicalforces, instead of defending minority influence. The "doublemajority" now gives excessive veto power to minorities no longersocially relevant, at the expense of newer, more needy groups.National cohesion and consensus democracy, in short, risk beingeroded rather than strengthened by these core institutions ofthe Swiss federal system. |
