The Regular Practice of Morality in Law |
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| Authors: | MICHAEL GIUDICE |
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| Institution: | 1. York UniversityDepartment of Philosophy4700 Keele StreetToronto, OntarioM3J 1P3 CanadaE‐mail: giudice@yorku.ca;2. I wish to thank Juan‐Vega Gomez, Les Green, and Wil Waluchow for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I also benefited from helpful discussion with an audience at the Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, in November 2005. |
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| Abstract: | Abstract. This article examines the possibility of moral considerations and arguments serving as validity conditions of law in legal positivist theory. I argue that, despite recent attempts, this possibility has yet to be established. My argument turns on a defense of Joseph Raz's Sources Thesis, yet I do not adopt his famous “argument from authority.” Rather, I offer a renewed defense of the distinction between creation and application of law and argue that moral considerations and arguments, whether recognized in law or not, remain arguments about the modification of law. |
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