农村土地流转政策的执行偏差——对小岗村的实证分析

农村土地承包经营权的流转是完善我国农村工作非常重大的现实问题,但政策执行过程中容易产生偏差。有哪些偏差,其原因何在?街道层官僚理论为分析中国农村土地承包经营权流转的政策执行提供了一个全新的理论视角。以中国改革第一村——小岗村为研究对象,以街道层官僚理论为视角,通过对小岗村的农村土地流转政策执行情况及偏差原因进行实证分析。研究发现,处于公共政策执行末梢环节的街道层官僚在资源稀缺和公共服务弹性需求的夹缝之中,因其特殊的身份、地位和工作性质而持有相当大的政策制定能力,导致公共利益权威分配过程中产生偏差;分析了形成该问题的三个具体原因,对提高我国农村土地流转政策执行的质量具有一定的借鉴意义。

The Deviations of Policy Implementation in Rural Land Circulation:Taking Xiaogang Villages an Example

The objective of this paper is to illustrate why the deviations of policy implementation happens during the process of Rural Land Circulation. With An exploratory case study of Xiaogang Village, and the perspective of Street-level Bureaucrats theory, this study focuses on the rural land circulation policy implementation and the reasons for deviations of empirical analysis. The study reveals three reasons that lead to the deviations of policy implementation in Rural Land Circulation in Xiaogang Village. Because of the special identity, status and nature of their jobs, the street-level bureaucrats actually are able to "make" policy in the policy implementation process. In the end of the public policy implementation,"Street-level Bureaucrats"of survival in the scarcity of resources and the elastic demand of public services, have the deviations in the process of the authority distribution on the public interest. The main limitation of the study is that it solely focuses on the street-level bureaucrats, which makes difficult differ from the impacts of other level bureaucrats. The study will help us to realize China’s farmland large-scale management of farmland in the laws and regulations, and play a significant role in impelling the rural economic development. The Street-level Bureaucrats theory is a totally new perspective to analysis the rural land circulation policy implementation.