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"超载现象"的法律经济学分析
引用本文:张书豪,吕晶."超载现象"的法律经济学分析[J].吉林公安高等专科学校学报,2004(4).
作者姓名:张书豪  吕晶
作者单位:武汉大学法学院,武汉大学法学院 湖北 武汉 430034,湖北 武汉 430034
摘    要:"超载现象"是影响道路交通安全的重要问题,却久治不绝,在某些地方已经演化成一种"罚款放行"制度。运用法律经济学原理去分析,这种制度性事实存在的深层次经济原因就在于,交易双方--超载车司机和治超站执法人员短期达到了自身利益最大化。但问题的实质在于,超载造成的整个社会效益的减退使"罚款放行"制度交易成本扩大化,而不是缩小。遏制扭转这种制度性做法需要对症下药,一味地加强执法部门的执法力度并不能取得理想的效果,而应从加大司机超载的成本入手解决问题。

关 键 词:道路交通  超载现象  法律  制度  成本  效益

"Overloading Phenomenon" Legal Economics Analysis
Zhang Shu-hao,Lv Jing."Overloading Phenomenon" Legal Economics Analysis[J].Journal of Jilin Public Secunity Academy,2004(4).
Authors:Zhang Shu-hao  Lv Jing
Abstract:"Overloading phenomenon" is an important problem affecting transportation safety, which have been dealt with for a long time but without solution. In some areas, they have evolved into a system of "fine passing". Analyzing with legal economics principle, the deep economic reason of such systematic fact lies in: the drivers of the two business parties and the executive personnel of the overloading managing station have achieved the max of self interest within short period. But the essence of the problem lies in that the whole society benefit's decrease caused by overloading has made the "fine passing" system dealing cost enlarge but not shorten. To control and change the systematic method need suit the remedy to the case. It cannot get the ideal effect to enhance the executive strength uniquely but should solve the problem by increasing the driver's overloading cost income.
Keywords:traffic transportation  overloading phenomenon  law  system  cost  benefit
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