企业政治行为对管制动态均衡的隐蔽性影响

随着现代管制理论和管制实践的不断发展,研究管制均衡的动态性变化和企业影响管制均衡的隐蔽性行为,对于提高政府管制政策的合理性有着十分重要的意义.因为这些隐蔽性行为处在合法性的边缘或是范围以内,在实践中也越来越多地被企业所运用.从管制过程中的三个利益相关者--消费者、企业和政府之间的现实关系、各自追求不同的目标和相互作用入手,运用Stigle-Peltzman的管制均衡模型研究了政府管制机制从初始设计到现实执行结果之间的演变轨迹,并在此基础上通过对该模型进一步的推理分析和案例研究得出结论,企业运用政治行为对管制动态均衡进行隐蔽性影响,使其向有利于自身的方向发生动态的偏离,从而获取超额利润的机制和作用方式.主要有:利用管制政策的相对静态性,通过隐蔽信息产生管制错位;削弱消费者的影响力,改变政府边际效用替代率.进一步阐述了管制错位和政府失灵的经济学机理,对现有的管制理论和企业政治行为理论进行了拓展,这对提高经济转型时期的我国政府管制政策的合理性具有积极的意义.

Study on the Cryptic Influence of Corporate Political Action on Dynamic Regulation Equilibrium

Along with the development of modern regulation theory and practice, the research on the dynamic regulation equilibrium and the cryptic influence of Corporate Political Action is very important to enhance the rationality of governmental regulation policy, since this kind of Cryptic action is on the edge of legality and applied by more corporations. Therefore, starting with the relationship among customers, corporations and government, and their interactive influence on each other during the process of regulation, this paper discusses the evolution of government regulation from its initial design to its final enforcement result, utilizing the Stigler-Peltzman regulation equilibrium model. Then, after further inferential analysis and case study, the conclusion is shown that there are two kinds of cryptic Corporate Political Actions which corporations used to influence the Dynamic Regulation Equilibrium so as to get excess profit. The first one is to take advantage of the comparative static characteristic of regulation policy, resulting in the regulation deviation by shielding information. The second one is to weaken the power of customers and change the marginal rate of substitution of governmental utility. This conclusion expounds the economic mechanism of the regulation deviation and the government failure and meanwhile expands the current regulation theory and the corporate political action theory.