Understanding third‐party advertising: An analysis of the 2004, 2006 and 2008 Canadian elections

For approximately two decades, the federal regulation for third‐party election spending was the focus of repeated constitutional debate. However, with the 2004 Supreme Court decision in Harper v. Canada, a relative level of policy stability has been established. This stability permits us to evaluate the performance of spending limits according to the principles of the egalitarian model on which it is based. Using an original data set compiled from third‐party election advertising reports from the 2004, 2006 and 2008 federal elections, this article offers the first empirical analysis of this important election policy. A number of observations can be offered. First, third parties are not spending large amounts relative to spending limits. Second, despite legislative changes in 2006 banning all federal party contributions except those from individuals, there appears little strategic action by third parties in spending “around” contribution limits. During this three‐election cycle, third parties quite simply did not spend significant amounts. Current third‐party spending limits therefore appear to be situated comfortably within the expectations of the egalitarian model, though why third parties of all types spend so little remains in question.