The Role of Parliamentary Intention in Adjudication under the Human Rights Act 1998

This essay gives more detailed content to the widespread viewthat the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) has changed the traditionalrole of parliamentary intention in statutory interpretation.It begins by outlining the various ways in which legislativeintent has featured in traditional (pre-HRA) statutory interpretation.This is followed by an examination of the interpretive principlesdeveloped by the senior judiciary under the HRA case-law, focusingon the extent to which they seem to depart from traditionalprinciples. It is argued that although the traditional roleof parliamentary intention is partly preserved post-HRA, theinterpretive obligation under s 3(1) HRA nonetheless shiftsthe interpretive focus away from what Parliament originallyintended in enacting the legislation under HRA scrutiny, towardsfulfilling the overriding goal of achieving compatibility withConvention rights. The final sections of the essay attempt toprovide an account of what is involved in this shift.