Agency and fiscal dependence in central‐provincial relations in China |
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Authors: | Andrew Wedeman |
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Institution: | Assistant Professor of Political Science , University of Nebraska , Lincoln |
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Abstract: | The incremental decentralization of economic and fiscal authority within the Chinese state has led to a debate over the extent to which the central government retains authoritative control over the provinces. Using detailed budgetary data, this paper argues that even though fiscal reforms may have given provincial governments independent sources of income, they remain dependent upon the center for budgetary subsidies and that without central subsidies provincial government would face serious budgetary shortfalls. This is true not only for provinces that receive more in central subsidies than they transfer to the center, but also for provinces that were net exporters of funds to the center prior to the 1994 fiscal reforms. Fiscal dependence is important because it gives the center a source of leverage that supplements the political leverage it gains from the nomenklatura system, allowing it to not only punish insubordinate provincial leaders as individuals, but to also punish recalcitrant provincial governments as institutions by either cutting or withholding budgetary subsidies. |
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