从代理理论看对高管报酬的规范

从效益角度看,对企业高管报酬的数额讨论是没有意义的,要想制定一个理想的企业高管报酬数额的立法、行政和司法标准,将会产生适得其反的效果。对企业高管报酬方法规范的重点,应该是提高报酬与企业业绩的正相关关系。相比而言,企业高管报酬的披露制度更符合市场经济的规律,也更有利于资本市场的完善。

Regulation of the Remuneration of Executives: Through the Perspective of the Theory of Agency Device

Through the perspective of the theory of agency device, this paper makes an analysis of the remuneration received by enterprise officers in China. From the angle of efficiency, any discussion about the amount of the remuneration seems meaningless, and any attempt to establish a legislative, administrative or judicial criterion is also counterproductive. The emphasis of regulatory work should be on how to intensify the correlation between an executives’ payment and corporate achievements. Comparatively, a disclosure regime is more consistent with market economic patterns and is more conducive to the improvement of a capital market.