The political practice of genetic epistemology

Genetic epistemology is sometimes taken by those unfamiliar with it as a justification for a meritocracy of moral reasoning and the continued oppression of people employing reasoning at lower stages than those who seek to perpetuate the oppression. Whether this interpretation is praised or reviled, it remains erroneous. In particular, this misunderstanding is applied to attempts by genetic epistemologists to apply its insights to the construction of the larger social world. However, a genetic-epistemological politics is really characterized by a concern for maintaining systems permitting free discourse among moral agents. This article outlines the nature of the erroneous interpretations and discusses genetic epistemology's proper application to politics. Stephen chilton is assistant professor of political science at the University of Minnesota at Duluth, where he specializes in conceptual analysis in the fields of comparative politics and political psychology. He is the author ofDefining Political Development (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988);Grounding Political Development (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991); and (with Shawn Rosenberg and Dana Ward) ofPolitical Reasoning and Cognition: A Piagetian View (Duke University Press, 1988).