| 从委托—代理理论出发浅析基层警察行为管理 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 李丹阳.从委托—代理理论出发浅析基层警察行为管理[J].公安理论与实践,2011(3):33-36,54. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 李丹阳 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 中国人民公安大学,北京100038 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 基层警察作为公共安全产品的直接生产者,其行为对公共安全产品的产出有着重大影响。委托—代理理论是博弈论的一个重要的应用分支,以委托—代理理论为研究框架,揭示社会公众与民警间的间接委托关系,并分析其中高代理成本产生的原因,主张通过尽职激励和敬业激励契约来引导和管理代理人的行为。
|
| 关 键 词： | 委托—代理 警察行为 激励 契约 |
To Start with the Principal-Agent Theory to Briefly Discuss Field Police Management Behaviors |
| |
| Li Danyang.To Start with the Principal-Agent Theory to Briefly Discuss Field Police Management Behaviors[J].Journal of Shanghai Public Security Academy,2011(3):33-36,54. |
| |
| Authors: | Li Danyang |
| |
| Institution: | Li Danyang(Chinese People＇s Public Security University,Beijing 100038,China) |
| |
| Abstract: | Field policemen are the direct manufacturers of public security products and their behaviors have a great effect on the production of the public security products.The principal-agent theory is an important applied branch of game theory.By taking the principal-agent theory as a research framework the writer tries to reveal the relationship between the principal and agent and analyzes the causes of high agency costs.Through ethic agreements the writer tries to guide agents＇ behaviors. |
| |
| Keywords: | Principal Agent Policemen＇s Behavior Stimulate Agreement |
| 本文献已被 维普 等数据库收录！ |
|
