股东表决权:公司所有与公司控制的连接点

美国学者Berle和Means于1932年系统地分析了在公众公司中存在的公司所有与公司经营相分离的现象后,在经济学和公司法学中都产生了重大的影响。根据该理论,在公众公司中的股东对经营层失去了控制,表决权也没有任何意义了。对此,基于所有权结构的有效性分析,本文认为股东对管理层并没有失去控制,而是由某一个或者几个大股东控制着公司。在两权分离过程中,表决权扮演着极为重要的角色,它是公司所有与公司经营的连接点。它不但维系和控制着公司所有者与经营者的关系,还是不同股东之间争夺公司控制权的工具,是控制股东对中小股东进行控制的工具。为了顺应这一工具主义趋势,表决权与股份之间出现了分离倾向的同时,表决权本身也出现了客体化趋势,在表决权的救济上也已经从损害赔偿为主的救济方式走向了撤销公司决议为主。

Shareholder's Voting Right: The Connecting Point between Corporate Ownership and Corporate Controlling

In 1932, Berle & Means systematically identified the separation of corporate ownership and management in public corporations. They explained that shareholders cannot control the company's affairs, and shareholder voting as a controlling device is ineffective. After analyzing the validity of the corporate ownership structure, I believe that one or more shareholders have the capacity of controlling the company' s affairs. The voting right is not only the Link between corporate ownership and management, but also the tool of fighting the corporate control among shareholders, hi other words, the majority faction may use its voting power to oppress the minority. There were many changes, such as voting right separating from the stock, voting itself is becoming the object of right, and the principle methods of relieving turns from damage compensation to revoke the corporate resolution.