中国传统法律思想的研究范式——以先秦儒家的礼法思想为例

本文运用马克斯·韦伯的“理想类型”与维特根斯坦的“家族类似” ,对休谟的“事实判断”与“价值判断”的划分进行了扩展研究 ,完成了休谟这一理论从绝对理性的本质主义向相对理性的非本质主义的过渡 ,并以非本质意义上的“事实判断”与“价值判断”为基础 ,以先秦儒家的礼法思想为例证 ,提出了中国传统法律思想研究范式的两种“理想类型” :还原与解释 ;推展与原创。作者认为 ,依照这两种“理想类型” ,就能厘清目前中国传统法律思想研究方法的盲目和混乱 ,在解释与对话中确立起码的规则 ,从而深化思想的研究 ,推动思想的创造。

A Study of the Research Mode on the Traditional Legal Ideology of the Ancient China

The article does an expansive research on the theory of Hume's "fact-judgment" and "value-judgment " by utilizing the theories of Marx Webber's "ideal type" and Wittgenstein's "family resemblance", helping to draw a conclusion to the transformation of Hume's theory from absolute rationality of the essentialism to relative rationality of non-essentialism reason. Based on non-essential "fact-judgment" and "value-judgment", and illustrating the "Rite-punishment" in the Confucianism theory before the Qin Dynasty, the author puts forward two ideal types of research on the Chinese traditional legal ideology-rehabilitation and explanation, advance and creation. On the basis of the two ideal types, we can overcome the blindness and confusion of research on the traditional Chinese legal thoughts and can establish minimum rules in explanation and dialogue so as to deepen the research on the study, and promote the creativity of thought.