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集体谈判中工人代表的行为偏好分析与激励机制建构
引用本文:任小平.集体谈判中工人代表的行为偏好分析与激励机制建构[J].中国劳动关系学院学报,2012,26(2):33-37.
作者姓名:任小平
作者单位:中国劳动关系学院经济管理系,北京,100048
摘    要:在劳动关系领域,集体谈判被认为是维护劳工权益的有效制度.但中国的经验表明,集体谈判制度的有效性并未得到工人,特别是基层工人的充分肯定.之所以出现这一问题,是因为工人代表在集体谈判中的行为偏好及其与之耦合的激励机制缺位所致.因此,关注工人代表在集体谈判中的行为偏好并建立与之一致的激励机制,是提升中国集体谈判制度效果的现实选择,也是维护工人权益,促进劳资和谐乃至社会和谐的重要之举.

关 键 词:集体谈判  工人代表  行为偏好  激励机制

On Behavior Preferences and Incentive Mechanism of Employee Representatives in Collective Bargaining
Ren Xiaoping.On Behavior Preferences and Incentive Mechanism of Employee Representatives in Collective Bargaining[J].Journal of China Institute of Industrial Relations,2012,26(2):33-37.
Authors:Ren Xiaoping
Institution:Ren Xiaoping(China Institute of Industrial Relations,Beijing 100048,China)
Abstract:In the field of labor relations,the system of collective bargaining is considered as an effective system of labor right protection.However,the effectiveness of collective bargaining system is not fully recognized by grass-roots employees in China.The reasons include the behavior preferences of employee representatives in collective bargaining and the deficiency of incentive mechanism.In order to protect labor rights and interests and to improve China’s collective bargaining system,we should put attention to the behavior preference of employee representatives and set up the incentive mechanism.
Keywords:collective bargaining  employee representative  behavior preference  incentive mechanism
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