外卖平台“二选一”行为市场支配力研究

外卖平台“二选一”行为降低了社会总福利,其所产生的垄断效应直接损害了商家的多栖性,剥夺了消费者的选择权,使消费者被大数据杀熟,也使外卖骑手陷入事实层面上的“二选一”,在上游劳动力市场形成了与下游平台内经营者市场截然不同的寡头垄断。对此,外卖平台可能基于自我保护原则、统一性原则、排除搭便车原则为其行为寻找合理性,但这三种抗辩事由均不具有适用可能性。外卖平台在实施“二选一”过程中,对商家形成了佣金价格及获取消费者流量的控制力,对消费者形成了商品价格的控制力,对外卖骑手形成了劳动力雇佣价格及劳动时间的控制力。综合交叉网络外部性等因素,“二选一”行为对三方所产生的危害并不相同,对此应完善监管机构行为性救济模式,要求平台解除“二选一”独家协议,履行信息披露义务,限制收集消费者个人信息的范围,对平台配送系统进行优化,允许骑手保留数据权属。

Research on the Market Dominance of“Exclusive Dealing”Behavior of Takeout Platform

The“exclusive dealing”behavior of takeout platform reduces the total social welfare,and its monopoly effect directly damages the multi-habitat of operators in the platform.The“exclusive dealing”behavior deprives consumers of the right to choose,so that consumers are cooked by big data,and makes takeout riders fall into the de facto“exclusive dealing”.It has formed an oligopoly in the upstream labor market,which is completely different from the operator market in the downstream platform.In this regard,the platform may seek rationality for its behavior based on the principle of self-protection,unity and excluding free riding,but the three defenses are not applicable.In the process of implementing“exclusive dealing”,the platform has formed the ability to control the price and consumers’network traffic,the commodity price of consumers,the labor employment price and labor time of takeout riders.Considering the cross network externalities and other factors,the harm of“exclusive dealing”behavior to the three parties is different.Therefore,we should improve the behavior relief mode,urge the platform to release the“exclusive dealing”exclusive agreement,to fulfill the obligation of information disclosure and limit the scope of collecting personal information,and optimize platform distribution system to allow takeout riders to retain data ownership.