Arms Negotiation,War Exhaustion,and the Credibility of Preventive War |
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Authors: | William Spaniel |
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Institution: | 1. University of Rochesterwilliamspaniel@gmail.com |
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Abstract: | Why do some states agree to suspend their weapons programs in exchange for compensation while others fail to come to terms? I argue that the changing credibility of preventive war is an important determinant of arms construction. If preventive war is never an option, states can reach mutually preferable settlements. However, if preventive war is not credible today but will be credible in the future, a commitment problem results: the state considering investment faces a “window of opportunity” and must build the arms or it will not receive concessions later on. Thus, agreements fail under these conditions. I then apply the theoretical findings to the Soviet Union’s decision to build nuclear weapons in 1949. War exhaustion made preventive war not credible for the United States immediately following World War II, but lingering concerns about future preventive action induced Moscow to proliferate. |
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Keywords: | formal modeling negotiation power transition |
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