Informal Sector Work and Evaluations of the Incumbent: The Electoral Effect of Vulnerability on Economic Voting |
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| Authors: | Matthew M. Singer |
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| Affiliation: | Associate professor of political science at the University of Connecticut |
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| Abstract: | Economically vulnerable voters are expected to hold politicians accountable for their management of the economy because these voters are more likely to be personally affected by economic shocks and less able to cope with the resulting dislocation. Evidence from the informal sector in Argentina, where the lack of formal registration increases income volatility and denies unemployment benefits, is consistent with this hypothesis. Data from Argentina from 2005 to 2006 show that the association between evaluations of the economy and evaluations of President Néstor Kirchner was stronger among those working without formal employment guarantees. The implication is that the electoral support of Latin America's many informal workers may very well be fickle and dependent on economic performance. |
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