Human Rights: Existential,Not Metaphysical |
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| Authors: | Massimo La Torre |
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| Affiliation: | “Magna Graecia” University of Catanzaro, Law Faculty, Viale Europa‐Germaneto, I‐88100 Catanzaro, ItalyA previous version of this paper was presented at the Menschenrechte als transnationales Verfassungsrecht—Menschenwürde, Verh?ltnism?ssigkeit und Gleichheit conference, University of Erlangen, Germany, 5–7 November 2015. |
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| Abstract: | My paper consists of four sections. The first is concerned with the distinction and connection between fundamental and human rights. Here I shall just introduce a few conceptual notions and definitions that are more or less widely used, but that may help us to frame the issue and better focus on the most relevant question of the foundation or justification of human rights. In the second and third sections I will present what I believe to be the four fundamental normative situations that shape our understanding and use of human rights. In the second section attention will focus on what in my opinion is the most basic of these four normative situations, which I call the “existential” situation. This is intended to offer a strong foundation for human rights as “not metaphysical,” without appealing to or relying on heavy metaphysical assumptions. I will try to stick more or less to an argumentative strategy based on common sense. The third section, dealing with the three other normative situations, will to some extent be an exercise in eclecticism, trying to combine different approaches to (and schools of thought on) the question of normativity. Here eclecticism will not be trivial, or at least I hope not. In the fourth and final section I will briefly conclude with a general overview on the issue of the “existence” of normativity and human rights. |
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