Raz on Rights: Human Rights,Fundamental Rights,and Balancing |
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| Authors: | Aleardo Zanghellini |
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| Affiliation: | University of Reading, School of Law Foxhill House, Whiteknights Road, Earley, Reading, RG6 7BA, U.K.Professor of Law and Social Theory, University of Reading. Many thanks to Denise Meyerson for her comments on an early draft, to Stuart Lakin for our discussions on balancing, and to the anonymous referees for their helpful feedback. |
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| Abstract: | After clarifying the outlines of Raz's interest theory of rights and its relationship to aspects of the principles theory of rights, I consider how his recent observations on human rights manage to fit (or fail to fit) into the interest theory. I then address two questions. First, I elaborate on Raz's definition of morally fundamental rights, arguing that he is right in claiming that there are no such rights. I then show that the interest theory accommodates the notion that rights may take qualitative precedence over conflicting considerations—a question that has become increasingly relevant in light of recent writing on rights. |
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