Redefining the Nonproliferation Norm? Australian Uranium,the NPT,and the Global Nuclear Revival

Optimists maintain that great powers oppose the proliferation of nuclear weapons and have a moral aversion to their use. The Eighth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non‐Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in May 2010 produced a final declaration calling for steps toward complete disarmament. Yet recent optimism belies some contradictory, incremental foreign policy decisions taken by countries like Australia and the United States that could produce a change of meaning for the nuclear nonproliferation norm. Building on the “norm life‐cycle” model developed by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, this article links a new constructivist model of normative change to decisions by developed states to expand the global nuclear fuel cycle and provide sensitive nuclear assistance to other countries. An exploratory case study of Australian government policies on nuclear energy and uranium exports (2006‐present), including the possible sale of uranium to India, a non‐NPT signatory, suggests an important role for elite agency in norm redefinition.     

From Ambivalence to Influence: Australia and the Negotiation of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

In early 1967 it appeared that the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva would successfully negotiate a multilateral treaty to curb global proliferation of nuclear weapons. This triggered an urgent review by the Australian Government of its policies on the civil and military applications of nuclear technology. The need to build a coherent response to a US expectation that its Pacific ally would sign the prospective Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty imposed discipline upon a hitherto ad hoc approach to nuclear policy development. Those in the new Gorton Government and the nuclear science bureaucracy who advocated the embrace of nuclear technology—in both its civil and military applications—fought, and ultimately lost, a battle against proponents of the NPT. The resolution of the struggle for supremacy within elements of the policy community impelled the Government to demand and receive concessions from the USA. Originally silent on how the NPT might be interpreted and operationalised in order to maximise support, the US now shared its views with the members of the Western Alliance. US willingness to compromise with Australia in this way exceeded what its Pacific ally had cause to expect and illustrates that middle powers can wield influence on a global scale when circumstances permit.     

《核不扩散条约》的困境及应对

作为现有国际核不扩散机制的基石,《核不扩散条约》近年来面临多重危机。危机源于缔约各方相互矛盾的利益关切和目标、对条约进行利己主义式的解读和利用、条约自身的局限性和脆弱性、以及许多国家的政府和民众对核武器的认识和道德评价仍未形成共识。应对上述危机需要各缔约国弥合分歧、重建共识,在利益相互妥协的基础上维护条约的权威和效力。     

Rebuilding the Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Regime in the Post-US–India Deal World

The US–India deal on civil nuclear cooperation, in spite of the Indian non-proliferation commitment, has potential adverse impacts on global non-proliferation undermining the basic bargain behind the NPT. In order to overcome such adverse impacts the author proposes to move towards a “universal nuclear disarmament” under which every nuclear weapon holder will be asked to make contributions towards nuclear disarmament. The US, for example, will be asked to ratify CTBT, negotiate a successor to the START I Treaty and engage in strategic dialogues with Russia and China.

The author proposes to apply a proportionate reduction of nuclear warheads weighted according to the size of each arsenal. This way, while the US and Russia will be asked to drastically reduce their arsenals, the other holders will also be asked to start reducing their warheads even in a symbolic manner of by just a few bombs each.     

US–India Nuclear Cooperation Accord: Implications for the Non-proliferation Regime

Members of the IAEA Board and of the Nuclear Suppliers Group may need to decide this year whether to go along with the US proposal to allow nuclear cooperation with India despite its non-NPT status. Permitting nuclear sales to India would have important geo-strategic benefits by strengthening its partnership with the US. Yet granting India an exception to nuclear supply guidelines would also have significant non-proliferation disadvantages by weakening the NPT. Whether it would assist India's nuclear weapons development is unclear. If India were to agree voluntarily to cap its production of fissile material, this would rectify the greatest lost opportunity of the US-India nuclear agreement. The non-proliferation benefits that the Bush Administration has claimed for the accord, such as that it brings India into consensus on the Iran nuclear issue, are neither guaranteed nor long-lasting. Perhaps the best that can be said is that the transparency the accord will bring to some aspects of the Indian nuclear program could contribute to arms control measures in the future.     

North Korea’s nuclear issue

Given the unpredictability of North Korea’s leadership, and its capability to develop nuclear weapons, the North Korean nuclear issue has become one of the most important concerns in the region in the last few years, particularly for the United States, Japan, and, of course, South Korea. Up until January 30, 1992, when North Korea finally concluded the fullscope safeguards agreement, the focus of concern was the very fact that North Korea repeatedly had refused to conclude the obligatory agreement for more than six years since December 12, 1985, when it signed the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).     

“In the National Interest”: Australia's Approach to Nuclear Proliferation in a Changing International Environment

In the context of the ongoing international debate concerning the efficacy or otherwise of the NPT and IAEA in preventing or managing nuclear proliferation, Australia's undertaking to enter a nuclear cooperation agreement with the People's Republic of China (PRC), once identified as a “strategic competitor” of Australia's major alliance partner the United States (US), suggests that Australia's approach to proliferation issues is being re-evaluated. This paper argues, utilising an analysis of the relationship between the evolving US approach to nuclear issues and Australian policy, that the Howard government's evolving approach to nuclear issues can be characterised as an attempt to balance the competing imperatives of maintaining Australia's reputation as a nuclear non-proliferation standard bearer, regional strategic and economic considerations and the weight of the Australia-US alliance.     

The Limits of International Society: Understanding China’s Response to Nuclear Breakout and Third Party Non-Compliance

Abstract

Despite warnings of unchecked nuclear proliferation and the potential for state-sponsored WMD terrorism, official statements and consistent diplomatic activities show that China remains resolutely committed to a patient and peaceful strategy for dealing with third-party non-compliance and nuclear breakout. Although it has adopted more stringent national controls and has signed up to an ever-increasing array of international non-proliferation agreements, China prevents the decisive application of the enforcement mechanisms available to the UN Security Council, and is highly critical of non-proliferation initiatives that attempt to bypass these mechanisms. To put it another way, China is resolutely opposed to nuclear non-proliferation with teeth, preferring to keep the regime muzzled. This article examines the rationale behind China’s approach to this issue, drawing on the English School’s interlinking concepts of international system, international society, and global society to help explain China’s advocacy of peaceful non-proliferation and the resulting tensions in its relationship with the United States and other parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).     

THE AMERICAN RESPONSE TO PAKISTANI AND IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: A STUDY IN PARADOX

This article explores the paradox in the reaction of the United States to the two different proliferation cases: Pakistan's proliferation and Iran's weaponization effort. The article tries to find answer to the following key question; why the United States, as one of the guardians of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) which would prefer to see a region that is entirely free of weapons of mass destruction, ultimately has accepted Pakistan's proliferation, while imposed considerable amount of pressure to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

The paper posits that number of factors explain such differences; first, and at the theoretical level, Pakistan was never considered an “irrational” and “messianic” state like Iran, but regarded as a country with a certain degree of cold-war type nuclear rationality. Second and at the applied level, while Pakistan was a US ally with not having a history of challenging the United States, Iran has been considered enemy and a threat toward the US interest.

Third, while Pakistan's nuclear arsenal was viewed as a defensive mean against overwhelming strength of India, Iran's possible nuclear arsenal considered to be for offensive uses against the United States and Israel. The fourth factor pertains to the consequences of proliferation, which is what happens when Iran's neighboring countries may feel threatened by Iranian nuclear weapon and proceed to develop their own arsenal. Fifth factor deals with the possible Iran's temptation to give some nuclear material to a terror group in which made the United States serious in preventing Iran's weaponization. Last but not least, Israel was not involved to pressure and agitate against Pakistan, while it was applied a tremendous pressure against Iran to prevent it from achieving nuclear weapons.     

The nuclear option in India's security policy

Notwithstanding its good international citizenship on arms control, its low defense expenditures, and its democratic institutions that are largely taken for granted by the West, India's ambiguous nuclear posture is a self‐inflicted wound that will not heal so long as it neither acquires nor renounces nuclear weapons, says Ramesh Thakur. He argues that India has four options: to become an overt NWS, to reject the NPT but sign the CTBT, to renounce the nuclear option, or to maintain its present threshold status while keeping open the nuclear option. Thakur was head of the Peace Research Centre at the Australian National University and has been appointed as vice rector at the United Nations University, Tokyo.     

Nuclear energy fifty years after Hiroshima

Environmental restrictions are posing restraints on hydrocarbon fuel use. Barring widescale acceptance of limits to growth, or mass conversion to the ecology movement, it would seem that nuclear power is the only alternative energy supply today to achieve a measure of industrial capability. But whether the role of nuclear power can be disassociated from weapons in the next century's energy/environment complex remains to be seen. These issues are analyzed by IIPS Distinguished Research Fellow and Kyorin University Professor Ryukichi Imai, who has served as Japan's Ambassador to Kuwait, Mexico, and the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. He is the author of numerous books and articles on nuclear issues. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the July 1995 Pugwash Hiroshima Conference.     

Do Nuclear Weapons Stabilize South Asian Militarized Crises? Evidence from the 1990 Case

Abstract

Scholars have claimed that nuclear weapons help to stabilize South Asia by preventing Indo-Pakistani militarized crises from escalating to the level of all-out conventional war. This article argues that while nuclear weapons have had cautionary effects on Indian and Pakistani decision makers, proliferation also has played a role in fomenting some of the very crises that scholars credit nuclear weapons with defusing. Moreover, nuclear deterrence was not always essential to preventing these crises from escalating to the level of outright war. The article illustrates its argument with evidence from the Indo-Pakistani militarized crisis of 1990.

Leading scholars and analysts have argued that nuclear weapons help to prevent South Asian militarized crises from escalating to the level of all-out conventional war. ¹ 1. See, e.g., Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 109–110; Devin Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 133–170; Kenneth N. Waltz, “For Better,” in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: Norton, 2003), pp. 109–124; K. Subrahmanyam, “India and the International Nuclear Order,” in D. R. SarDesai and G. C. Raju Thomas, eds., Nuclear India in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2002), pp. 63–84, at pp. 82–83; Raja Menon, A Nuclear Strategy for India (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000), pp. 197–198. A considerable literature exists regarding nuclear weapons’ general effects on the South Asian security environment. Scholars optimistic that nuclear weapons will help to pacify South Asia include Waltz, “For Better”; Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation; John J. Mearsheimer, “Here We Go Again,” New York Times, May 17, 1998; Subrahmanyam, “India and the International Nuclear Order”; Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan India, 2002). Scholars pessimistic as to nuclear weapons’ likely effects on the regional security environment include Scott D. Sagan, “For the Worse: Till Death Do Us Part,” in Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons; P. R. Chari, “Nuclear Restraint, Nuclear Risk Reduction, and the Security–Insecurity Paradox in South Asia,” in Michael Krepon and Chris Gagné, eds., The Stability–Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinksmanship in South Asia (Washington, DC: The Stimson Center, 2001), pp. 15–36; Kanti Bajpai, “The Fallacy of an Indian Deterrent,” in Amitabh Mattoo, ed., India’s Nuclear Deterrent: Pokhran II and Beyond (New Delhi: HarAnand, 1999); Samina Ahmed, “Security Dilemmas of Nuclear-Armed Pakistan,” Third World Quarterly Vol. 21, No. 5 (October 2000), pp. 781–793; S. R. Valluri, “Lest We Forget: The Futility and Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons for India,” in Raju G.C. Thomas and Amit Gupta, eds., India’s Nuclear Security (United States: Lynne Rienner, 2000), pp. 263–273. This claim has important implications for the regional security environment and beyond. Given the volatile nature of Indo-Pakistani relations, reducing the likelihood of crisis escalation would make the subcontinent significantly safer. The claim also suggests that nuclear weapons could lower the probability of war in crisis-prone conflict dyads elsewhere in the world.

This article takes a less sanguine view of nuclear weapons’ impact on South Asian militarized crises. It argues that while nuclear weapons have at times had important cautionary effects on Indian and Pakistani decision makers, proliferation has played a role in fomenting a number of the very crises that scholars credit nuclear weapons with defusing. Moreover, it is not clear that nuclear deterrence was essential to preventing some of these crises from escalating to the level of outright war. I illustrate my argument with evidence from the period when India and Pakistan were acquiring nascent nuclear weapons capabilities. I show that during the late 1980s, Pakistan’s emerging nuclear capacity emboldened Pakistani decision makers to provide extensive support to the emerging insurgency against Indian rule in Jammu and Kashmir. In early 1990, India responded with large-scale force deployments along the Line of Control and International Border, in an attempt to stem militant infiltration into Indian territory, and potentially to intimidate Pakistan into abandoning its Kashmir policy. Pakistan countered with large deployments of its own, and the result was a major Indo-Pakistani militarized standoff. Although scholars have credited Pakistani nuclear weapons with deterring India from attacking Pakistan during this crisis, the preponderance of available evidence suggests that Indian leaders never seriously considered striking Pakistan, and therefore were not in fact deterred from launching a war in 1990. Thus nuclear weapons played an important role in fomenting a major Indo-Pakistani crisis during this period, but probably were not instrumental in preventing the crisis from escalating to the level of outright war.

Below, I briefly describe the emergence of the Kashmir insurgency. I then explain how Pakistan’s nuclear capacity encouraged it to support the uprising. Next, I show how conflict between Pakistan-supported guerillas and Indian security forces in Kashmir drove a spiral of tension between the two countries, which led to a stand-off between Indian and Pakistani armed forces in early 1990. Finally, I discuss the end of the 1990 crisis, and address the role that nuclear weapons played in its peaceful deescalation.     

The Doha Development Agenda: Reflections on the Road Ahead

From 9 to 14 November 2001, Qatar hosted the Fourth Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and a new trade round, the successor to the Uruguay round, was successfully launched in Doha. This was by no means a foregone conclusion and was a major feat. The outcome of the Doha Ministerial Conference was in doubt until the very end. Failure at Doha to resolve the issues left over from the inconclusive Seattle Ministerial Conference of 1999 would have seriously weakened the WTO and threatened the future of the multilateral trading system. In this article, WTO Director-General Mike Moore, describes the steps taken in a more transparent and inclusive preparatory process for the Doha meeting and the key achievements of the new round--the Doha Development Agenda. He concludes that as a ''member-driven'' organization, all WTO members share joint responsibility for a successful and inclusive multilateral trading system and describes the current preparations being made for the conclusion of the new round by the three-year time-frame, as agreed by ministers.     

Phasing out nuclear energy in Germany

The German Red‐Green government decided to phase out all nuclear power stations and stop the reprocessing of German nuclear fuel in Britain and France. The coalition agreement between the Greens and SPD set out a well‐defined timetable for the implementation of this policy, involving new legislation within the first 100 days and the negotiation of a consensus with the electricity utilities to be achieved within 12 months. While these deadlines passed without political results, an agreement between the government and the nuclear utilities was reached in mid‐June 2000. This analysis of the genesis and development of the policy of phasing out nuclear power focuses in particular on the difficulties of the Green Environment Minister, Jürgen Trittin, to put the anti‐nuclear policies of his party into practice. It is argued that the Greens faced a ‘no win’ situation in their attempt to design a constitutionally and politically viable phasing out policy. The party remains caught in the middle between the radical anti‐nuclear movement that continues its protest against all nuclear operations and an intransigent electricity industry fighting for its commercial self‐interest to keep nuclear stations running as long as possible. A range of theoretical approaches that could help the understanding of these processes is discussed, with an ‘advocacy coalition’ approach appearing to be the most promising option.     

民进党时期的台湾政治生态--以"核四"事件为分析个案

本文旨在以"核四"事件为分析个案,对当前台湾政治生态进行研讨.本文认为在台湾的"民主政治"表象之下仍保留着大量不良的政治文化,不过相对于过去而言,台湾目前在政治制度发展方面的若干实践仍是值得肯定的.     

The NPT,the CTBT and Pakistan: Explaining the Non-adherence Posture of a De Facto Nuclear State

Abstract

Pakistan represents a case of non-compliance to the two most important treaties on non-proliferation—The Non-Proliferation Treaty and The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This article surveys the changing contour of Pakistan's policy approach towards the NPT and the CTBT, and explains the underlying motivations and implications of the Pakistani postures. It analyses why Pakistan, despite supporting the final drafts, ultimately refused to sign the NPT in 1968 and the CTBT in 1996, and why it subsequently resisted strong international pressure maintained a non-adherence posture and towards these two documents. Finally, this article draws some general lessons from the Pakistani case.     

Can the earth sustain ten billion people? Problems of food,energy, and environment in the twenty‐first century

Ryukichi Imai, distinguished research fellow at IIPS and formerly Japan's ambassador to Kuwait, Mexico, and the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, considers the impact that increasing population will have on humanity's food and energy needs and on the environment. Imai discusses whether technology, especially nuclear, can solve the problem of sustaining ten billion people. This paper was presented in September 1996 at the Oxford Energy Seminar, Oxford University.     

The many phases of nuclear energy

Nuclear energy, stresses the author, whether used for peaceful or other purposes, is associated with a wide range of complicated and unresolved issues. Efforts to find solutions — indeed, even to take the next steps toward that end — will be successful only when these diverse but closely interrelated issues are clarified and understood. Ryukichi Imai, formerly Ambassador of Japan to Kuwait, to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, and to Mexico; Counselor to the Atomic Energy Commission of Japan; Professor of Social Sciences at Kyorin University; and author of many books and articles on nuclear issues, is a Distinguished Research Fellow at IIPS. He first presented this paper at the Oxford Energy Seminar cosponsored by OPEC and OAPEC at St. Catherine's College in September 1994. Some additions and deletions have been made since then.     

2000年以来的欧盟条约改革进程——欧洲联盟宪政化进程中的曲折起伏

2000年至2008年期间,欧洲联盟付出了巨大努力以正式推进宪政化进程。基于欧洲一体化进程长期以来形成的传统,成员国在谈判《尼斯条约》的政府间会议的最后阶段首次提出了制宪这一议题,从而开启了所谓的莱肯进程:就欧洲的未来展开正式而公开的辩论、设立制宪大会,以及谈判起草一部《欧洲宪法条约》。然而,《欧洲宪法条约》遭遇否决使得整个改革计划受到质疑。经过一段时间的反思和重新谈判,各国政府就一部新条约达成了一致。该条约在很大程度上保留了原宪法条约的实质内容,但不再使用一些象征性用语。这次条约修改的成果《里斯本条约》自2009年12月1日生效。本文详尽列举了2000至2008年期间条约改革进程中的曲折起伏,提出应将欧盟的宪政化视为一个长期而渐进的过程。即使今后一段时间内不会重提通过一部欧盟宪法的正式计划,这一过程仍将继续。     

Tokyo conference on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament 4–5 November 1999

The Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS) of Japan, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation of Germany, and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA) of Harvard University, USA, held a joint meeting on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament in Tokyo on 4–5 March 1999 and agreed on a Joint Proposal. This Proposal was then distributed to leading research institutes around the world and their viewpoints were solicited. Twenty representatives from 15 countries gathered for a conference to discuss the Proposal on 4–5 November 1999. The following report is a summary of the discussion that took place at the November conference. The Joint Proposal was published in Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 6, No. 1, May 1999.