The G8 Summit and Japan

In the following article, Akira Kojima, managing director and editorial page editor of the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, evaluates the 2000 Kyushu-Okinawa Summit. In contrast to those critics who contend that the summit has deteriorated into an irrelevant and redundant international gathering, Kojima argues that the summit is even more important than it has ever been. In this evaluation of the 2000 G8 Summit, he outlines the role of the summit and, in particular, explains the significance of the summit for Japan, both for politicians and for the general public. He also discusses the rationale for the choice of Okinawa as the venue for the last G8 Summit of the twentieth century.     

IMPASSE AT MCAS FUTENMA

In 1960, a Japanese prime minister was forced to resign after he committed Japan to an unpopular security relationship with the United States. In 2010, exactly fifty years later, the security relationship with the United States, centered on the stationing of a vast U.S. base complex in Japan, has unseated a prime minister who came to office just last year with an over 70 percent approval rating. In the small southern prefecture of Okinawa, where 75 percent of the U.S. military in Japan is stationed, the continued presence of the unpopular Futenma air base has become a lodestone for Okinawan frustration. High-level talks to remove Futenma from the crowded city of Ginowan have been ongoing since 1996, yet nothing has been accomplished. On 25 April 2010, an estimated 90,000 people rallied in Okinawa and demanded the base be removed from the prefecture completely, and not simply relocated to a location near the city of Nago. This essay attempts to explain Washington's central role in creating the problem and argues that Futenma is an unnecessary burden on the people of Okinawa and on cash-strapped Japanese and American taxpayers.     

Playing Base Politics in a Global Strategic Theater: Futenma Relocation,the G-8 Summit,and Okinawa

In late 1995, a culmination of events on Japan's southernmost island of Okinawa, home to over 70 percent of U.S. military facilities in Japan, both threatened the future of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and posed a direct challenge to the contradictory legacies of Japan's postwar system of constitutional democracy. Almost five years later, in July 2000, in anticipation of the gathering of heads of state at the Okinawa 2000 G-8 Summit, Bill Clinton became the first U.S. president to visit the island in over forty years. Speaking at the Cornerstone of Peace, a monument built in memory of the only ground war fought on Japanese soil between Japanese and U.S. forces in World War II, Clinton reaffirmed the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance – and Okinawa's role within it – to peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. Yet in Okinawa the nature and constitution of peace itself has never been a political given. This article traces the politics surrounding the U.S. military presence over this period, delving into the deeper historical, political, and social issues at stake for both this small island prefecture and for parts of the world beyond.     

Okinawa and the Nago heliport problem in the US-Japan relationship

The impact of the decision about when and if the United States Marine Corp Air Station will be relocated in Okinawa reverberates beyond the prefectural shores. It has the potential to upset the G-8 Summit, scheduled to be held in Nago City in July 2000, as well as to affect the strategic relationship between the US and Japan. In this article, Robert Eldridge, Post-doctoral Fellow at the Suntory Foundation, Osaka, reviews the history of this complicated problem. He argues that the US and Japan must continue to make progress addressing Okinawan requests and concerns. Ameliorating Okinawa” s burden, while at the same time more actively seeking public understanding and suppor t of the US-Japan security relationship and Japan's role in that relationship, as well as increasing Japan's ability to cooperate in times of emergency, is in the interest of both countries.     

The transformation of hi no maru in postwar Okinawa: from symbol of hope to object of contempt

Starting in the early 1950s, the Japanese flag hi no maru was a cherished symbol in Okinawa of the movement for an end to the postwar U.S. military occupation and reversion to Japanese sovereignty. The flag represented an appeal for liberation from U.S. military rule that dragged on for twenty years (1945–1972) after mainland Japan regained its sovereignty in 1952; and, for elimination, or at least reduction, of the overwhelming size and number of American bases on the island. However, the 1969 Okinawa Reversion Agreement between the U.S. and Japanese governments broke both of the Japanese government’s promises that, after reversion, Okinawa would have no nuclear weapons, and that U.S. bases would be reduced to mainland levels. The grossly disproportionate U.S. military remains to this day, and a “secret agreement” permits the United States to bring back nuclear weapons. Today many in Okinawa associate hi no maru with this discriminatory policy which imposes 74 percent of the total U.S. military presence in Japan on this small island prefecture comprising 0.2 percent of the nation’s land area. For historians, the flag also represents atrocities committed by Imperial Japanese soldiers during the Pacific War and the Japanese government’s continuing reluctance to acknowledge them.     

The Sacrifice Of A Schoolgirl: The 1995 Rape Case,Discourses of Power,and Women's Lives in Okinawa

In September 1995 relations between the United States, Japan, and Okinawa were transformed when three U.S. servicemen brutally gang-raped a twelve-year-old schoolgirl. Okinawan feminists called public attention to the rape, but it wasn't long before the media and political leaders shifted their focus to concerns about Okinawa's colonial history and its postwar occupation by the United States. A crisis of sovereignty replaced the crisis for women and a particular girl, which gradually faded from view, as did the agenda of feminist activists. Through an examination of Okinawa's contentious identity politics, the author traces the political trajectories of Okinawa's component groups and asks why this particular crime, in a long list of crimes against Okinawans by U.S. personnel since 1945, resonates so strongly both in Okinawa and in mainland Japan. The author argues that the rape has been enlisted for its powerful symbolic capacity: Okinawa as sacrificed schoolgirl/daughter. As such it is emblematic of past, prior narratives of Okinawan victimhood, most notably the Himeyuri students in the Battle of Okinawa. Feminists' cooperation in a patriarchal language that posits Okinawa as daughter within a national Japanese family is problematic but necessary as a strategy in the fight for women's human rights.     

Waging Peace on Okinawa

“Waging Peace on Okinawa” examines peace discourses as enacted in tours of battle sites and war (peace) memorials on the main island of Okinawa. Pointing out linkages with and divergences from mainland Japanese peace practices, the essay focuses on “peace guides” that have emerged as the backbone of educational tours that cater to Okinawan and, especially, mainland Japanese schoolchildren. Staffed by volunteers in conjunction with private and public organizations, peace guide tours and their supporting materials endeavor to promote peace by conveying a historical knowledge of the Battle of Okinawa that is more richly contextualized – “complete” – than that which is typically found in official textbooks, commercial tours, and patriotic pilgrimages. “Complete” in this context implies open discussion – even highlighting – of the violence and discrimination Okinawan civilians suffered at the hands of Japanese during the battle, but it also signals discriminatory treatment toward Okinawans before and beyond the battle (the most concrete example of the latter being the maintenance of U.S. military bases under the U.S.-Japan security arrangement). Peace guides and their supporters thus find themselves in a battle over historical representation that arguably has more to do with immediate political and economic issues than with setting the historical record straight.     

The Okinawa “Effect” in US–Japan Alliance Politics

Abstract

Discontent over US military bases in Japan’s Okinawa prefecture has long been a prominent “thorn in the side” of US–Japan relations. But what exactly has been the effect of Okinawa’s base politics on the management of the alliance? We examine Okinawa’s significance on the US–Japan alliance—the “Okinawa effect”—in terms of the alliance’s strategic coherence. Through an examination of the post–Cold War history of the base issue, we argue that, while there little to suggest that the Okinawa issue has undermined the alliance’s strategic effectiveness, alliance efficiency in dealing with burden sharing problems has been diminished, at times substantially. While reduced efficiency may often be inevitable in alliances between democracies, this persistent inability to resolve burden sharing disputes in the Okinawan case means that there is still potential for deteriorating efficiency to eventually undermine the alliance’s solidarity and effectiveness.     

U.S. COURT RULES IN THE “OKINAWA DUGONG” CASE

In January 2008, a U.S. federal court in San Francisco ruled that the U.S. Defense Department's plans to construct a new U.S. offshore Marine airbase in Okinawa violated the National Historic Preservation Act by not protecting a Japanese “national monument,” the endangered Okinawa dugong. This article discusses the background and trajectory of the lawsuit and the implications of this judgment. The outcome of this lawsuit is expected to improve processes of evaluating and managing environmental and other social impacts of U.S. military forces on hosting communities in Okinawa/Japan. The case also demonstrates the potential of transnational civil society actors to overcome a deficient democratic system within one state. The expanded theater of the anti‐base Okinawans' protest brought them new allies while avoiding difficult and unnecessary conflict on the ground at home.     

Leadership Lessons: Minority Governments,Independents and Relationships

The 2010 Australian election returned the first “hung” House of Representatives since the Second World War. This paper tracks the political lessons of history to the only other time when a prime minister had to work in a hung parliament. Circumstances and political parties differ, but on closer examination some common themes emerge. The prime ministership is both a gift and a burden, where control is, for the most part illusory. R.G. Menzies lacked the personal qualities his parliamentary colleagues found in Arthur Fadden. In 1941 he lost the prime ministership because he lost the support of his party room. Just as she had defeated Kevin Rudd in 2010, Julia Gillard was eventually defeated in a caucus ballot in June 2013. However, at least initially, Gillard displayed personal traits which Rudd lacked and which enabled her to retain the trust of both the ALP caucus and key independent members. History contains some valid lessons which, given recent events, need restating: relationships in politics matter.     

马丁·布朗芬布伦纳与战后日本经济的重建（1949年-1952年）

美国经济学家马丁·布朗芬布伦纳对日本经济颇有研究,并深入参与了战后日本经济的重建工作。他极力支持＂道奇路线＂的紧缩政策,为解决冲绳货币问题提出了政策建议,在夏普税制使节团和联合国亚洲远东经济委员会中发挥了重要作用。本文参考其论文与自传,并结合其学习和工作经历,力图概括指出马丁.布朗芬布伦纳对战后日本经济发展的思考及其所作出的贡献。     

Japan’s Diplomacy towards Member Countries of Pacific Islands Forum: Significance of Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM)

As an island country in the Pacific region, it is natural for Japan to have diplomatic relationships with neighboring island countries. By the early 1970s, Japan started to provide Official Development Assistance (ODA) to two individual island countries in the Pacific region, and, in the mid-1980s, when most of the island countries had achieved independence, Japan’s diplomacy expanded to additional countries. In 1985 then Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone made an official visit to two of the island countries, and, in 1987, official policy expressing support for the Pacific island countries’ independence, regional cooperation, political stability, economic development, and people-to-people exchange was issued. In October 1997, the “Japan-SPF Summit Meeting” with participants of leaders from Japan and 14 South Pacific Forum member island countries/regions and government representatives of Australia and New Zealand was held in Tokyo. The 8^th Pacific Islands Leaders meeting held in May 2018 is symbolic of Japan’s diplomacy toward the Pacific Islands Forum member countries. This article is the author’s personal observation of Japan’s diplomacy toward Pacific Islands Forum member countries and the significance of Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting.     

“These Few Small Boats”: Representations of Asylum Seekers During Australia’s 1977 and 2001 Elections

ABSTRACT

This paper compares the asylum-seeker discourses of prime minister Malcolm Fraser and his minister for immigration and ethnic affairs, Michael MacKellar, during Australia’s 1977 federal election campaign, with those of prime minister John Howard and his minister for immigration and multicultural affairs, Philip Ruddock, during the much-analysed 2001 election campaign. It argues that in 1977 Fraser was not an outspoken advocate for asylum seekers as he was later in life, but that his silence—when considered in conjunction with MacKellar’s emphatic and humanising statements—functioned to depoliticise boat arrivals and calm public concerns. Further, it demonstrates that the arguments prosecuted by the Howard government in 2001 were not new; similar arguments had been made in 1977 but were decisively rebutted by MacKellar at the time. This analysis ultimately suggests that while government discourses have the power to amplify the latent fears and hostilities that can lead to moral panics, they also have the capacity to defuse them.     

The U.S. military and sexual violence against women

Abstract

The Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars (BCAS) created the “Notes from the Field” section in 1992 in an attempt to bring BCAS closer to its activist origins and goals by publishing brief reports on events and issues of particular concern in the world today. Not intended to duplicate BCAS's usual in-depth and well-documented analysis and research, these reports are meant to be a less formal equivalent of “field notes” describing what is happening or being debated or studied out there in the world of action. Although analysis is usually a valuable part of these presentations, the “Notes” are more akin to urgent notices or offerings for discussion. The name “Notes from the Field” is not meant to imply the colonialist concept of people reporting back from the so-called Third World, and even though the name can be seen to loosely apply to the field of Asian studies, it does not refer to reporting on the more strictly academic aspects of fields of study within academia. The hope is that the information and opinions presented in these “Notes from the Field” will inspire readers to concern themselves with issues that matter, either through further study and analysis or by speaking out or taking action more directly.

It has been reported that on 4 September 1995 two U.S. Marines and one U.S. Navy man stationed at Camp Hansen Marine Base in Kin, Okinawa, raped a twelve-year-old Okinawan girl. This situation caught the Okinawan, Japanese, and international media's attention, brought out an Okinawan demonstration of 90,000 people in the latest of “U.S. Bases Out Of Okinawa” demonstrations that go back at least to 1972 with the reversion of Okinawa to Japan, made apologies by U.S. president Clinton mandatory, and resulted in the turning over of the three servicemen to the justice of Japanese courts, itself an act reflecting the need of the U.S. military and civilian authorities to try to defuse the situation.     

New Conventions Required: Ideas to Re-invigorate Japanese Party Politics

Over the past 20 years, Japanese politics has changed significantly. There have been many improvements over the old LDP politics. At the same time, however, the rules of the game, which were predicated on the dominance of a single political party and on factional politics, have inevitably changed, and, in accordance with this situation, the conventions that prescribed the party-political order have fallen by the wayside. Given this situation, new conventions are now required that will make Japanese politics function. This article will discuss the most pressing topics: they are the appointment of the prime minister, the political cycle, bicameralism and party politics, intra-party governance, and the relationship between ministers and bureaucrats. These rules will not derive from new laws or institutions, but will be based on new conventions agreed to by the political parties. Political parties are to be the key actors in creating the new conventions, which should provide the rules of the game for Japanese politics.     

The New Cabinet Crisis Management Center and the Leadership of the Prime Minister

In May 2001, a cabinet crisis management center was set up below the prime minister's new official residence. It is from here that Japan's national crises are now to be managed. In an era of constant flux, questions over the circumstances surrounding Japan's strategic security are being raised. Clearly, the structure of crisis management and legislation are crucial for a nation'ssecurity. In this article, Lt. Gen. Toshiyuki Shikata of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (retired) and professor of Law at Teikyo University, examines 30 international and domestic crises that Japan had to deal with in which the leadership of the prime minister determined the outcome. He describes the history of Japanese crisis management, pointing out the current problems and argues that in a post-Cold War era, Japan needs to confront the discrepancies in the structure of its security if it wishes to become a credible member of the international community.     

Japan's Global Health Strategy: Connecting Development and Security

Japan has made its presence felt in the realm of power politics by focusing on the promotion of “human security” and sustainable development. At the core of both concepts lies the issue of health. As Japan prepares for the upcoming G7 Summit, Keizo Takemi examines the question of what sort of leadership role Japan should play in the critical field of health.     

The Afterlives of Post-War Japanese Prime Ministers

Despite growing interest over the last 20 years in the position and power of the Japanese prime minister, what he does after resigning from this position has been overlooked in the extant literatures in both English and Japanese. This is unfortunate because, to paraphrase former US President Bill Clinton, as an ex-leader “you lose your power but not your influence.” This article represents the first attempt to explore what post-war Japanese prime ministers have done after stepping down and what influence they have continued to exert. It does so by providing an empirical overview of the afterlives of Japan’s 33 post-war ex-prime ministers before then discussing the benefits and shortcomings of applying the comparative, conceptual literature on the role of former leaders in Western democracies to the specific case of Japan. After providing the necessary justification, it then focuses on three detailed and illuminating case studies of Nakasone Yasuhiro, Murayama Tomiichi and Fukuda Yasuo. It argues that Japanese prime ministers continue to exert influence in several informal ways.     

Militarizing Japan’s Southwest Islands: Subnational Involvement and Insecurities in the Maritime Frontier Zone

Abstract

This paper sheds light on a relatively underexplored aspect of Japan’s recent security changes by examining the subnational level where the impact has been far-reaching. It focuses on Japan’s maritime frontier zone: the Yaeyama Islands located at the southwestern end of the Japanese archipelago and administered as part of Okinawa Prefecture. It argues that while Yaeyama militarization has been primarily a national response to China’s portrayed assertiveness in the East China Sea, it has also been facilitated by the strategic actions of local political elites, in cooperation with sympathetic extra-local forces. Political elites from two islands, Yonaguni and Ishigaki, have been motivated primarily by diverging material and ideational factors. Yonaguni elites have viewed militarization largely through the prism of “compensation politics.” Their counterparts in Ishigaki have been driven by more ideological objectives, seeking militarization for deterrence purposes and otherwise transforming the island into a rightist breeding ground in defence of Japanese territory. Yaeyama militarization has not only diminished enthusiasm for seeking autonomy and enhancing economic security through microregional cooperation, but has also enhanced local-level insecurities while creating and exacerbating divisions.     

The Baden-Württemberg State Election of 2011: A Political Landslide

After 58 years in the position of dominant political party, the Christian Democrats suffered from an electoral defeat in the Baden-Württemberg state election of 27 March 2011 and, as a result of the election, the first Green prime minister was elected and headed a state government formed by the Green and the Social Democrat parties. The main reasons for this political landslide were the unique constellation of political issues and the voters' attitudes towards the candidates for the office of prime minister. Instead of economic issues traditionally ‘owned’ by the Christian Democrats, the nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima and the bitter conflict over the reconstruction of the Stuttgart railway station brought ‘new politics’ issues to the top of the agenda. Moreover, never before in the history of German state elections was a prime minister running for re-election as unpopular as the leading candidate of Christian Democrats. Finally, many voters were convinced that it was just time for a change.