Decentralization in Kerala: Panchayat government discretion and accountability

Kerala is regarded as one of the most decentralized states in India. Through a ‘big bang’ approach, Kerala implemented a significant fiscal decentralization program and then built the capacity of its local governments. We employ a diagnostic framework to analyze its local government discretion and accountability in political, administrative and fiscal domains. We find that Kerala's local governments have a very high degree of discretionary power accompanied by a high degree of accountability towards citizens. But the areas of administrative accountability and financial management need to be strengthened. Also there may have been excessive focus and investment on social accountability mechanisms at the cost of local government discretion and formal public sector accountability mechanisms. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does international monetary aid help or hinder Somalia's social economic revival?

Somalia government has been accused of lacking transparency and proper accounting systems. This study investigates international monetary aid in Somalia's social and economic revival. A purposely chosen sample of Somalis living in Kenya (N = 204) was used. Approximately 59.4% disagreed that the lives of a great number of Somali people have improved, while 65.2% acknowledged that there was lack of integrity and expertise in the management of foreign aids. Finally, the study suggests that the key to success of monetary aid in Somalia largely depends on; developing good financial infrastructure based on modern information technology and telecommunication, the establishment of strong financial institutions with good financial and aid policies, and enhanced transparency and rigorous accountability of Somalia government officials. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Before There Was Enron,There Was Orange County: A Study of Local Government Financial‐Oversight Committees

Recent financial scandals in some of America's largest corporations have prompted popular speculation that a similar crisis may occur within the public sector and, therefore, that government and nonprofit organizations should be required to adopt financial oversight practices similar to those that are mandated of publicly‐traded corporations in the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002. One of those mandated practices—the use of financial‐oversight committees—is already a common practice in public organizations, though little is known about its effectiveness. This study uses a national sample of local governments to examine whether financial‐oversight committees improve financial control and strengthen stakeholder confidence in financial reporting. The findings provide preliminary support for the use of financial‐oversight committees as an effective tool to improve financial accountability in local government.     

Organization and Reporting of Public Financial Accounts: Insights and Policy Implications from the Singapore Budget

This paper analyses the Singapore government budget's organization and reporting structure, and draws lessons and policy implications for improving public financial management practices. The paper finds that Singapore's fiscal marksmanship record has been poor with consistent underestimates of revenue and overestimates of expenditure. Second, subtle divergences from international reporting standards limit the information available and constrain the budget's analytical usefulness in international comparisons. Third, current reporting conventions of the budget fail to provide an adequate representation of the government's fiscal position. Fourth, revised estimates of budgetary balances in line with international reporting standards show a considerable increase in the fiscal space available. The policy implications of these findings are discussed, as well as some reporting changes which can help improve the fiscal marksmanship record, increase public sector transparency and accountability, and facilitate better quality discourse among all stakeholders on public financial management.     

False advertising and experience goods: the case of political services in the U.S. senate

This study uses the voter-shopping construct to analyze signaling of moderateness in the U.S. Senate. We compare legislator-provided signals (advertising)—such as membership in the U.S. Senate’s Centrist Coalition—with actual voting histories in order to characterize these types of advertising cues as sincere or insincere. Following recent research indicating that moderate legislators receive greater financial support, we test whether or not Political Action Committees (PACs) are willing to support financially those who send false signals of moderateness. Our results show that the mean level of real PAC contributions garnered by non-moderate Democrats who send false signals exceeds that of the non-moderate Democrats who do not do so by $182,078. This figure is about 74% of mean level of real PAC contributions for those non-moderate Democrats who do not send false signals.     

Does government funding alter nonprofit governance? Evidence from New York City nonprofit contractors

Government contracting has raised a collection of issues with respect to adequate oversight and accountability. This paper explores one avenue through which contracting agencies may achieve these tasks: through the governance practices of the contractor's board. Oversight and monitoring are a board's key responsibilities, and influencing a board's practices is one way a governmental agency can help to insure quality performance. Agencies could thus use both their selection process and their post‐contracting power to influence board practice. Using a new, rich data set on the nonprofit contractors of New York City, a series of hypotheses were tested on the relationship between government funding and board practices. Significant differences were found to exist in board practices as a function of government funding levels, differences that mark a shift of energy away from some activities (i.e., traditional board functions, such as fund‐raising) towards others (financial monitoring and advocacy). This suggests that government agencies may indeed use their contracting choices with an eye to particular governance practices. This increased emphasis on such activities appears to crowd out other activities, and is not unambiguously to the benefit of nonprofit board governance. © 2002 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Public Financial Management Reform in South African Provincial Basic Education Departments

Since the transition to democracy in 1994, the South African government has engaged in a sustained programme of public financial management (PFM) reform across the national, provincial and local spheres of government. This study evaluates the progress of the nine provincial education departments (PEDs) in implementing the Public Finance Management Act of 1999 and explores the factors that facilitated or impeded reform. A PFM progress (PFMP) index is constructed to track each PED's performance from 1997/1998 to 2013/2014 and then used to benchmark its progress over time and relative to the education sector as a whole. The indicators comprising the PFMP index assess key PFM functions (budgeting, accounting, financial auditing and audits of performance information), financial leadership and the effectiveness of governance institutions such as audit committees. While there has been considerable progress in PFM, distinct differences in the quality and effectiveness of PFM practices across the nine PEDs remain. Stable top administrative leadership, availability of PFM skills, varying degrees of accountability and departmental capacity to establish PFM systems that conform to new accounting standards drive variances in reform outcomes. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Bargaining in the appointment process, constrained delegation and the political weight of the Senate

The President and the Senate bargain over the appointment of the Head of a key government department. The operating unit of the department has private information about its operating environment. We model the appointment process as a constrained delegation of policymaking to the operating unit (agency). When the Senate is sufficiently close to the agency the President has to give the agency more authority. On the other hand, given the Senate’s ideal point, when the information is more precise the President can tighten delegation bounds.     

The Government's Plans for Decentralisation and Localism: A Progress Report

This article assesses progress on the coalition government's ambitious agenda for decentralisation and localism against six actions set out in the government's own guide to decentralisation. It critically examines the government's case that the previous government's centralised approach failed. The six actions cover reducing bureaucracy, community empowerment, more local control of public funding, provider diversification, more public scrutiny and stronger local accountability. The paper concludes that accountability is the most challenging and that progress is hampered by tensions between the actions and between government departments. It argues that the government needs a clearer, shared vision for localism going forward.     

Promoting Accountability in Municipalities

Local government financial reporting reforms in Australia in the late 1980s and early 1990s were promoted on the basis of usefulness for decision making and for enhanced accountability purposes. Persistent criticisms of these reforms continue to be made, including those made by councillors and other ratepayers who often appear to find such information to be too narrow, too complex and often bewildering. A case is made for rethinking the present mentality, requirements and practices, especially with respect to the contrived recognition of ‘community assets’. Instead, an emphasis is placed on advancing broad‐scope accountability and meaningful financial reporting. To this end, the disclosure of a set of factual, reliable and interpretable indicators is proposed to enable a broader, more functional notion of accountability to be applied in Australian local government within prevailing social and organisational contexts. This contribution seeks to present a series of views, questions and proposals that are strictly concerned with ‘promoting accountability in municipalities’ (PAM).     

The Politics of Judicial Procedures: The Role of Public Oral Hearings in the German Constitutional Court

Modern liberal democracies typically depend on courts with the power of constitutional review to ensure that elected officials do not breach their constitutional obligations. The efficacy of this review, however, can depend on the public observing such breaches. One resource available to many of the world's constitutional courts to influence the public's ability to do so is public oral hearings. Drawing on the comparative judicial literature on separation of powers, public awareness, and noncompliance, I develop a formal model of public oral hearings. The model provides empirical implications for when a court will hold public oral hearings and how hearings correspond to a court's willingness to rule against elected officials. An empirical analysis of hearings at the German Constitutional Court supports the model's prediction that courts use hearings as a resource to address potential noncompliance.     

Explaining the Failure of Mexico’s National Commission of Human Rights (Ombudsman’s Office) after Democratization: Elections, Incentives, and Unaccountability in the Mexican Senate

Mexico??s ombudsman??s office (the Comision Nacional de Derechos Humanos (CNDH)), established in 1990 by a nondemocratic government, posed no threat to the then ruling party. Counter to expectations, even after Mexico democratized in 2000, the CNDH remained unwilling to challenge officials for human rights violations. I argue that this is because the ombudsman (the head of the CNDH) is chosen by Mexican Senators who are not accountable??due to secret voting and a prohibition on reelection??to the Mexican public. While civil society wanted a powerful ombudsman, the three main parties did not. Ignoring the public, Senators responded to their parties and appointed a compliant individual to serve as ombudsman, thereby ensuring that the CNDH would not challenge those who held political power. The paper suggests that where accountability institutions, such as human rights offices, are chosen by unaccountable actors (in this case the Mexican Senate), the development of such accountability institutions will be limited.     

The Accountability Priorities of Australian Parliamentarians

Managerialist reforms to the public service, as part of the drive for improved efficiency and effectiveness, sought to reorient the accountability priorities of parliamentarians away from a supposedly excessive concern with process and results and more towards results (outputs and outcomes). To what extent, if any, have the accountability priorities of parliamentarians changed over the last two decades? Content analysis of a sample of estimates committee hearings dealing with six departments over three selected years (1986, 1992 and 2003) reveals a marked increase in attention to outputs and a correspondingly decreased focus on inputs (with little change in concern for process), thus confirming a managerialist trend. At the same time, Senators' explicit references to departments' budget documentation and annual reports fell away noticeably with the introduction of the outcomes and outputs framework which is therefore failing their accountability needs.     

Local government in Kyrghyzstan

The Kyrghyzstan government is making the difficult transition from a command economy under Communist Party control to a market economy within a pluralist political framework. For the time being, however, the reality of firm executive, hierarchical control persists. An Akim heads the government structure at provincial (oblast) and district (raion) levels and exercises considerable power; though formally answerable for his budget and socio-economic programme to the local parliament (kenesh), his accountability is virtually nil. Some attention is given to equalizing revenue among the provinces: Bishkek, the capital city, which has oblast status, and Chui oblast provide substantial financial underpinning for the rest of the country. In April 1995 the government accepted the main provisions of the EIPA Report prepared under the European Union's TACIS project ED/052, the effect of which should be to enhance the government's ability to promote development. President Akayev sees local administration, local self-government and privatization as important levers of reform.     

Building capacity in indigenous governance: Comparing the Australian and American experiences

This paper compares key aspects of governance structures for Indigenous populations in the United States and Australia. The paper focuses on policy coordination and administration, in particular the nodes of decision-making in the two countries in relation to government contracting and accountability. The U.S. approach to funding Indigenous organizations stems from the 1975 Indian Self-Determination and Education Act and its subsequent expansions. Through the development of contracting into permanent compacting via block grants, this approach builds established nodes of Indigenous government and facilitates whole-of-government coherence at the level of the American Indian tribe. The U.S. approach seems correlated with better performance and may lighten bureaucratic loads over the long term. The Australian model, on the other hand, seeks to create whole-of-government coherence through top-down financial accountability in a way that hampers the development of Indigenous political capacity. The paper traces the development of these practices through time and illustrates how they contribute to the fragmentation rather than growth of Indigenous political capacities. It suggests ways the Australian model could be improved even in the absence of fundamental reform by drawing on the contracting-to-compacting framework of longstanding U.S. practices.     

The accountability effect of endorsements: A survey experiment

Do endorsements from incumbent politicians to co-partisans lead to more electoral accountability for the performance of the government? I use a randomized experiment embedded in a national survey conducted before the 2012 Mexican general election to examine the effect of endorsements by the outgoing president Felipe Calderón to the Senate candidates of his Partido Acción Nacional (PAN). Results show that among PAN identifiers, the incumbent vote is more tightly linked to the performance of the president when voters are exposed to the endorsement. I improve on the current standing of the accountability literature by showing that the relationship between an outgoing politician and the candidates of her party matters for electoral sanctioning. My findings imply that politicians’ strategic decisions have an effect on how voters assign responsibility: By nominating candidates without close ties to the endorser in cases of weak government performance, parties can use nominations strategically to diffuse responsibility.     

THE FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND CONTROL STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC SECTOR UTILITIES*

Abstract: Profit-based financial measures have been given prominence in the present financial accountability and control systems of public sector utilities in Australia. As a result, periodic evaluation of financial accountability and managerial performance suffers from a lack of objective-orientation. Assessing the financial accountability and controlling the activities of public utilities properly requires information consistent with their operational environment. Neither clear financial policies and targets, nor a set of environment-specific performance measures have been outlined by the government. The paper proposes that, in addition to profit measures, consideration should also be given to non-profit measures if an improvement is really desired in the monitoring of managerial performance and in accountability of those utilities which operate in virtual monopoly or near-monopoly situations.     

WHAT SHAPES CITIZENS' EVALUATIONS OF THEIR PUBLIC OFFICIALS' ACCOUNTABILITY? EVIDENCE FROM LOCAL ETHIOPIA

In this article, we study which institutional factors shape citizens' views of the local accountability of their public officials. Our departing assumption is that evaluations of local accountability reflect not only citizens' poltical attitudes and beliefs but also whether local institutions contribute to an environment of mutual trust, accountability and ultimately democratic legitimacy. Combining public opinion data from a large‐N citizen survey (N = 10 651) with contextual information for 63 local governments in Ethiopia, we look at access to information, participatory planning and the publicness of basic services as potential predictors of citizens' evaluations of local public officials. Our findings suggest that local context matters. Jurisdictions that provide access to information on political decision making are perceived to have more accountable officials. Moreover, when local governments provide public fora that facilitate citizens' stakes in local planning processes, it positively affects citizens' evaluations of the accountability of their officials. Our study adds to the empirical literatrure by showing that establishing local institutions that can foster citizen–government relations at the local level through inclusive processes is crucial for improving public perceptions of accountability. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

No Accounting for Tax Avoidance

In the 2010–15 Parliaments, the UK House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts held hearings and investigated some of the operations of the tax avoidance industry. Its reports have been highly critical of the role of big accountancy firms in designing, marketing and implementing tax avoidance schemes which have enabled their clients to avoid taxes. The Committee's recommendations set a reform agenda but drew a lukewarm response from the government. An examination of the Committee's reports provides an indication of the trajectories of future debates and policies.