Lobbying by Law Firms: A Study of Lobbying by National Law Firms in Canberra1

This article examines the way in which national law firms lobby the federal government from their Canberra offices. It is based on extensive interviews with lobbyists from those law firms, other commercial lobbyists in Canberra and legal professional bodies. The article begins by establishing the unique nature of law firm lobbying. In particular, it looks at the technical skills law firm lobbyists possess, their access to specialist legal knowledge and their preference for administrative, over political, lobbying. The development of law firm lobbying is then discussed. This centres around changes to the legal profession, federal business laws and federal government decision-making. The article concludes by suggesting that law firm lobbying both reflects and stimulates changes in government decision-making and will grow in importance as the legal profession in Canberra grows.     

Regulating lobbying activities in the European Union: A voluntary club perspective

This article offers a systematic exploration of why interest groups sign up to the European Union Transparency Register, a non‐binding lobby regulation system. We distinguish between instrumental and normative perspectives to explain voluntary compliance, and find that concern for one's reputation represents the most important motivational driver. Based on this, we suggest that the Transparency Register can be understood as a “voluntary club” sponsored by European institutions. This theoretical perspective captures the appeal of the instrument among lobbyists, but also a number of inconsistencies in its current design, which make it unviable in the long term. We outline implications for the ongoing reform of the Transparency Register, and more generally for the regulation of lobbying activities. The analysis draws on semi‐structured interviews with various types of lobbyists active in Brussels, and on data from public consultations organized by the European Commission.     

The decision to lobby bureaucrats

Despite a good deal of interest in lobbyists?? tactics, virtually no research has been published examining the conditions under which interest groups lobby the bureaucracy rather than or in addition to the legislature. Using two comprehensive datasets, I show that lobbying increases in both branches when conflict is higher and when the lobbyist has professional or political connections to that venue. In addition, certain conditions cause lobbyists to specialize in one branch or a particular branch only, depending on the issue area being lobbied, the interest group type being represented, the lobbyist??s resources, and other factors.     

Self‐interest in new wrapping: “Appeal to the public interest” as a topos in lobbying

This article explores public affairs and lobbying strategies that make public appeals beyond organizational self‐interest and instead focus on appeals to the public interest. While research has highlighted such appeals as a staple for lobbying campaigns, there is scant research exploring the communicative construction of this notion. Thus, this article uses the rhetorical concept of topos to explore how lobbyists attempt to fuse their private interests with a broader appeal to what is best for society. In particular, we discuss how different types of organizations have different rhetorical opportunities to ground their arguments. Finally, we discuss the democratic implications of appeals to the public interest as a standard lobbying strategy.     

The Declining Value of Revolving-Door Lobbyists: Evidence from the American States

‘‘Revolving-door” lobbyists are individuals who transition from governmental positions into lobbying for private entities. Such lobbyists thrive on the insider connections and political knowledge that they developed while in government. These assets afford former lawmakers more access to and influence over incumbent lawmakers. The value of their connections and knowledge, however, is contingent on former colleagues remaining within the legislature. As new legislators enter the assembly, the connections and knowledge of former members expire and lose value. Whereas increases in turnover or assembly size generate more former lawmakers who might lobby, such increases negatively affect former members’ value as lobbyists. Interest groups accordingly hire fewer former legislators to lobby. Other factors, such as longer cooling-off periods or increased legislative staff resources, produce slight or no substantive effects on rates of revolving. Legislative characteristics mostly determine rates of revolving for former lawmakers.     

Lobbying: fantasy,reality or both? A health care public policy case study

This paper provides a theoretical explanation for lobbying as interpersonal rhetorical communication based on the tenets of symbolic convergence theory (SCT). SCT is a general theory of communication in the symbolic interactionism paradigm. Nowhere in the extant communication literature, including the scholarly public relations research, is lobbying explicated in this way. This paper utilises a health care public policy case study to illustrate SCT in lobbying practice. The emphasis here is on how lobbyists use homo narrans, or human storytelling, in influential face‐to‐face information exchange with public policy decision makers to be persuasive on behalf of their clients. The ultimate aim of this paper is to build the current body of theoretical and practical knowledge about lobbying, to advance more positive perceptions of lobbyists and lobbying and to improve the practice of lobbying in producing effective public policy outcomes. Copyright © 2001 Henry Stewart Publications     

Social heterogeneity and wasteful lobbying

Using a general equilibrium model with endogenous policy, we explore how heterogeneity affects wasteful lobbying by sectoral interest groups. With the help of a simulation approach, we first investigate the impact of information heterogeneity on how lobbies react to a shift from a soft to a strict government budget constraint. Next, we examine how lobbying is influenced by heterogenous perception of the general equilibrium implications of lobbying effort. Finally, we explore the consequences of heterogenous specialization in households' asset portfolios. We conclude that social heterogeneity in information, perceptions, and portfolio compositions increases incentives to lobby.     

Lobbying and uncertainty: Lobbying's varying response to different political events

Does political uncertainty affect whether lobbyists contact government officials? We suggest that the answer depends on the type of uncertainty introduced. Distinguishing between policy objective uncertainty—where organized interests and lobbyists are uncertain about the policy intentions of decision makers—and issue information uncertainty—where policymakers are uncertain about the technical details of issues—we hypothesize that whereas an increase in policy objective uncertainty leads to a decrease in lobbying, a rise in issue information uncertainty leads to more lobbying. We test the hypotheses with longitudinal data from the Canadian Lobbyists Registry measuring change in the number of times lobbyists have contacted government ministries each month from 2008 to 2018. The results suggest that lobbying intensity does respond differently to these types of uncertainty. Whereas events introducing issue information uncertainty have a statistically significant positive relationship with lobbying, events introducing policy objective uncertainty do not.     

Lobbying and the 2006 U.S. midterm elections

• Lobbyists are inextricably intertwined with the electoral process in the United States, but rarely have they ever featured so prominently in an election year as in 2006. The midterm elections came at the end of a year in which the political news was often dominated by stories of lobbying scandal, most notably that involving Jack Abramoff. Lobbying was an important issue in many peoples' voting decisions, and moreover one of the immediate outcomes of the election was a raft of lobbying reform measures both in Congress and in the individual states. As one commentator put it: ‘For lobbyists, 2006 rolled by like a late‐night B movie where the earthquake wipes out the villagers who refused to heed the warning signs’ (Divis, 2006 ). This article reviews some of the most substantial lobbying scandals which emerged during 2006, considers how lobbying and lobbyists fared during the election campaigns, and analyses the various reforms which have recently been considered and implemented, before briefly examining how lobbyists will impact upon the 2008 election races.

Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Autonomy or Privilege? Lobbying Intensity of Local Business Associations in China

This article examines the relationship between the state and society in contemporary China by analyzing the lobbying behavior of business associations. Particularly, it asks whether and how autonomy and/or privileged access exert/s influence on their lobbying frequency. A formal model is developed that focuses on the trade-off between lobbying intensity and the private provision of collective goods. The hypotheses are tested against the original survey data from Zhejiang and Jiangsu Provinces. The research finds that self-established associations lobby less, and those with consultant status assigned by the government lobby the government more often. In contrast, the impact of “autonomy” in a narrow sense is weaker than is commonly claimed in the Chinese lobbying literature.     

‘They are not my people’: Barack Obama on lobbying and lobbyists

This article traces the development of Barack Obama's sometimes ambiguous and sometimes antithetical attitudes and relationship to lobbyists. During his childhood in Indonesia, his stepfther was a lobbyist for a US oil company. Obama engaged himself in what many would consider to be lobbying in his career as a ‘community activist’ in Chicago. As an Illinois state senator, he befriended lobbyists and enjoyed poker and basketball games with them, in addition to raising about two thirds of his campaign finance from big business, unions, and political action committees. In the US Senate, Obama involved in ethics reforms that curbed the influence of lobbyists. His presidential campaign rhetoric was hard‐hitting, often decrying the irresponsibility of lobbyists while he had a number of lobbyists in key positions in his campaign team. On his first full day in office, President Obama signed an executive order restricting lobbyists from working in his administration. He later banned registered lobbyists from having personal meeting with officials about economic stimulus projects. Both these pledges have, however, had unforeseen or unwelcome consequences. More recently, Obama decided to ban lobbyists from membership of federal advisory panels but continues to meet frequently with favored lobbyists and corporate executives behind closed doors. The article questions whether Obama's history in this area adds up to a coherent or principled track record or whether it simply relates a series of inconsistent and political decisions. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When do politicians listen to lobbyists (and who benefits when they do)?

This article provides an empirical test of an informational model of lobbying. The model predicts when lobbyists provide useful information to policy makers and when policy makers follow lobbyists' advice. The predictions are assessed against data on the policy positions and lobbying activities of firms and other organised groups in the context of 28 policy proposals advanced by United Kingdom governments between 2001 and 2007. The results suggest that the interactions between policy makers and lobbyists are driven mainly by the expected policy costs for policy makers, providing lobbyists with strong incentives to provide correct advice to policy makers. There is little support for the expectation that lobbyists can successfully persuade policy makers to take a course of action that is beneficial to the lobbyist at the expense of wider constituencies.     

The Conservative Member of Parliament as Lobbyist for Constituency Economic Interests

Interviews undertaken in the House of Commons with 70 backbench Conservative MPs in 1983–84 examined the extent to which they pursue their own localized industrial policy strategies as part of their efforts to maintain constituency electoral support. This involves lobbying efforts directed toward ministers in support of local industries, either in defence of jobs, in promotion of new jobs, or in a variety of quests for government benefits or relaxation of restrictions. It was found that 36 of the 70 Conservative MPs could be classified as 'constituency lobbyists', reflecting interview evidence that they consider lobbying on behalf of local industries to be a normal and important part of their representative role as MPs. The hypothesis that vulnerable constituencies—vulnerable in both political and economic terms—would be represented by constituency lobbyists was tested through the construction of an index of constituency 'security'. It was found that the more secure the constituency, the less likely is the MP to lobby on behalf of local industrial interests.     

Framing lobbying messages: defining and communicating political issues persuasively

• The concept of product positioning is well established in the commercial communication sphere, as are the notions of issue definition and agenda setting in the field of political science. Less thoroughly researched, though, is an area which intersects these two fields—the way in which lobbyists use language in order to frame policy issues so as to position their organization and its policy preferences to greatest effect. Lobbyists consciously frame and define issues in an effort to encourage policy makers both to share the lobbyist's perspective on a given policy problem, and to suggest to those policy makers what policy solution ought to be adopted. In doing so, they explicitly draw upon ideas and practices more commonly associated with other forms of commercial communication such as advertising and marketing. This paper suggests that the use of language by lobbyists is a potentially fruitful field for both academics and practitioners interested in political communication broadly defined—indeed, lobbying is essentially a form of persuasive communication in the political arena. It is well understood that how political issues are presented is an important factor in the extent to which an issue will be supported; this paper focuses on how lobbyists make use of this understanding in their efforts to achieve a desired policy outcome.

Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Regulating Australia's lobbyists: coming full circle to promote democracy?

• This paper initially examines the history and evolution of lobbying regulations in Australia at both the federal and state levels. This examination is conducted in a comparative context, setting the codes of conduct in place in various Australian jurisdictions against each other, as well as against the lobbying regulations in place in other countries around the world. Based upon this approach, the regulations in each Australian jurisdiction are classified according to their characteristics, providing insights into their commonalities and differences. Thereafter, we examine the attitudes of Australian politicians, administrators and lobbyists, at both the federal and state levels, towards the regulations they have to abide by.

Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Who Lobbies Whom? Special Interest Politics under Alternative Electoral Systems

Why do some interest groups lobby politicians and others lobby bureaucrats? We theorize lobbying venue choices and intensity as a function of contract enforceability with policy makers, politicians, or bureaucrats. We argue that organizational structures of interest groups, in particular, whether they are centralized or decentralized, substantially affect their lobbying strategies because they are associated with different ability to monitor and enforce contracts with policy makers and punish them when they fail. We further demonstrate that the effect of centralized versus decentralized structure on venue choices is conditional on the types of electoral system: majoritarian, semiproportional (single, nontransferable vote: SNTV), or proportional representation systems. We test this argument using longitudinal survey data on lobbying which span two decades and cover around 250 interest groups in various sectors and issue areas in Japan. The results lend strong support to our argument about contract enforceability under alternative electoral systems.     

Six strategy lessons from Clausewitz and Sun Tzu

A good strategy is crucial for a successful lobby or public affairs campaign. In this article, six strategy lessons from Clausewitz and Sun Tzu's classical works on military strategy are discussed, which could be useful for lobbyists and public affairs managers. Although waging war and lobbying are totally different things, there are also many similarities: both deal with aims to be achieved, opponents, threats and opportunities, (political) victories, and defeats. Therefore, military strategic thinking might provide the field of public affairs with some good and practical insights. First of all, Sun Tzu and Clausewitz stress the importance of meticulous exploration before the action starts. Subsequently, when laying strategy plans, one should beware of Pyrrhic victories and ‘the fallacies of hope’. Clausewitz, in particular, warns us to expect the unexpected and not to be surprised by the friction between even the best plans and their realization. A good way to handle this friction is to lay down the why and the what of coming actions but not how these actions should be carried out. Both thinkers also provide guidance in how to effectively deal with opponents; surprise an opponent to achieve the upper hand, and bring yourself in a position which will enable a decisive step forward; divide opponents whilst making yourself as strong as possible; and finally prevent a hard‐edged confrontation by offering an alternative. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How multinational civil society organisations and non‐governmental organisations lobby policy for human rights in Africa

In recent years, the number of international non‐governmental organisations (INGOs) and international civil society organisations (ICSOs) trying to influence policy processes in Africa has increased considerably. These players increasingly play an important role in socio‐political and life of many African countries. To achieve certain political results, INGOs and ICSOs often lobby governments, using a variety of techniques. Though lobbying as a public relations (PR) technique is widely discussed in academic spheres, the debate on the relationship between transnational advocacy and lobbying as a PR practice is still marginal. This paper explores how INGOs and ICSOs lobby governments in Africa and examines via a case the effectiveness of activist lobbying in the continent.     

Intergovernmental Lobbying for the Passage of TEA-21

This article explains the role of the IGR lobby in the passageof TEA-21 and the nature of the coalitions and partnershipsformed by groups within the IGR lobby to accomplish their policygoals. The data for the study are divided into three realms.The first identifies the priorities of groups within the IGRlobby and the types of coalitions that groups entered into.These data were gathered through examinations of IGR lobby testimonybefore congressional committees, interviews with organizationaland congressional staff members, and from secondary sourcessuch as the official publications and websites of IGR lobbyorganizations. The second part seeks to gain a more preciseunderstanding of how state and local officials use non-PIG coalitionsand groups to press for their policy objectives by surveyingselected state and local government officials. Finally, thesurvey assesses the impact that IGR lobbying had on TEA-21.