‘…I TAKE POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY!’: THE THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL RELATION BETWEEN MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MINISTERIAL RESIGNATIONS IN GERMANY

How is the doctrine of ministerial responsibility applied in the decisions of German ministers (not) to resign? This question arises from an empirical puzzle as well as from a theoretical contradiction. Despite the prominent principle of ministerial responsibility, empirically, the ‘personal consequences' of ministerial scandals in their area of responsibility, display a large variance. Some ministers resign because of rather trifling affairs, others stay in office in spite of serious scandals. Taking into consideration the delegation relationship between the executive and the parliament, in view of the principal‐agent theory, a minister's resignation due to major political or personal misconduct is to be expected. On the other hand, the actual constitutional configuration of ministerial responsibility casts theoretical doubts on the ministerial loss of office. The quantitative analysis of 133 resignation issues in the years 1949 to 2009 reveals that ministerial responsibility bears no relevance to the decision whether to resign or not. Indeed, when the cause of the resignation issue is directly connected to ministerial responsibility, the probability of a resignation even decreases.     

UK Ministerial Responsibility in 2002: The Tale of Two Resignations

The resignations in 2002 of Stephen Byers and Estelle Morris (UK Secretaries of State for Transport and Education respectively) suggest the need to review the constitutional and political aspects of resignation. In both cases, ministers recognized that they had failed in the oversight or supervision of their departments and thus in the fulfilment of their ministerial role. Their resignations therefore provide evidence of a move away from 'causal responsibility', with its complication of the policy/operations and accountability/responsibility distinctions, towards 'role responsibility'. In so doing, they raise the possibility that what are commonly understood as 'departmental fault' resignations may be more appropriately subsumed within an expanded category of personal fault. The resignations also challenge Finer's thesis on the conditions that need to be meet for a resignation to be forthcoming. In neither instance was the political party out for blood or the prime minister unbending. In both cases the press was relentless, suggesting that the media has become a prime actor in determining resignation, and the minister yielding, a recognition, perhaps, of constitutional principle over political pragmatism.     

PRIME MINISTERS AND THE COMMONS: PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOUR, 1868 TO 1987

Since 1868 nineteen Prime Ministers have answered parliamentary questions, made statements, given major speeches, and intervened in debates in the House of Commons. This article presents a comparative and quantitative analysis of PMS' behaviour patterns on these four dimensions. Key findings include: the importance of 1940 as the critical break between a traditional and a modem form of parliamentary activity, in which Prime Ministers make fewer contributions to Commons proceedings altogether, fewer speeches and far fewer interventions in debates than in the pre-1940 period, but more statements; the emergence of question time as the absolutely dominant form of prime ministerial activity in the Commons, especially from the mid-1970s onwards; and the distinctiveness of Thatcher's minimalist Commons activity, when set against other post-1940 PMs.     

Thaksin's model of government reform: Prime Ministerialisation through “a country is my company” approach

This article contends that when a big businessman becomes the leader of a country, he is likely to assume that his country is his company. “A country is my company” approach toward government reform results in prime ministerial predominance as all government power is centralised into the hands of a single authority. This phenomenon of prime ministerialisation is illustrated by the reforms introduced in Thailand by the Thaksin government since 2001. The nine assumptions underlying Prime Minister Thaksin's model of government reform and how they reinforce prime ministerialisation are discussed in the article.     

THE NEXT STEPS AGENCIES, POLITICAL SALIENCE AND THE ARM'S-LENGTH PRINCIPLE: BARBARA CASTLE AT THE MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT 1965-68

The Next Steps agencies preserve a long tradition as the latest manifestation of the arm's-length principle of ministerial control. During the major part of this century, the now almost defunct public corporations offered one of the best examples of the arm's-length principle at work, and the recorded experiences of participants can provide valuable lessons for the Next Steps agencies. This article employs the diaries of Barbara Castle during her period as Transport Minister from 1965-68 in order to examine how she apportioned her time. From the evidence, a model is constructed which suggests that political salience is of greater importance than official structures in determining ministerial behaviour. Arising from the case study and the model, the final section of the article attempts to identify Next Steps agencies which have an inherently high potential for political salience, and concludes that, in this category, direct ministerial control would be preferable to the arm's-length principle.     

Ministerial Resignations 1945–97

This article reports on data collected on ministerial resignations and non-resignations 1945–1997. It analyses the reasons why ministers resign and patterns that emerge in terms of the types of issues that are more likely to lead to resignation, and variances between different Prime Ministers, parties and over time. It provides the first fully quantified analysis of ministerial resignations in Britain in the post-war period to enhance the impressionistic analyses which have been offered before.     

THE IDEA BROKERS: THE IMPACT OF THINK TANKS ON BRITISH GOVERNMENT

Although there are few think tanks in Britain they have been credited with considerable influence on government policies since the late 1970s. This article charts their recent history, distinguishing between larger, 'establishment' bodies like the Policy Studies Institute and smaller, more politically partisan bodies such as the Centre for Policy Studies; generally the latter have enjoyed greater influence. It identifies the distinctive characteristics of these bodies–their ideological orientation, their concentration on élite opinion formers, their short to medium-term horizons, their emphasis on originality and publicity. Think tanks face tactical dilemmas when pressing their views on Britain's comparatively closed system of government, in particular their choice between insider and outsider forms of persuasion; the tension between proximity to ministers and intellectual autonomy; and their advantages to politicians as deniable sources that can float new ideas, which can be counter-balanced by politicians' fluctuating appetite for radical ideas. As a case study the article examines the relations enjoyed by the Institute of Economic Affairs and the Centre for Policy Studies with Mrs Thatcher's government, and particularly the evolution of a potent network of influence embracing ministers, special advisers and backbenchers. Finally it considers the dangers of an overemphasis on novelty at the expense of feasibility, and the danger of burnout in the smaller think tanks dangers mitigated by the continuous turnover that operates in the world of think tanks.     

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE OMBUDSMAN

In an article in Public Administration five years ago I reported on the operation of the new freedom of information laws in Australia, Canada and New Zealand (Hazell 1989). Despite these Commonwealth precedents, under Mrs Thatcher's premiership the British government maintained that freedom of information was incompatible with the Westminster system of ministerial accountability to Parliament. Under John Major that line has softened a bit, and last year the British government took an important step towards freedom of information, with the introduction of its new code of practice on open government. The code of practice will be policed by the Ombudsman; and this article considers the implications of this novel extension to his jurisdiction.     

Finding a party and losing some friends: Overcoming the weaknesses of the prime ministerial figure in Italy

Silvio Berlusconi poses a problem for the existing literature on prime ministers and their power. Though Italian prime ministers are traditionally seen as weak, Berlusconi has been able to achieve some remarkable policy gains during his current term as prime minister. This article uses veto player theory and combines it with existing institutional and political explanations for variation in prime ministerial power to look at this challenging case. By looking at the number of veto players in the Italian system, and their ability to credibly use their veto against Berlusconi, an explanation is posited which can accommodate the exceptionalism of his second term in office. Despite the emphasis on his control of the media, we conclude that Berlusconi's power stems from more traditional political factors. The authors argue that Berlusconi's coalition and party allies have no choice but to accept his will and his decisions, as any alternatives are less appealing.     

THE LOGISTICS OF MINISTERIAL RESHUFFLES

Ministerial reshuffles are complex exercises requiring careful handling. A frequent occurrence in British government, their significance is usually seen in political terms. Prime Ministers attach great importance to maximizing the political advantages to be gained from them. This factor is the chief determinant of their logistics, the principal characteristics of which are secrecy in advance and the speed with which ministerial changes are executed. These features - as much as the frequency of ministerial changes per se - may disrupt the policy process and have serious implications for minister-civil servant power relations. Such problems could be alleviated by giving ministers advance notice of changes of post. The institution of a process of ministerial handovers would strengthen the position of incoming ministers by making them less dependent on their officials, upon whom they rely heavily for initial briefing at present.     

Embattled executives: Prime ministerial weakness in East Central Europe

In a period in which “strong” and even “presidential” prime ministers have arguably become more the rule than the exception in the major states of Western Europe, most prime ministers in the new democracies of East Central Europe appear to have been relatively weak figures. This article investigates the reasons for that relative weakness in the ten East Central European countries, which together have had 87 prime ministers in the 16 years since the fall of Communism. It evaluates several possible explanations: party system weakness, the institutional structure, elite recruitment patterns, and policy constraints. It then seeks to explain several notable exceptions to the prime ministerial weakness rule.     

Suggested Capacities for Minister's Success: An Empirical Approach Based on Saaty's AHP

The roles of ministers are complicated, multiple, and demanding. They need to perform both as a leader of public organization and as a political actor in the Cabinet as appointed by the president or prime minister. This research empirically examines which capacities and types of ministers account for their success. It concludes that a policy capacity is the most desirable ministerial capacity. In addition, this study concludes that a political type minister is the most appropriate ministerial type for ministerial success. However, there is not one best ministerial model, or one required capacity for ministerial success. That is, this study intends to better understand the virtue and the responsibility of ministers.     

THE NATIONAL COORDINATION OF EU POLICY IN HUNGARY: PATTERNS OF CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

Although European Union (EU) membership generates similar functional pressures for national administrations, member states developed institutional arrangements that show marked cross‐country variation in the coordination of EU policy. This article examines and assesses the institutions and mechanisms established in Hungary for formulating policy positions on the domestic level. In line with the general features of central government, the system is highly centralized and hierarchical, and has been characterized by a comprehensive coordination ambition from its inception. The case confirms the primary importance of national institutional factors for shaping coordination systems, but also the relevance of more actor‐centered explanations for accounting for changes in the top decision‐making tier. At the same time, the Hungarian experience also draws attention to power relations within governing parties and prime ministerial involvement as important variables so far relatively neglected in the literature.     

THE SCOTT REPORT

The Scott report shows that the two most serious allegations made against ministers - that they conspired to sell lethal arms to Iraq in violation of government guidelines, and that they conspired to send innocent men to prison - are unfounded.
The inquiry violated the Salmon guidelines for the conduct of tribunals and is further evidence that an informal tribunal of this type is less well-equipped to examine a matter causing nation-wide public concern and to secure justice to individuals, than a statutory tribunal appointed under the Act of 1921.
Nevertheless, the Scott report raises three issues of fundamental constitutional importance - ministerial accountability to which the final section of the report is devoted, freedom of information which Sir Richard regards as a corollary of ministerial accountability, and the proper relationships between ministers and civil servants.
Sir Richard believes that constitutionally improper things occurred during the period which his inquiry covers. The fact that no minister or civil servant paid any penalty casts doubt as to whether ministerial accountability is a genuine convention of the constitution or a convenient fiction enabling both ministers and officials to evade responsibility.     

EUROPEAN COMMISSION OVERLOAD AND THE PATHOLOGY OF MANAGEMENT REFORM: GARBAGE CANS,RATIONALITY AND RISK AVERSION

Prior to the EU resignation crisis (the fall of the Santer Commission in 1999), it had long been argued that the European Commission was suffering from managerial ‘overload’. The incoming Prodi Commission embarked on a programme of administrative and managerial reform under the leadership of Commission Vice President, Neil Kinnock. Central to this programme were the objectives of improving managerial capacities and bolstering legitimacy in order that the Commission would be better able to discharge its expanded responsibilities. Using the model of governmental overload developed in the 1970s and 1980s, this article quantifies the impact of the reforms and argues that the overload problem has been aggravated rather than diminished. In this context, the rationale of the reform project is explored with reference to theories of public policy decision making.     

STRATEGIC LINKS IN A CUT‐THROAT WORLD: RETHINKING THE ROLE AND RELATIONSHIPS OF AUSTRALIAN MINISTERIAL STAFF

Ministerial staff relationships form part of the networks within the core executive. This article uses data from a comprehensive empirical study of Australian ministerial staff to explore advisers' horizontal relationships with each other. It finds that the interactions between Australian ministerial advisers are a key part of their role, are highly valued by ministers and public servants, and are an important element of the cabinet system. The informal links and networks between partisan advisers are underpinned by commonly understood norms of behaviour and a clear power structure. This partisan arena of the core executive has become important to ministers and the collective functioning of government.     

DEVOLVED RESPONSIBILITY AND CENTRALIZATION: EFFECTS OF EEC ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

The European Community is still a community of nation states in the sense that the obligations created by Community legislation fall on the member states who then have to implement them.
A point much commented upon is that this involves a loss of sovereignty or power for national parliaments and governments. What is less frequently noticed is that it can also centralize into a national government's hands some powers that had previously been devolved to local and other authorities. Since the Community deals largely with national governments, what had previously been local functions have to become national government functions the moment they fall within a Community policy.
This process can be seen at work as a result of the Community's environmental policy. In Britain a variety of administrative agencies have exercised considerable discretion in handling pollution matters. Some functions are handled by district councils, some by county councils, some by specialized regional authorities, eg water authorities, and some by specialized national agencies, eg the Industrial Air Pollution Inspectorate. As a result of the Community's environmental policy, the central government now has greater powers. If the erosion of the tradition of devolved responsibility is not to be resented, it must be justified on the grounds that some larger purpose is being served.     

CORE EXECUTIVE STUDIES TWO DECADES ON

The concept of the ‘core executive’ was introduced by Dunleavy and Rhodes in 1990. Two decades on, what is the state of core executive studies? This article argues that the language of the study of central government has been transformed. In addition, there is now a much broader consideration of the central government space, incorporating ministers, civil servants, and so on. Within core executive studies, the resource‐dependency approach has become dominant. Arguably, though, with its insistence on a structural element to power and its focus on prime ministerial predominance, much of this work collapses back into an interpretation that is close to the conclusions of the pre‐1990 debate. Currently, only the interpretive, ethnographic approach proposed by Rhodes and his co‐authors challenges the new orthodoxy. This article suggests that a resolutely positivist account of the core executive would provide a similar challenge and spark a lively and very welcome debate.     

Post-conflict justice in divided democracies: the 1984 anti-Sikh riots in India

Abstract

Official figures claim that almost 3000 people were killed, and many more injured or displaced, in four days of rioting aimed at the Sikh population of Delhi in late October and early November 1984 following the assassination of Indira Gandhi. This article analyses the efforts made to address the human rights violations that occurred. It argues that as a divided democracy, India has struggled to do justice to the victims, despite multiple commissions of inquiry, compensation schemes and a prime ministerial apology. It argues that this has occurred not simply because of challenges commonly faced by democracies dealing with similar incidents, but also because of the particular problems faced in a context in which we see continuity of rule by a political elite allegedly implicated in the abuse and in which there is acute concern for the survival of a fragile divided polity.