Decentralization and Development in Contemporary Uganda

Abstract

There has long been an emphasis on the importance of decentralization in providing better quality public services in the developing world. In order to assess the effectiveness of decentralization I examine here the case study of Uganda, which has seen major decentralization of power over the last quarter-century. In particular the current government has introduced a five-tiered local government structure, decentralized both fiscal and political power to local governments and introduced regular local government elections. However, initial excitement about Uganda's decentralization programme has tapered off in recent years due to a number of problems outlined here. In particular, I show that decentralization in Uganda has suffered from a lack of independence from central government control, which has led to a lack of effectiveness in the provision of high quality public goods.     

Autonomy and Performance: Decentralization Reforms in Zhejiang Province,China

Decentralization reforms rarely live up to the high hopes and expectations of the reformers for a variety of reasons rooted in actions and omissions of the governments pursuing it or in the context in which it is undertaken. The paper examines the experience of Zhejiang Province where decentralization was successful in achieving and indeed exceeding initial expectations. The remarkable feature of its reforms was ‘performance‐based’ decentralization wherein localities showing superior performance were awarded additional autonomy at a faster speed while the rest were given additional support to build their capacity for assuming more responsibility in the future. To understand the effects of this unique pattern of decentralization, the paper compares the performance of participating and non‐participating counties under five waves of reforms between 1992 and 2008, based on indicators such as gross domestic product, industrial output and local government revenue. It finds that performance‐based decentralization not only helped overcome the problem of capacity deficits but also fostered capacity in weaker counties to assume more autonomy in the future. The paper confirms that speed and sequence of transfer of autonomy and responsibilities to local governments are as important as the content of decentralization. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The political process of decentralization in Peru, 1985–1990

This paper, using Peru as a case study, argues that the most potent factor in the implementation of decentralization in developing countries is ‘political’ in nature and operation. The legislative process of decentralization under President Alan García's regime went through three major steps, controlled by his party, APRA (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana,): (1) The 1986 Bill of the Basic Law of Regionalization; (2) The 1987 Basic Law of Regionalization; and (3) The 1988 Modified Law of Regionalization. Why did Alan García push for decentralization, unlike his predecessors? The 1985 elections produced García, a populist demagogue, and a loose political party system dominated by APRA. However, the legislation of decentralization was possible paradoxically because García, who was desperately looking for a political issue to distract people's minds from his misgovernment, needed to control APRA for a regional power base after 1990. Thus, the whole decentralization process was highly politicized, and García's strategy was ‘successful’ in that regional governments came to be controlled by APRA after the 1989 and 1990 regional elections. The Peruvian case shows how far decentralization can be used for personalistic or partisan interests in a fragile democracy.     

Health systems decentralization and human resources management in low and middle income countries

The aim of this article is to explore the experiences of human resources management in the context of health sector decentralization. The initial review of health sector decentralization covers issues relating to the context, content, formulation/implementation and impact of decentralization. The review of the literature on human resources management (HRM) and decentralization has identified a number of key points that are organized around the following HRM functions: HR planning/ staff supply, personnel administration and employee relations, and performance management. The importance of the management of change is also highlighted. The article concludes by emphasizing the need to include human resources as a key issue in health systems change and emphasizes the areas of policy dialogue and research. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Decentralization,Fiscal Independence,and Poverty in the Philippines

Decentralization is a common public sector reform in developing countries. Its basic rationale is that local governments have an informational advantage regarding the needs and preferences of consumers. However, decentralization also has drawbacks. Foremost is the efficiency advantage of the central government in providing public services because of economies of scale and better access to resources. This study looked at the relationship between decentralization and poverty using data from Philippine cities and municipalities. Results suggest that decentralization, as represented by fiscal independence and measured by the share of locally sourced revenues to total local government revenues, is indeed associated with lower poverty. However, this effect is not linear—the marginal effect of decentralization on poverty diminishes as decentralization increases. Moreover, decentralization moderates the positive effect of good governance on poverty reduction and the magnitude of the relationship between poverty and decentralization is stronger in poorer municipalities than in richer ones.     

Interstate Spillovers,Fiscal Decentralization,and Public Spending on Medicaid Home‐ and Community‐Based Services

This article examines the interstate spillover effect of Medicaid expenditures for home‐ and community‐based services (HCBS) and tests the relationship between fiscal decentralization and public spending. Based on the theory of interstate strategic interaction, an empirical model is specified that explicitly accounts for interdependence in states’ spending decisions. The model is estimated by applying spatial econometric methods to panel data for the 50 U.S. states for 2000–2010. Findings show a positive interdependence in state HCBS expenditures that is contingent on similarity in citizen ideology between states. Fiscal decentralization, measured by transfer dependence and revenue autonomy, is positively related to Medicaid HCBS spending.     

Bureaucratic politics,innovation compatibility,and the dynamic diffusion of subnational decentralization reforms in China

Despite the widely recognized significance of policy attributes in explaining innovation diffusion, limited research has emphasized the underlying endogenous mechanisms dictating the construction of innovation attributes. This study points out that bureaucratic politics could dynamically shape an innovation's compatibility with the potential adopters and its diffusion likelihood. Based on the subnational decentralization reforms in China, we note that compared to administrative and fiscal decentralization, political decentralization is less likely to generate personal gains and more likely to negatively affect the career prospects of local officials in a layer-by-layer personnel management system. Therefore, the study speculates that political decentralization reforms have a lower level of compatibility, consequently reducing its diffusion likelihood among local governments. We confirmed our theoretical expectations by conducting an in-depth case study of the top-down diffusion of three types of “Province-Managing-County Reforms” among 102 counties in China's Henan Province (2004–2021).     

Parties in Elections, Parties in Government, and Partisan Bias

Adam Meirowitz Department of Politics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544 e-mail: ameirowi{at}princeton.edu Thomas Romer Department of Politics and Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544 e-mail: romer{at}princeton.edu Political parties are active when citizens choose among candidatesin elections and when winning candidates choose among policyalternatives in government. But the inextricably linked institutions,incentives, and behavior that determine these multistage choicesare substantively complex and analytically unwieldy, particularlyif modeled explicitly and considered in total, from citizenpreferences through government outcomes. To strike a balancebetween complexity and tractability, we modify standard spatialmodels of electoral competition and governmental policy-makingto study how components of partisanship—such as candidateplatform separation in elections, party ID-based voting, nationalpartisan tides, and party-disciplined behavior in the legislature—arerelated to policy outcomes. We define partisan bias as the distancebetween the following two points in a conventional choice space:the ideal point of the median voter in the median legislativedistrict and the policy outcome selected by the elected legislature.The study reveals that none of the party-in-electorate conditionsis capable of producing partisan bias independently. Specifiedcombinations of conditions, however, can significantly increasethe bias and/or the variance of policy outcomes, sometimes insubtle ways.     

Greg Grandin and Thomas Miller Klubock, eds. 'Truth Commissions: State Terror, History, and Memory,' a special issue of Radical History Review 97

What does Radical History Review have to say about truth commissions?The journal gives them mixed reviews in this special issue,Truth Commissions: State Terror, History, and Memory. Accordingto the authors of the three full-length articles which makeup the volume, truth commissions’ treatment of past violencemay sometimes hew too closely to depoliticized narratives ofindividual victims and perpetrators – foregoing deeperaccounts of structural violence. Or, their     

Between Deadlock and Decentralization: Bargaining Dynamics in Federal States

A classic way to meet regionally diverse interests is to grant partial autonomy to sub-national entities, either by assigning them the right to decide upon policies (federalism), to implement policies (decentralization), or both. This article argues and formally elaborates that central governments may intentionally choose to increase decentralization in an effort to facilitate agreements that otherwise would be deadlocked. In this regard, a central government's decision to promote decentralization depends on its own relative valuation of policy change and congruence. We illustrate the empirical validity of our argument with a case study pertaining to the Swiss New Regional Policy.     

Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth Versus Justice, Naomi Roht-Arriaza and Javier Mariezcurrena * Reconciliation in Divided Societies: Finding Common Ground, Erin Daly and Jeremy Sarkin

It took a long time to get there but, near the close of thelast millennium, humanity embraced measured accountability –instead of the extremes of impunity or vengeance – asthe appropriate fate for perpetrators of mass atrocity. Thisembrace has prompted the construction of institutions, suchas the International Criminal Court and the various ad hoc internationalor internationalized tribunals, to actualize this accountabilityimperative. But this institution-building is only the start of the justicematrix. It is not the end point. A newer second generation ofscholars and activists presses on. Agreeing on the need foraccountability does not mean that existing methods of accountabilityshould become insulated from study or critical inquiry withregard to their progress toward justice goals. Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century and Reconciliationin Divided Societies are bold trendsetters for this second-generationliterature. Edited by Naomi Roht-Arriaza and     

Comparative Decentralization Lessons from Pakistan, Indonesia, and the Philippines

This article provides an analytic framework to guide regimes that are designing or implementing decentralization programs. It is based on a comparison of three Asian cases of fast-track decentralization. The framework suggests that regimes contemplating devolution must face fundamental issues of (1) background support, (2) culture and institutions, and (3) technical design and sequencing. It can be used by regimes to compare the relative difficulty of fundamental challenges to decentralization with their own capacity and potential for effective response. The three regimes responded similarly to the first two issues and differed in how they performed technical activities to implement the decentralization programs. Within this technical sequence, the regimes varied widely in performance. In that the Philippine program has attained better performance so far, the different responses of that regime are significant. More research is required to explain differences in technical performance in the Philippines and other similar programs and to attribute measures of decentralization success to these differences.     

Fiscal Decentralization,Flat Administrative Structure,and Local Government Size: Evidence and Lessons from China

This paper examines the effects of fiscal decentralization and flat administrative structure on local budget size and program outlays. We test three related theoretical hypotheses in China's adoption of province‐over‐county scheme of financial administration. We provide evidence that both decentralization of expenditure and decentralization of revenue increase the size of local budgets; that the impact of the former far outweighs that of the latter with local budgets on a rising trajectory; and that discretion grants localities more means to increase their budget. These results show that as China's reform deepens the proportion of local outlay on administration declines because of more local discretion from eliminating the prefecture bypass between the province and counties. But neither decentralization nor increased local discretion has allocated more local resources for education, and both contribute to increasing outlay on economic development. The paper formulates tentative policy recommendations that carry potential application for other countries. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Indonesia: what do we mean by decentralization?

Decentralization has been a major theme in many countries in recent years. In Indonesia it has been part of the rhetoric of the Government for some time, but recent initiatives have suggested some more substance. This article reviews two main concepts: inter-governmental decentralization and management decentralization. It examines the Indonesian approach to decentralization in law and in practice, focusing on some recent initiatives in reforming the grant system and the declaration of a ‘pilot areas’ decentralization project. The aim of such initiatives appears to be to reap the efficiency gains of management decentralization without transferring power. However, the Indonesian system lacks some of the institutional requirements for effective management decentralization, notably the absence of performance measures and an effective framework of constraints, as reflected in the shortcomings of the systems of central controls over local government. The article concludes with an analysis of the reasons why the Indonesian Government appears to be so wary of western notions of decentralization. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. Vol. 17 , 351–367 (1997). No. of Figures: 0. No. of Tables: 2. No. of Refs: 49.     

Revisiting Adjusted ADA Scores for the U.S. Congress, 1947-2007

Philip Habel Department of Political Science, Southern Illinois University Carbondale, Mailcode 4501, Carbondale, IL 62901 This paper replicates and extends Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder,"Comparing Interest Group Scores Across Time and Chambers: AdjustedADA Scores for the U.S. Congress," which appeared in the AmericanPolitical Science Review (1999/93:33–50). We replicatethe most recent unpublished extension by Dr. Groseclose andresearch assistants for years 1947–1999, and then we extendthe analysis to include years 2000 through 2007. We make availableinflation-adjusted ADA scores from 1947 through 2007, allowingscholars to incorporate the most recent interest group scoresinto their analyses. Author's Note: Authors are listed alphabetically. The authorswish to thank Tim Groseclose for making available both the nominalADA scores from 1947 to 1999 and the Matlab program files usedin this analysis. SA gratefully acknowledges the support ofthe Hoover Institution during her time there as the 2006–07W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-Campbell National Fellowand the Robert Eckles Swain National Fellow. PH wishes to thankboth the Dirksen Congressional Center and the National ScienceFoundation, doctoral dissertation improvement division grant493469, for their generous support. He also wishes to acknowledgethe valuable research assistance of James Lewis, Joshua Mitchell,and Matt Bergbower. Special thanks to J. Tobin Grant, ScottMcClurg, and Wendy Tam Cho for their helpful feedback and assistance.All errors are the responsibility of the authors. Replicationmaterials and programs are available on the Political AnalysisWeb site.     

Taking Wrongs Seriously: Acknowledgment, Reconciliation, and the Politics of Sustainable Peace, Trudy Govier

Calls for truth commissions and similar public processes topromote social reconciliation after national conflicts oftenreflect admirable aspirations but muddy thinking. This subtleand careful analysis of the processes of political reconciliationafter periods of mass violence opens for analysis the spectrumof potential meanings associated with ‘reconciliation,’ranging from social unity and harmony to the cessation of physicalviolence. Informed by philosophic analysis, social psychological studiesand historical case studies, Taking Wrongs Seriously     

Municipalization as Central Government Strategy: Central-Regional-Local Politics in Peru, Brazil, and South Africa

This article analyzes how central governments can use municipaldecentralization to weaken intermediate levels of governmentusing evidence from Peru, Brazil, and South Africa in the 1990s.Two principal questions are addressed. First, why did centralgovernments opt for municipalization in these countries? Second,how did the municipalization processes proceed? In these cases,the strategic calculus behind municipalization is eminentlypolitical: central government incentives to counter the powerof the intermediate level of government trigger these processes.Specific strategies to enhance municipal power vary from countryto country and include revenue municipalization, expendituremunicipalization, and juridical changes to strengthen localities.These three quite different cases show that central governmentscan make strategic and tactical decisions in intergovernmentalrelations to favor one level of subnational government to thedetriment of another.     

Improving Data Quality: Actors, Incentives, and Capabilities

Devesh Kapur Centre for Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania, 3600 Market Street, Suite 560, Philadelphia, PA 19104 e-mail: dkapur{at}sas.upenn.edu e-mail: herrera{at}fas.harvard.edu (corresponding author) This paper examines the construction and use of data sets inpolitical science. We focus on three interrelated questions:How might we assess data quality? What factors shape data quality?and How can these factors be addressed to improve data quality?We first outline some problems with existing data set quality,including issues of validity, coverage, and accuracy, and wediscuss some ways of identifying problems as well as some consequencesof data quality problems. The core of the paper addresses thesecond question by analyzing the incentives and capabilitiesfacing four key actors in a data supply chain: respondents,data collection agencies (including state bureaucracies andprivate organizations), international organizations, and finally,academic scholars. We conclude by making some suggestions forimproving the use and construction of data sets. Authors' note: For generous comments at many stages in the paper,the authors would like to thank Dawn Brancati, Bear Braumoeller,Kanchan Chandra, Jorge Dominguez, Errol D'Souza, Richard Grossman,Ana Grzymala-Busse, Andrew Kydd, David Laitin, Daniel Posner,Jasjeet Sekhon, Hillel Soifer, Jessica Wallack, and Steven Wilkinsonand the Comparative Politics Research Workshop at Harvard University,and the anonymous reviewers from Political Analysis. The authorstake full responsibility for any errors. An earlier versionof this paper was presented at the American Political ScienceAssociation Annual Meetings, Boston, MA, August 2002.     

Federalism at the American Founding: In Defense of the Diamond Theses

Vincent Ostrom's analysis of The Federalist's understandingof federalism fails to consider the historical and theoreticalcontext of The Federalist's arguments. Ostrom takes certainrhetorical devices of The Federalist too much at face value.He correctly sees that the authors of The Federalist view eighteenth-centuryfederalism as bad government. He incorrectly concludes thatsince it is bad government, that understanding could not havebeen the true meaning of federalism. The Federalist understandseighteenth-century federalism to be "the true meaning" of federalismas established by the political discourse of the times. TheConstitution departs radically from eighteenth-century federalism,but The Federalist seeks to conceal how radical the departureis, in part, by offering a looser definition of federalism thatwill allow the Constitution to be characterized as a federalsystem. A consideration of the writings of the opponents tothe Constitution suggests the limited success of this attemptat redefinition.