Saving Globalization From the Republicans

Globalization may not be coming apart at the seams—yet—but the seams are ever more apparent. Rising fuel prices challenge a model of global transportation based on cheap energy, reinforcing the possibility of decoupling through great regionaliza‐tion of trade. Already, 50 percent of trade among ASEAN plus China and Japan is among each other. The Wall Street meltdown has spread a lack of confidence in the American financial system and the model of deregulation which stimulated rapid globalization of capital flows. Along with other developments, all this raises the question of whether the United States is prepared to operate successfully in a world it no longer dominates. An anti‐globalization leader, a former US labor secretary, a top American intellectual and a Nobel laureate address these issues.     

Is America Ready for a Post‐American World?

Globalization may not be coming apart at the seams—yet—but the seams are ever more apparent. Rising fuel prices challenge a model of global transportation based on cheap energy, reinforcing the possibility of decoupling through great regionaliza‐tion of trade. Already, 50 percent of trade among ASEAN plus China and Japan is among each other. The Wall Street meltdown has spread a lack of confidence in the American financial system and the model of deregulation which stimulated rapid globalization of capital flows. Along with other developments, all this raises the question of whether the United States is prepared to operate successfully in a world it no longer dominates. An anti‐globalization leader, a former US labor secretary, a top American intellectual and a Nobel laureate address these issues.     

Globalization Is Running Out of Fuel

Globalization may not be coming apart at the seams—yet—but the seams are ever more apparent. Rising fuel prices challenge a model of global transportation based on cheap energy, reinforcing the possibility of decoupling through great regionaliza‐tion of trade. Already, 50 percent of trade among ASEAN plus China and Japan is among each other. The Wall Street meltdown has spread a lack of confidence in the American financial system and the model of deregulation which stimulated rapid globalization of capital flows. Along with other developments, all this raises the question of whether the United States is prepared to operate successfully in a world it no longer dominates. An anti‐globalization leader, a former US labor secretary, a top American intellectual and a Nobel laureate address these issues.     

China and the Rest Are Only Joining the American‐Built Order

American‐led globalization has enabled the third great powershift of the last five hundred years—the “rise of the rest” following on the rise of the West and then the rise of the US as the dominant power in the West. When China, India, Brazil, Turkey and the rest sit at the table of global power with the West what will the world order look like? Will it be post‐American? Will it be culturally non‐Western, but play by the same rules of an open international order laid down by the American's after World War II? In the following pages, leading American and Asian intellectuals ponder these questions.     

Is Japan Closer to the West Than Turkey?

American‐led globalization has enabled the third great powershift of the last five hundred years—the “rise of the rest” following on the rise of the West and then the rise of the US as the dominant power in the West. When China, India, Brazil, Turkey and the rest sit at the table of global power with the West what will the world order look like? Will it be post‐American? Will it be culturally non‐Western, but play by the same rules of an open international order laid down by the American's after World War II? In the following pages, leading American and Asian intellectuals ponder these questions.     

Here Comes the Second World

American‐led globalization has enabled the third great powershift of the last five hundred years—the “rise of the rest” following on the rise of the West and then the rise of the US as the dominant power in the West. When China, India, Brazil, Turkey and the rest sit at the table of global power with the West what will the world order look like? Will it be post‐American? Will it be culturally non‐Western, but play by the same rules of an open international order laid down by the American's after World War II? In the following pages, leading American and Asian intellectuals ponder these questions.     

When Western Interests Trump Values

American‐led globalization has enabled the third great powershift of the last five hundred years—the “rise of the rest” following on the rise of the West and then the rise of the US as the dominant power in the West. When China, India, Brazil, Turkey and the rest sit at the table of global power with the West what will the world order look like? Will it be post‐American? Will it be culturally non‐Western, but play by the same rules of an open international order laid down by the American's after World War II? In the following pages, leading American and Asian intellectuals ponder these questions.     

The Coming Battle of the Atlantic: Euro vs. the Dollar

American‐led globalization has enabled the third great powershift of the last five hundred years—the “rise of the rest” following on the rise of the West and then the rise of the US as the dominant power in the West. When China, India, Brazil, Turkey and the rest sit at the table of global power with the West what will the world order look like? Will it be post‐American? Will it be culturally non‐Western, but play by the same rules of an open international order laid down by the American's after World War II? In the following pages, leading American and Asian intellectuals ponder these questions.     

Facing a Post‐American World

American‐led globalization has enabled the third great powershift of the last five hundred years—the “rise of the rest” following on the rise of the West and then the rise of the US as the dominant power in the West. When China, India, Brazil, Turkey and the rest sit at the table of global power with the West what will the world order look like? Will it be post‐American? Will it be culturally non‐Western, but play by the same rules of an open international order laid down by the American's after World War II? In the following pages, leading American and Asian intellectuals ponder these questions.     

Be Wary of Asian Triumphalism

American‐led globalization has enabled the third great powershift of the last five hundred years—the “rise of the rest” following on the rise of the West and then the rise of the US as the dominant power in the West. When China, India, Brazil, Turkey and the rest sit at the table of global power with the West what will the world order look like? Will it be post‐American? Will it be culturally non‐Western, but play by the same rules of an open international order laid down by the American's after World War II? In the following pages, leading American and Asian intellectuals ponder these questions.     

Terrorism and Beyond: a 21st Century Perspective

Abstract

This study examines trends in the incidence of international hostage‐barricade terrorism (HBT) since the late 1960s, the concurrent development of elite hostage rescue units (HRUs), and the relative effectiveness of American, Soviet, West European, Israeli, and other Third World responses—using dialogue or force—to HBT actions. Although HRUs have scored some dramatic rescues, three major hostage massacres in Third World countries in 1985–1986 and other bloody HBT incidents in 1988 demonstrated the high cost of using force prematurely and ineptly to resolve HBT crises. Focusing on these and other HRU failures, this study questions the American and Israeli “no‐ransom, no‐negotiation” policies in HBT situations and concludes that a more flexible approach of patiently “talking down” and “wearing down” the hostage‐takers through basic hostage‐negotiation techniques—even if only as a delaying tactic—is vital for maximizing the chances for rescuing hostages safely, whether through dialogue or force. Conversely, if authorities quickly resort to military action, hostages are far more likely to suffer casualties than to be rescued safely.     

Trade creation,trade diversion and effective protection in the central American common market

Aggregate analyses suggest that the formation of the Central American Common Market (CACM) has resulted in little or no trade diversion, but different conclusions apply when the import data are appropriately disaggregated. Increases in the effective rates of protection for consumer goods have led to increased demand for extra‐regional imports of intermediate inputs and decreased demand for extra‐regional imports of final goods. On balance, the CACM is a trade‐diverting customs union for non‐durable consumer goods: trade‐creating effects are present in Honduras and Costa Rica, but trade‐diverting effects dominate in Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua.     

For the Rest of Asia,America Might Be a Friend,but China Cannot Be an Enemy

In 1990, right after the Berlin Wall fell, NPQ published our Spring edition, titled “The New World Disorder,” about the nationalistic chaos and up‐in‐theair sensibility of that fraught new historical moment. Nearly a quarter of a century later, the regime of globalization that had supplanted the Cold War world of blocs is itself coming apart at the seams. Even Henry Kissinger these days says “the world order is crumbling.” Will this New World Disorder 2.0 revert to a system of conflicting blocs, as during the Cold War, or will we be mature enough to save the interdependence of plural identities that is the foundation of a new global civilization? In this section our contributors offer their perspectives on what the future holds.     

On Japan and China: Taking a Stand,Not Taking Sides

In 1990, right after the Berlin Wall fell, NPQ published our Spring edition, titled “The New World Disorder,” about the nationalistic chaos and up‐in‐theair sensibility of that fraught new historical moment. Nearly a quarter of a century later, the regime of globalization that had supplanted the Cold War world of blocs is itself coming apart at the seams. Even Henry Kissinger these days says “the world order is crumbling.” Will this New World Disorder 2.0 revert to a system of conflicting blocs, as during the Cold War, or will we be mature enough to save the interdependence of plural identities that is the foundation of a new global civilization? In this section our contributors offer their perspectives on what the future holds.     

Will Erdogan's Victory Mark the Rise of Illiberal Democracy?

In 1990, right after the Berlin Wall fell, NPQ published our Spring edition, titled “The New World Disorder,” about the nationalistic chaos and up‐in‐theair sensibility of that fraught new historical moment. Nearly a quarter of a century later, the regime of globalization that had supplanted the Cold War world of blocs is itself coming apart at the seams. Even Henry Kissinger these days says “the world order is crumbling.” Will this New World Disorder 2.0 revert to a system of conflicting blocs, as during the Cold War, or will we be mature enough to save the interdependence of plural identities that is the foundation of a new global civilization? In this section our contributors offer their perspectives on what the future holds.     

Imagining World War III—In 2034

In 1990, right after the Berlin Wall fell, NPQ published our Spring edition, titled “The New World Disorder,” about the nationalistic chaos and up‐in‐theair sensibility of that fraught new historical moment. Nearly a quarter of a century later, the regime of globalization that had supplanted the Cold War world of blocs is itself coming apart at the seams. Even Henry Kissinger these days says “the world order is crumbling.” Will this New World Disorder 2.0 revert to a system of conflicting blocs, as during the Cold War, or will we be mature enough to save the interdependence of plural identities that is the foundation of a new global civilization? In this section our contributors offer their perspectives on what the future holds.     

How The Mideast Conflict Nourishes Anti‐Semitism

In 1990, right after the Berlin Wall fell, NPQ published our Spring edition, titled “The New World Disorder,” about the nationalistic chaos and up‐in‐theair sensibility of that fraught new historical moment. Nearly a quarter of a century later, the regime of globalization that had supplanted the Cold War world of blocs is itself coming apart at the seams. Even Henry Kissinger these days says “the world order is crumbling.” Will this New World Disorder 2.0 revert to a system of conflicting blocs, as during the Cold War, or will we be mature enough to save the interdependence of plural identities that is the foundation of a new global civilization? In this section our contributors offer their perspectives on what the future holds.     

The Mechanism of State Charter School Policy Adoption: The Case of American States

This article concentrates on charter school policy that is regarded as the fastest growing innovative policy in America. Its adoption is more impressive than other innovative policies in the public educational area. By 2008, 40 states among 50 American states have passed charter school law since Minnesota became the first pathfinder to create charter school law about two decades ago. However, 10 states have not adopted charter school law. Based on this dichotomous policy phenomenon, the primary research question of the study focuses on clarifying what factors drive American states to adopt charter school policy. To obtain answers for this research question, the study dedicates to analyzing main hypotheses from the regional diffusion model and state characteristics, using event history analysis. The results demonstrate that the three predictor variables—regional diffusion, similar innovation, and gubernatorial political tendency—positively have significant effects in explaining the adoption of American state charter school policy.     

Is Viktor Orbán Right That Liberal Democracy Has Failed? Is Italy Exhibit #1?

In 1990, right after the Berlin Wall fell, NPQ published our Spring edition, titled “The New World Disorder,” about the nationalistic chaos and up‐in‐theair sensibility of that fraught new historical moment. Nearly a quarter of a century later, the regime of globalization that had supplanted the Cold War world of blocs is itself coming apart at the seams. Even Henry Kissinger these days says “the world order is crumbling.” Will this New World Disorder 2.0 revert to a system of conflicting blocs, as during the Cold War, or will we be mature enough to save the interdependence of plural identities that is the foundation of a new global civilization? In this section our contributors offer their perspectives on what the future holds.     

Putin,Erdogan and Orbán: Band of Brothers?

In 1990, right after the Berlin Wall fell, NPQ published our Spring edition, titled “The New World Disorder,” about the nationalistic chaos and up‐in‐theair sensibility of that fraught new historical moment. Nearly a quarter of a century later, the regime of globalization that had supplanted the Cold War world of blocs is itself coming apart at the seams. Even Henry Kissinger these days says “the world order is crumbling.” Will this New World Disorder 2.0 revert to a system of conflicting blocs, as during the Cold War, or will we be mature enough to save the interdependence of plural identities that is the foundation of a new global civilization? In this section our contributors offer their perspectives on what the future holds.