A Framework for Understanding State Balanced Budget Requirement Systems: Reexamining Distinctive Features and an Operational Definition

Studies of state fiscal and budgetary policies often use balanced budget requirements (BBRs) as explanatory variables. While current measures laid the crucial groundwork for a basic understanding of state BBRs, their lack of comprehensiveness threatens the validity of empirical work. Based on comprehensive legal research, this article offers a framework for analyzing state requirements: each state's BBRs form a coherent system for achieving budget balance through budget cycles; a fully developed BBR system offers a three‐line construct against imbalance; and the more complete, developed, and explicit a BBR system is, the more stringent it will be in achieving budgetary balance.     

Do budgetary institutions mitigate the common pool problem? New empirical evidence for the EU

We analyze how budgetary institutions affect government budget deficits in member states of the European Union during 1984–2003 employing new indicators provided by Hallerberg et al. (2009). Using panel fixed effects models, we examine whether the impact of budgetary institutions on budget deficits is conditioned by political fragmentation (i.e., ideological differences among parties in government) and size fragmentation (i.e., the effective number of parties in government or the number of spending ministers). Our results suggest that strong budgetary institutions, no matter whether they are based on delegation to a strong minister of finance or on fiscal contracts, reduce the deficit bias in case of strong ideological fragmentation. In contrast, the impact of budgetary institutions is not conditioned by size fragmentation.     

The Impact of Budget Stabilization Funds on State General Obligation Bond Ratings

This study examines the impact of budget stabilization funds (BSFs) on state general obligation (GO) bond credit ratings. While a number of past empirical papers have examined the effect of various fiscal institutions on state GO bond ratings; to date, BSFs have been largely ignored in the literature. Model estimates show that neither the choice to have a statutory BSF versus a constitutional BSF or the size of a BSF has any apparent impact on credit ratings. However, weak deposit rules are associated with lower credit ratings while weak withdrawal rules are associated with higher credit ratings.     

How Weak Recognition and Measurement in the Federal Budget Encouraged Costly Policy: The Case of "Supervisory Goodwill"

The budget process is the primary means by which federal policymakers allocate resources. The failure of the budget to recognize and measure the full cost of federal programs encourages the Congress and president to skew resource allocation toward policies whose budgetary costs are underestimated. These "low-cost" policies often increase costs to taxpayers without providing taxpayers with benefits. Recent examples of this phenomenon are found in the "supervisory goodwill" cases. This article reviews these cases, the budgetary weaknesses they identify, the influence these weaknesses had on legislators, and the unnecessary costs for taxpayers that result from the supervisory goodwill policy. Specifically, the federal budget did not recognize the cost that would result from encouraging financial institutions to assume the assets and liabilities of insolvent savings and loans. The budget's recognition of costs failed a second time by not recording expenditures when the government abrogated its contracts with acquirers. Both actions raised costs to taxpayers unnecessarily. In addition to analyzing budgetary weaknesses and their potential costs, this article also reviews two proposed budgetary reforms that could address the budgetary failures highlighted by the supervisory goodwill cases.     

Budget Procedures and the Size of the Budget: Evidence from Danish Local Government

This paper analyzes procedural influences on budgetary outcomes in Danish local government. By analyzing local governments the study can remedy two shortcomings of most procedural budget studies. The first is that most studies analyze national budget procedures, which means that only a limited and quite heterogeneous number of cases can be analyzed. The second and more fundamental shortcoming in most studies is the lack of a distinction between political institutions and budget institutions. Although this distinction is difficult to establish for empirical analysis at the national level, it is immediately clear when dealing with local governments. The paper tests a number of hypotheses on procedural influences. It finds that budget institutions have no certain effects on budget outcomes in the preparatory phase. However, in the implementation phase budget institutions seem to matter.     

Budget Stabilization Fund: Structural Features of the Enabling Legislation and Balance Levels

This article examines what leads to high balances of the budget stabilization fund (BSF) to make it a countercyclical fiscal tool. Checking state BSF laws, this article classifies BSF structural features into purposes, funding sources, balance caps, and use approval procedures. Using panel data (1979–1999) and controlling for related variables, this article tests the features' effects on BSF levels over the sample period and different phases of the economy to identify specific effects of the features in boom and lean years. The article also forwards policy recommendations for state governments to consider in designing or revising their BSF legislation.     

The Evolution of Budgetary Institutions in Estonia: A Path Full of Puzzles?

This article examines the evolution of budgetary institutions in Estonia between 1993 and 2008, with a main focus on rules governing the preparation, adoption, and implementation of the state budget. It discusses the initial choice of budgetary institutions in 1993 and subsequent developments in the light of theoretical propositions put forth by the fiscal governance literature. The case of Estonia poses a number of puzzles, and the article seeks to explain the institutional choices in Estonia: Why did the coalition government opt for a delegation mode of fiscal governance in 1993? Why has the preparation phase of the budget process evolved toward a contracts approach from 1994 onward, while the adoption phase has moved closer to a delegation mode? The article demonstrates that alongside government type, institutional choices can be influenced by lesson‐drawing from history, examples of other countries, and negative experiences gained in legislative budget process.     

The first decade of the Congressional Budget Act: Legislative imitation and adaptation in budgeting

The influence of institutions on budgetary behavior at the federal level is the subject of this article, which examines the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. While its impact on budgetary priorities and growth seems modest at best, the Act has had a substantial impact on the process of budgetary decisionmaking, the nature of budgetary debate, and the budgetary strategies employed within Congress. These new and generally dysfunctional forms of congessional budgetary behavior are consequences of a budgetary reform that attempted to transfer many of the resource allocation procedures of the Executive branch to a legislative context. The transfer of many Executive branch budgetary procedures has led to the appearance within Congress of budgetary behavior previously confined largely to the Executive branch. The article also discusses attempts to render the congressional budget process more compatible with the legislative environment, analyzing the modifications in the original budget process that have been effected and proposed in recent years.Earlier versions of this article were delivered at the Workshop on Budgetary Control in the Public Sector, Brussels, Belgium, October 13–14, 1983, the meetings of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, October, 1983, and the meetings of the American Political Science Association, September, 1983. Allen Schick, Robert X. Browning, Alex Hicks, Robert Strauss, John R. Hibbings, Evelyn Brodkin, and Rod Kiewiet provided helpful comments, and Pamela Reyner provided secretarial assistance. All remaining deficiencies are the responsibilities of the authors.     

Budget institutions and taxation

While a number of different studies have explored the effects of budgetary procedures and the centralization of the budget process on government debt, deficits and spending, few of them have explored whether such fiscal institutions matter for public revenue. This article argues that centralizing the budget process raises the levels of taxation by limiting the ability of individual government officials to veto tax increases in line with common-pool-problem arguments regarding public finances. Using detailed data on budgetary procedures from 15 EU countries, the empirical analysis shows that greater centralization of the budget process increases taxation as a share of GDP and that both the type of budget centralization and level of government fractionalization matter for the size of this effect. The results suggest that further centralizing the budget process limits government debt and deficits by increasing public revenues as well as constraining public spending.     

Political Cycles,Fiscal Deficits,and Output Spillovers in Europe

This paper investigates whether national elections in Europegenerate political cycles in other European countries, and, ifso, whether these spillover effects are likely to surviveinside EMU. The paper first tests whether elections in Germanyaffect macroeconomic outcomes in other European countries andthen investigates the impact of elections on budget deficits.The results indicate that German politics significantlyimpacts macroeconomic variables in other European countries,and also that politics significantly affects the behaviour ofEuropean budgetary policy. The prospect of elections tends toincrease public deficits in recessions, whereas left-winggovernments tend to be more deficit-prone than right-winggovernments regardless of the state of the economy. Moreover,the existence of political cycles spillovers among Europeancountries suggest that there may be a need for electoralcoordination.     

What Stabilizes State General Fund Expenditures in Downturn Years—Budget Stabilization Fund or General Fund Unreserved Undesignated Balance?

This article strictly defines the budget stabilization fund (BSF) as a counter-cyclical reserve, and with a panel data set examines the effects of BSF and general fund unreserved undesignated balances (UUB) on stabilizing state general fund expenditure during downturns. The article finds that BSFs bolster spending in lean years: each percentage point increase of BSF balance as a percent of general fund expenditure can minimize negative expenditure gap by a quarter percentage point. But the article does not find evidence that UUB is a counter-cyclical fiscal tool, indicating that wide adoption of BSF may have changed the nature and use of UUB.     

State Budgetary Processes and Reforms: The California Story

This paper analyzes state budgetary processes and reforms to inform California budgetary policy. We consider key institutional provisions, including budget periodicity, tax and expenditure limitations, balanced budget and reserve requirements, and supermajority vote requirements, and analyze the extent to which changes are likely to advance procedural norms. Our analysis suggests that empirically unproven assumptions and poorly articulated linkages between budgetary processes and outcomes have undermined the state's ability to understand the budgetary problem and identify effective reforms. We recommend a focus on procedural norms and related reforms that promote effective budgeting processes as a less partisan framework for reform.     

Political Budget Cycles: The Case of the Western German Länder

This paper focuses on the issue of the electoral andideological cycles in state government budget for the elevenWestern German Länder. We verify this hypothesis over theperiod 1974–1994 for the following budgetary variables: totalexpenditures, surplus/deficit, administration, health care,education, roads and social security benefits. While overallour results seem to show that generally the party variabledoes not play a systematic role in spending decisions, theyprovide some support to the opportunistic cycle theory showingthat the only relevant phenomenon is the effect of theupcoming election on the government spending inclinations.     

Deficits, Soft Budget Constraints and Bailouts: Budgeting after the Norwegian Hospital Reform

In the 1990s, the Norwegian hospital sector was characterized by soft budgetary constraints and increasing budget deficits. This was one of the main antecedents of the 2002 hospital reform, where the central state took over ownership of the hospitals from the counties. Arguably, the centralization of ownership, financing and production would harden the budget constraints and increase the budgetary discipline. This analysis shows that this has not been accomplished. Instead, the production has been far above what was planned, and the deficits higher than ever. Two stages of the post-reform budget processes are analyzed: first, the stage where the central state set the budgets and sends signals of budgetary rules (whether the state sends signals of soft or hard budget constraints), and second, how the central state handled deficits in the hospital sector as they emerged (whether the hospitals was bailed out or not). The conclusion is that the central state neither set a hard budget constraint nor managed to stay firm as deficits turned up. It is argued that three mechanisms explain the prevailing problems of managing the hospital sector: uncertainty of the hospitals' financial situation during the transition phase; minority governments; and specific features related to the organization of the budgetary process in parliament.     

Statebuilding and the Politics of Budgeting in Afghanistan

Anchored in a framework drawn from the public finances literature and executive–legislative studies, the purpose of this article is to assess the impacts of Afghan budgetary institutions on the statebuilding project. Two main questions drive the analysis: what is the nature of the relationship between central government and subnational units concerning the allocation and distribution of resources, and – regarding budget preparation – what is the role played by the legislature? It is argued that beyond Afghanistan’s dependency on foreign aid to fund ordinary expenditures and development projects, the presence of a set of budgetary rules which not only centralizes the preparation and execution of budget decisions at the expense of provinces but also marginalizes the legislative involvement in the decision-making process are two important features that prevent further development in state capacity and the representative government.     

Portfolio Budgeting in the Australian Portfolios-Principles and Practice

In the mid-eighties Australia implemented a budgeting system that is similar in its principles to the U.S. PAYGO rule and the now defunct Policy and Expenditure Management System of Canada. Termed as portfolio budgeting, it seeks to encourage greater ministerial participation (a ministry comprising a number of related departments) in the portfolio budget process. It obligates portfolio ministers to offer offsetting savings for funding new policies. Ministers have to thereby set new policy priorities so that only the most deserving new policies obtain funding through the savings identified. Additionally, portfolio budgeting requires ministers to prioritize their ongoing programs so that budget allocation to these programs reflects ministerial priorities. The article examines the practice of portfolio budgeting in the Australian portfolios in light of these objectives. The article suggests that portfolio budgeting has caused greater ministerial involvement in budgetary management. However, there has been little significant change in budget decision making at the portfolio level. The state of play of portfolio budgeting at the national budget process (cabinet and the Department of Finance) offered little incentive to portfolios to provide offsetting savings for new policy proposals. And, the appropriation structure and the organizational and political dynamics impeded ministers from allocating and reallocating their budgets (operating expenditure or running costs) for ongoing programs along ministerial priorities.     

The contractual nature of budgeting: A transaction cost perspective on the design of budgeting institutions

Viewing budgets as contracts, transaction cost theory focuses on the costs of negotiating and enforcing the myriad political agreements by which policymakers allocate the government's resources. This essay provides an overview of transaction cost theory and its implications for the design of budgeting institutions. It contrasts the behavioral premises (bounded rationality and opportunism) of the transaction cost approach with those of more traditional budgetary theories, and examines whether commitment and agency costs have structured budget actors' institutional choices. Investigation of the usage of key budget instruments- entitlements, multi-year appropriations, and tax expenditures - suggests that Congress has been more discriminating in its institutional choices than is commonly supposed. Sensitivity to the importance of transaction costs would increase the effectiveness of budget reforms.     

The budgetary implications of welfare reform: Lessons from four state initiatives

Required work and training, a major component of recent “welfare reform” proposals, is intended to increase the self-sufficiency of welfare recipients and thereby produce savings for government treasuries as well as more income for the recipients themselves. This analysis focuses explicitly on the budgetary effects of such activities, estimating the cost savings and new revenues generated by welfare employment programs started in four states since 1981. It suggests that when a broad range of effects are taken into account over a sufficiently long period, the overall budgetary implications of the programs are usually positive at the federal, state, and local levels of government. The costs and gains, however, are shared unevenly by the three levels, which encourages disparities in the programs states and localities choose to implement.     

After the Earthquake: The President's Budget for FY 1996

What changes has the political earthquake of November 1994 wreaked on the federal budget and, in particular, on the president's budget? Are the policy dynamics of federal budgets so entrenched that they transcend politics and are impervious to shocks? Or do the political changes presage radical policy changes, reversing decades of cumulative commitments? Are budgetary institutions and processes flexible enough to accommodate enhanced conflicts while maintaining their integrity and purpose? This article discusses the fate of the 1995 budget and the initial problems faced in the president's budget for 1996.     

The Influence of EU Membership on Methods and Processes of Budgeting in Britain and France, 1970–1995

This article explores the impact European Union (EU) integration has had on methods and processes of budgeting in France and Britain from 1970 to 1995. It assesses whether convergence of budgetary institutions occurs and, if so, whether it is promoted by an obligation of compliance or by an hybridization effect. Compliance refers to changes in national budgetary institutions made compulsory by membership in the EU. Hybridization emphasizes that national and EU budgetary processes are increasingly interwoven and indivisible. Public budgeting is no longer purely national because part of the decision-making on national expenditure is made at the EU level and because the national budget is closely linked to the EU budget in financial and policy terms. Based on an institutional analysis, combined with elite interviewing, the article suggests that hybridization is a significant factor contributing to a convergence of budgetary practices in Britain and France. Underlying the argument is the fact that an increasingly important function of departmental actors involves negotiating with their EU counterparts at the EU level, in addition to the conventional budgetary game at the domestic level. Regarding compliance, there is an influence as testified by significant formal institutional convergence. However, compliance seems a less effective factor in influencing convergence than hybridization because it conveys a "negative" approach to convergence, based on enforcement and sanctions. The article suggests that the convergence of administrative systems is promoted by the growing similarity of administrative practices more than by the harmonization of rules.