The Muslim Middle East: Is There a Democratic Option?

American counterterrorism strategy defines as “moderate” or “mainstream” any Muslim who does not support the jihadi extremists, which sets the bar very low and does not consider the question of how widespread such support actually might be. Unfortunately, Al Qaeda is not the lunatic fringe of Sunni Islam—it is the fanatic core of Sunni Islam, and shares much of its ideology with other organized Islamic groups and, for that matter, much of the Muslim faithful. “Moderate” Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, are moderate only in relative terms, are mostly antidemocratic, and are more correctly considered nonviolent enemies of the U.S. This being the case, a democratic opening in the Muslim Middle East is all too likely to bring to power profoundly antidemocratic groups that are virulently and possibly violently hostile to the U.S. A possible alternative strategy is one stressing good government, with gradual democratization as societies decompress.     

Radical Islam in Europe

Europe now faces three related but different challenges: how to respond, in a time when “native” European populations are shrinking, to the growing presence of Muslim minorities; how to avoid having its relationships with its Muslim communities controlled by Islamists who seek to replace Western civilization with Islamic government based on sharia law; and what to do generally about this Islamist threat. Thus far, the European responses to these challenges have been shaped by four factors: accumulated civilizational exhaustion; the inability to grasp the challenge posed to European national identities by the allure of the global Caliphate; weakness arising from degraded security capabilities, including the impact of the continued drive to “build Europe” by adopting the Treaty of Lisbon; and the preference for appeasement of Islamist demands.     

‘Can’t We Discuss This?’ Liberalism and the Challenge of Islam in the Netherlands

The Netherlands, which has seen the political murders of the populist Pim Fortuyn in 2002 and film director Theo van Gogh in 2004, faces particular challenges in meeting Europe's “Islamic problem.” Not just a welfare state like all European countries, the Netherlands also has its own peculiar “pillarization” social structure, which developed in order to permit all groups to be different but equal. For decades, the differences were among various groups of Christians and secularized Christians. But after the 1968 protest movement, and with an influx of immigrants, parallel societies emerged in which Muslims could build up their own institutions and values. While the system has clearly failed, the responses of the Dutch political class to date seem inadequate. This article outlines an approach to the challenge of European Islam that could restore political life to the right priorities.     

Economic and Security Interests in Southeast Asia

Despite worries that ASEAN is becoming weak, the organization remains as strong as it ever was, given the parameters of its design. Its member countries still tightly embrace the organization's principles, the “ASEAN way.” But simple adherence to those principles can be problematic. ASEAN countries, whose national economic and political interests collide, often appeal to the same principles to back their positions. That tends to pull ASEAN in different directions. Great power policies, particularly those of China and the United States, now exacerbate the situation. At the same time, ASEAN's reliance on multilateral consensus has made it difficult to reconcile real differences among its member countries or develop unified regional responses. That can be seen in issues from the Xayaburi dam on the Mekong River to the South China Sea. The ease with which ASEAN's principles can come into conflict and its consensus-driven decision- making can become deadlocked clearly marks the limits of the “ASEAN way.”     

Competitive Engagement: Upgrading America's Influence

America's instruments of foreign policy are weak. As a result, Washington depends much more on its military power than it should. The militarization of foreign policy is neither good for American interests nor sustainable, since many political, economic, and ideological outcomes are not attainable through the use of military force. Yet ongoing discussions about America's non- military power miss one important factor: in virtually every theater of the world, local, regional, and strategic competitions affect America's ability to exert influence through its aid and diplomacy. From Pakistan to the Middle East to Africa, ideas about how to develop economies, shape educational systems, administer health care programs, and build political institutions, are contested. Until the competitive nature of aid and diplomacy is deliberately and explicitly considered, Washington's ability to achieve outcomes using its non-military power—often called “soft” or “smart power”—will remain fundamentally limited.     

Europe after the U.S. Pivot

Insofar as Europe's security and cohesion have for decades been premised upon a strong American political and strategic engagement, Washington's intention to “rebalance” to Asia casts a shadow over the sustainability of a stable and coherent geopolitical order on the continent. This article argues that as the United States seeks to rebalance strategically towards the Asia-Pacific region a number of “indigenous” geopolitical trends are becoming increasingly important in Europe: an Anglo-French entente for a “maritime” Europe, a German-French “continental” project of economic and political integration, and Russia's resurgence across Europe's East. The growing prominence of competing geopolitical visions for Europe might even call into question the cohesion and direction of the institutional expressions of the U.S.- engineered Western order in Europe, namely the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. Increasing geopolitical and institutional contestation, we contend, pose a number of challenges for both U.S. interests and European security.     

Making and Mobilizing Moderates: Rhetorical Strategy,Political Networks,and Counterterrorism

Studies of counterterrorism have argued for the importance of bolstering, or “mobilizing,” moderates in the confrontation with violent extremists. Yet the literature has not elucidated when states seek to mobilize moderates and marginalize extremists, how they do so, or when they prove successful. The received wisdom is that states should cultivate and strengthen moderate allies by reaching out to them. This approach, however, fails to grasp the political challenges confronting potential moderates, whose priority is to build and retain legitimacy within their political community. Inspired by network approaches, we maintain that moderates can more easily emerge when their political interactions with the authorities are relatively sparse. We further argue that the state's strategies, including crucially its rhetorical moves, can bolster the moderates' local legitimacy. At times, this will entail not reaching out to moderates but isolating them. Before moderates can be mobilized, they must be made, and the state's criticism, more than its love, may do much to help moderate political forces emerge. This article explains why mobilizing moderates is critical, when it is difficult, and how authorities can nevertheless play a productive role in moderates' emergence. We establish our theoretical framework's plausibility by examining two cases—India's ultimately triumphant campaign against Sikh extremists and Spain's gradual marginalization of Basque extremists. We then suggest what lessons these campaigns against ethnonational terrorism hold for the so-called War on Terror.     

‘Unlawful Combatants’: The West's Treatment of Irregular Fighters in the ‘War on Terror’

The West's treatment of irregular fighters in the “war on terror” was highly problematic. This article contends that we must look beyond the assumption that political and strategic considerations compromised the law and led to the “invention” of the category of the “unlawful combatant.” Rather, the law of armed conflict itself includes strong exclusionary mechanisms towards irregular fighters. These exclusionary strands in the law came to dominate the West's strategic decision-making on the treatment of irregular fighters. Moreover, the fact that irregular fighters became such a vital issue post-9/11 was not a result of the war on terror being a new kind of war, as has often been argued. Rather, this article suggests that it reflects an identity crisis of the West's regular armed forces at the start of the twenty-first century.     

Cheap Hawks, Cheap Doves, and the Pursuit of Strategy

The post-9/11 threats to American security require a complete revision of American national strategy. For too long, presidents have had to favor quick, cheap solutions to crises, unable to count on support from the “homebody” public for long, drawn-out conflicts. “Cheap hawks” among them have hoped that apocalyptic rhetoric will suffice when resources fall short; “cheap doves” hope that by ignoring the threat, it will go away. But with the war on terror, the revival of geopolitics, and ever-accelerating globalization, the U.S. tradition of bellicose rhetoric backed by underwhelming force is a recipe for failure. To effectively manage its threats, America needs a new catechism and to make sure its economic, energy, and military policies support this.     

The American Way of Going to War: Mexico (1846) to Iraq (2003)

Prior to the Iraq War, there had been a long series of American wars in which U.S. leaders often maneuvered the other side into “firing the first shot.” This strategy of “passive defense” amounts to an American way of going to war, and it dates back at least to the U.S.-Mexican War. The United States thus retained the moral and legal legitimacy, an asset which is especially important in a democratic political system. The Iraq War represents a fundamental departure from this American way. It might be the worst crisis since Vietnam. but that war was just another entry in the U.S. playbook for how to go to war. The Iraq War not only contradicts longstanding practices in American foreign policy, but it has the potential to issue in far greater international disorder than the Vietnam War. This catastrophe may make future presidents more heedful of John Quincy Adams’ prophetic words: go not abroad in search of monsters to destroy.     

Uganda and U.S. Foreign Policy

Washington's relationships with the “leveraged allies” preferred by realists—those countries that have little choice but to follow America's lead—have long been considered more reliable than in its relationships with the “natural allies” favored by idealists: prosperous, democratic nations that share the goals and interests of the United States. President Bush's foreign policy requires these natural allies, but many U.S. government officials are more wary. Uganda under President Museveni is a model “natural ally” candidate, with its relatively humane and democratic internal policies, but its greater capacity to act without American leverage, approval, or supervision is likely to worry realist career diplomats.     

China's Energy-Driven ‘Soft Power’

Energy security has prompted China to turn its strategic gaze to the seas for the first time in six centuries. For now, Taiwan remains Beijing's uppermost priority, but there are signs that Chinese leaders are already contemplating the “day after” matters in the Taiwan Strait to resolve them to their satisfaction. In the meantime, China is attempting to shape the diplomatic environment in vital regions such as Southeast and South Asia using “soft power.” By invoking the voyages of Zheng He, the Ming Dynasty's “eunuch admiral,” Beijing sends the message that it is a trustworthy guarantor of Asian maritime security. But the success of this soft-power strategy remains in doubt.     

The Invincible Wilsonian Matrix: Universal Human Rights Once Again

A conservative or realist approach has little appeal in the present debate over American foreign policy. In the twentieth century, according to George F. Kennan, the United States succumbed to “the evils of utopian enthusiasms.” In recent years, this worldview has been associated most closely with the neoconservatives, but even the Clinton administration leaned in the same direction. Crusading moralism has been the recurrent theme of America's self-image as a global power. Whether or not neoconservatives and liberals today are really dedicated to the same democratic political culture as the one that Wilson idealized, a recognizable Wilsonian manner of conceptualizing international relations has come to dominate American politics, reflected in a shared rejection of any foreign policy that is not based on the temporal salvation of humanity. Yet many Wilsonians seem unable to imagine that one can be “moral” without trying to make everyone resemble one's self.     

Countering Aggressive Rising Powers: A Clash of Strategic Cultures

The United States has to contend with rising powers ranging from the prc, which is already an economic and political great power and potentially a military threat, to Al Qaeda and the network of Islamist terror organizations, whose means to power remain limited but whose will to power and aggression are great. In the middle are states that already or may soon possess nuclear weapons. Each of these powers has its own “strategic culture” that affects its decision-making, and attention needs to be paid to how the strategic habits of today's rising and aggressive powers might intersect with U.S. strategy.     

Beyond Primacy: Hegemony and ‘Security Addiction’ in U.S. Grand Strategy

The George W. Bush administration embraced a particularly aggressive counter-terrorist and counter-proliferation strategy after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The “Bush Doctrine,” as it became known, reflects a “primacist” approach to grand strategy that aims not only to eliminate global terrorist networks and cowl rogue state proliferators, but also to dissuade potential near-peer competitors from challenging the American-centred international system. Critics expect that this ambitious approach to strategic affairs has become unsustainable in the face of the growing quagmire in Iraq. But “security addiction” in the post-9/11 environment has instead created conditions for a bipartisan consensus on the overall direction, if not the particular modalities, of “primacist” grand strategies. Despite the unpopularity of the Bush administration and significant American commitments to Afghanistan and Iraq, it is highly unlikely that President Barack Obama will heed calls for military retrenchment or strategic restraint.     

The Rise of Policy Institutes in the United States, 1943-1971

In the period after World War II, an eclectic assortment of scholars, policymakers, and managers presided over the creation of academic centers for the study of war. This article examines the intellectual and administrative assumptions of many of these actors. Made up of academic scholars from the fields of political science, sociology, and economics, they advanced a vision based on what might be called “instrumentalist-positivist social science,” but in appeals to donors they employed basic scientific language.¹     

Wolfish Wilsonians: Existential Dilemmas of the Liberal Internationalists

There are limits on America's ability to bring democracy to deeply divided societies with little or no history of democracy, and many American liberal internationalists have succumbed to intellectual and moral paralysis about America's right and ability to spread its system in the rest of the world. The principles of law-governed freedom are in fact important and nearly eternal principles, but they are best spread by America's setting the example as a peaceful democracy. The messianic approach to democracy-promotion adopted by the Bush administration and its liberal allies, rooted in faith in the “American creed” and an emerging “global civil society,” can only damage both American power and the cause of democratizing the world. The American approach to democratization needs instead to be governed by rigor of the intellect and generosity of spirit.     

Beyond Fukushima: Japan's Emerging Energy and Environmental Challenges

This article considers the political-economic process by which “energy angst” created an embedded nuclear orientation in Japanese energy policymaking, and then how, following Fukushima, Japan initially tried to transform that structural tendency, through a political system poorly suited to reform, before edging back toward its traditional path. Due both to the prevailing systemic bias and the underlying political economy of nuclear power, the process of transformation promises to be a turbulent and extended one, with natural gas and energy efficiency being crucial tools for ameliorating the difficult realities of the domestic status quo.     

SYRIZA's Electoral Victory in Greek Thrace: Impact of Muslim Minority Vote in the Changing Political System

This article, based on the link between institutional changes and voter behavior, focusing mainly on the 2015 parliamentary elections in Greece and the SYRIZA party's success in Greek Thrace, aims to understand why the Muslim minority voted significantly for SYRIZA and how they managed to send four Muslim representatives to the Greek Parliament, three of them from the same party. The article argues that, although there is massive support for radical-left SYRIZA due to its electoral promises to improve social services in addition to the party's rational candidate nomination, this support reflects a mixture of sociological and issue-voting behavior of the Muslim minority related to their motivation for political representation rather than an ideological shift. The changing political system in Greece since 2012, from a two-party to a multiparty system with decreasing voter turnout, increased the impact of the Muslim vote on electoral results in the September and January 2015 elections; however, it also increased social tension between the majority and the minority.     

Chinese Strategic Thinking on Multilateral Regional Security in Northeast Asia

This article argues that multilateral mechanisms for addressing security issues in East Asia are weak and that a key reason is the hollowness of China's ostensible and much-touted commitment to multilateralism. This is especially troubling when the region faces major security challenges and regional relations (and China's approach to them) appear to be moving from “economics in command” to “security in command.” The article concludes with a prediction that “A coordinated approach to combining alliances and quasi-alliances exclusive of China with multilateralism inclusive of it will best test China's intentions during this decade.”