Soldiers,Civilians, and Multilateral Humanitarian Intervention

Approval from the United Nations or NATO appears to have become a necessary condition for US humanitarian military intervention. Conventional explanations emphasizing the pull of legitimacy cannot fully account for this given that US policymakers vary considerably in their attachment to multilateralism. This article argues that America's military leaders, who are consistently skeptical about humanitarian intervention and tend to emphasize its costs, play a central role in making multilateral approval necessary. As long as top-ranking generals express strong reservations about intervention and no clear threat to US national security exists, they can veto the use of force. In such circumstances, even heavyweight “humanitarian hawks” among the civilian leadership, who initially may have wanted to bypass multilateral bodies to maximize US freedom of action, can be expected to recognize the need for UN or NATO approval—if only as a means of mollifying the generals by reassuring them about the prospect of sustained multilateral burden sharing. Two case studies drawing on interviews with senior civilian and military officials illustrate and probe the plausibility of the argument.     

Explaining and Forecasting Leaders' Decisions: A Poliheuristic Analysis of the Iran Hostage Rescue Decision

In an increasingly dangerous world, forecasting national leaders' decisions during crises is a central concern of policy analysts. But with a wide range of specific military responses available to leaders, pinpointing a likely decision can be difficult. This essay argues that the poliheuristic theory of foreign policy decision making is a useful tool for aiding policy analysts in forecasting the decisions of national leaders. The theory's emphasis on a noncompensatory decision dimension facilitates the elimination of many of the possible decision alternatives, reducing uncertainty. Then, surviving alternatives are weighed against additional, nontrivial dimensions, producing a likely decision. As an illustrative case, I examine Carter's decision to implement the hostage rescue mission, demonstrating that Carter ruled out alternatives that failed to satisfy criteria on the noncompensatory decision dimension—reelection. The president's final choice was selected from the remaining alternatives according to its ability to simultaneously maximize net benefits with respect to military and strategic concerns. Following a comparison of the analysis with compensatory models of decision making, I suggest a general forecasting framework rooted in the poliheuristic theory. The theory can be applied to international crises provided that policy analysts obtain information concerning (1) the leader's noncompensatory decision criteria, (2) the set of alternatives that satisfy those criteria, and (3) the expected net benefits of the remaining alternatives on other dimensions (i.e., the military and strategic dimensions).     

Fresh Thinking on U.S. Engagement with Africa: Probing the Limits of Engagement

The Biden administration faces the opportunity to reset U.S. policy towards Africa and possesses a variety of tools to use in doing so, including traditional diplomacy, economic statecraft, development assistance, and military engagement. With the increased militarization of U.S. foreign policy over the past few decades, there is an unfortunate tendency to default to military engagement when confronted with even remote threats to U.S. national security interests, and Africa is no exception. With vital security interests in Africa, it can be argued that military engagement should be limited in its application and targeted to those situations that do not lend themselves to solution through traditional diplomacy or development assistance.     

Managing the ‘Expert Problem’ in Civil‐Military Relations

Samuel Huntington once defined ‘the modern problem of civil‐military relations’ as managing the relationship between military experts and civilian ministers. The expert/minister problem arises not simply because senior military officers and defense officials hold a monopoly on technical and operational expertise, but also because they are charged by governments to execute policy, a duty that invites their interpretation of those policies. This paper seeks to examine two critical questions: what kind of continuing relationship between experts and ministers best serves liberal democracies in the long run and what strategies and instruments best allow ministers of defense to control defense policy outcomes and the activities of armed forces.     

Chinese Military Power: What Vexes the United States and Why?

The enhancement of Chinese military power over the past decade is generating ample debate over its meaning and consequences for American security interests. China's characterization in larger conceptions of U.S. national security strategy has experienced repeated shifts over the decades. China is now an arrived major power according to virtually all relevant power criteria, without U.S. policy makers conclusively resolving the implications of China's military modernization for American security interests. Comparable uncertainties bedevil Chinese thinking about American military power. The latent elements of strategic rivalry (if not outright confrontation) are beyond dispute, and could readily take deeper root in the bureaucratic processes of both countries. Without leaders in both systems fully imparting and communicating to one another their respective strategic equities in Asia and the Pacific, the emergence of a reconfigured regional security order fully accepted by both states remains very uncertain.     

Military Alliances in the 21 Century: Still Relevant after all These Years?

While military alliances have always been important to the United States, some experts wonder about their future. In today's uncertain security environment, they question whether these alliances may have outlived their usefulness. The author argues that U.S. national security leaders face some difficult choices as they formulate strategy and determine the number and types of collective security arrangements the nation will require to secure its national interests in the future.     

Explaining institutional Europeanisation in security and defence: the German administration under Schröder and Merkel

Abstract

Participating in EU crisis management operations has affected institutional actors on various levels. As the main deliverers of civilian and military resources to EU operations, national ministries and agencies have been particularly confronted with the need for administrative adaptation. A big member state like Germany is expected to make substantial contributions, but it also faces a rigid administration. This article uses a combined hypothesis of historical institutionalism and organisational learning to explain administrative Europeanisation in German government institutions involved in civilian and military crisis management deployments. The empirical data on the German administrative trajectories under Schröder and Merkel show an explanatory link between political learning and overcoming institutional path dependency.     

Liberal intervention in the foreign policy thinking of Tony Blair and David Cameron

David Cameron was a critic of Tony Blair's doctrine of the ‘international community’, which was used to justify war in Kosovo and more controversially in Iraq, suggesting caution in projecting military force abroad while in opposition. However, and in spite of making severe cuts to the defence budget, the Cameron-led Coalition government signed Britain up to a military intervention in Libya within a year of coming into office. What does this say about the place liberal interventionism occupies in contemporary British foreign policy? To answer this question, this article studies the nature of what we describe as the ‘bounded liberal’ tradition that has informed British foreign policy thinking since 1945, suggesting that it puts a distinctly UK national twist on conventional conservative thought about international affairs. Its components are: scepticism of grand schemes to remake the world; instinctive Atlanticism; security through collective endeavour; and anti-appeasement. We then compare and contrast the conditions for intervention set out by Tony Blair and David Cameron. We explain the similarities but crucially the vital differences between the two leaders' thinking on intervention, with particular reference to Cameron's perception that Downing Street needed to loosen its control over foreign policymaking after Iraq. Our argument is that policy substance, policy style and party political dilemmas prompted the two leaders to reconnect British foreign policy with its ethical roots, ingraining a bounded liberal posture in British foreign policy after the moral bankruptcy of the John Major years. This return to a pragmatic and ethically informed foreign policy meant that military operations in Kosovo and Libya were undertaken in quite different circumstances, yet came to be justified by similar arguments from the two leaders.     

Democracy and the Preparation for War: Does Regime Type Affect States' Anticipation of Casualties?

Immanuel Kant and more recent expositors of the democratic peace thesis suggest that citizens in a republic sanction leaders for resorting to war because, in part, citizens are loath to shed their own blood. This Kantian thesis in turn implies substitution. Just as consumers confronted with price shocks shift consumption to less affected goods rather than simply curtailing consumption, democratic leaders facing retribution for casualties can limit losses, not just by avoiding military contests, but also by substituting capital (ships, tanks, aircraft) for labor (soldiers, sailors, airmen) in the provision of security. A simple consumer choice model shows that citizens' leverage over leaders implies that democracies should consume disproportionately more capital in preparing for—and conducting—defense. Numerous anecdotes assert that democracies do shelter labor with capital, especially during war, but tests of defense-factor allocations on factor endowments, regime-type, and other variables show that defense-factor usage is explained by basic economic theory and not by democracy.     

Party,Politics and Deciding What Is Proper: Army Officers’ Attitudes after Two Long Wars

Drawing on recent research, the author shows how a majority of officers still believe that the active duty military should not criticize civilian leaders publicly. However, fewer today think this way than those surveyed in the late-1990s. This is a surprising finding given the poisoned state of civil-military relations towards the end of the Clinton Administration, but perhaps is indicative of the Army's frustrated experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade.     

Islamic activism in Turkey since the 1980 military takeover

This article examines the nature and strength of the Islamic movement in contemporary Turkey. It argues that the policies of the military and civilian governments, in attempting to establish a strong ideological base that could challenge the left, allowed and even promoted the activities of Turkey's Islamic organizations. Indeed, these counter‐balancing efforts backfired as the Islamic movement rejected the national cause and joined the struggle for social justice.‐As a result, and in direct contradiction to the intentions of the military and civilian governments, there evolved an ideological alliance between Islamic circles and the left. This ideological shift along with the collapse of ideological alternatives and a background of intensifying socio‐economic problems contributed heavily to the Islamic movement's electoral success in recent years.     

Beyond the fallacy of coup-ism: conceptualizing civilian control of the military in emerging democracies

It is consensus in the democratization literature that civilian control of the military is a necessary ingredient for democracy and democratic consolidation. However, there is considerable disagreement on what civilian control of the military exactly entails and there is a lack of solid theoretical arguments for how weak or absent civilian control affects democratic governance. Furthermore, a considerable portion of the research literature is captured by the fallacy of coup-ism, ignoring the many other forms in which military officers can constrain the authority of democratically elected political leaders to make political decisions and get them implemented. This article addresses these lacunae by providing a new conceptual framework for the analysis of civil–military relations in emerging democracies. From democracy theory it derives a definition of civilian control as a certain distribution of decision-making power between civilian leaders and military officers. Based on this definition, the authors develop a five-dimensional concept of civilian control, discuss the effects of weakly institutionalized civilian control on the quality of democracy and address the chances for democratic consolidation.     

Satisfaction,Alternatives, Investments,and the Microfoundations of Audience Cost Models

In this paper, we suggest that the Investment Model of Commitment, developed in social psychology, offers a solution to an important microfoundational issue in audience cost theory. Audience cost models are useful for thinking about the foreign policy behaviors of democratic and nondemocratic states. However, they often assume that citizens reliably penalize leaders who break their foreign policy promises even though the empirical record suggests this is not always the case. We argue that public commitment to foreign policy assets and relationships is a precondition for the application of audience costs. Using the UN and NATO as case studies, we hypothesize that the commitments people develop to international organizations emerge as a function of (1) their satisfaction with the performance of the organization, (2) the investments in those organizations, and (3) an assessment of the alternatives to these associations. Correlational and experimental tests of the model confirm that the strongest individual-level commitments arise when people are highly satisfied with the performance of specific institutions, believe that much has been invested in support of them, and perceive that the alternatives to particular institutions are poor. Implications for the development of audience cost theory are discussed.     

The Privatization of Security: Lessons from Iraq

Images of private forces in Iraq—killed and mutilated in Fallujah, implicated in prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, and shooting up civilian vehicles—have provided a dramatic illustration of the role private security companies (pscs) now play in U.S. military operations. Though the United States’ use of contractors on the battlefield is not entirely new, the increased number of contractors deployed and the use of private security forces to perform an escalating number of tasks has created a new environment that poses important trade-offs for U.S. policy and military effectiveness and for U.S. relations with other states. This article outlines the history of U.S. contractors on the battlefield, compares that with the use of private security in Iraq, discusses the benefits and risks associated with their use, and proposes some trade-offs that decision-makers in the United States should consider while contemplating their use in the future.     

Turkey’s struggle with the PKK and civilian control over the Turkish Armed Forces

Although most scholars of Turkey’s civil-military relations argue that the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) insurgency has led to a decrease in civilian control over the Turkish military from the 1980s onwards, this has not always been the case. This article argues that the presence or the degree of the PKK threat is not sufficient to explain the civil-military balance of power in Turkey throughout the 1980s and the 1990s. Instead, the article shows that in the face of the PKK threat, three major factors have influenced the behaviours of both civilian and military policy-makers in Turkey and shaped the level of civilian control. These factors are first, the Turkish political leaders’ control over their political parties and these parties’ control of a majority of seats in the parliament; second, how negatively or positively the military perceives the political leadership; and third, European Union pressures for democratisation.     

The influence of EU officials in European Security and Defence

Abstract

European Union (EU) foreign policy has long been considered the domaine réservé of the member states. This article challenges such conventional state-centered wisdom by analyzing the influence of the Brussels-based EU officials in the Common Security and Defence Policy. Using four case studies and data from 105 semi-structured interviews, it shows that EU officials are most influential in the agenda-setting phase and more influential in civilian than in military operations. Their prominence in agenda-setting can be explained by their central position in the policy process. This allows them to get early involved in the operations. The absence of strong control mechanisms and doctrine in civilian crisis management gives them opportunities to affect civilian missions. Finally, EU officials direct civilian operations from Brussels, whereas the command of military operations is with the member states and NATO.     

Why Some States Participate in UN Peace Missions While Others Do Not: An Analysis of Civil-Military Relations and Its Effects on Latin America's Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations

Why do some states deploy troops to support UN missions while others do not? Although short from war, peacekeeping entails a military dimension of foreign policy in which uniformed personnel is deployed to accomplish diplomatic and political means. As such, decisions to commit troops to UN operations must have the implicit support of the armed forces in order to take place. Yet, military backing for peacekeeping participation is not universal; some military institutions are more willing to join such missions than others. This article accounts for variations in terms of peacekeeping commitments by focusing on security doctrines and the degree of integration between military and foreign policy roles. It hypothesizes that countries with externally oriented doctrines and integrated foreign and defense policies are more likely to commit troops to the UN than countries with national security doctrines and segregated military and foreign policy roles. Using evidence from the Latin American region, the paper suggests that the decision to engage in UN operations is the result of doctrinal policies and bureaucratic infighting.     

Maritime security in the Black Sea: can regional solutions work?1

The development of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has been seen by some as key to giving the EU greater international influence, by others as a threat to the EU's strengths as a civilian power. This article finds that, as of 2002, the EU's new military dimension could not be conceived as a fundamental threat to its civilian power acquis. Concerns have justifiably been raised over the possible diversion of resources into the military sphere, the emergence of a less transparent policy‐making culture and ESDP's effect on the way the EU is perceived from outside. However, force levels have remained limited and most policymakers see the new EU Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) as an instrument for complementing civilian elements of crisis management. This article measures ESDP more specifically against the substantive approaches towards security challenges that the EU has elaborated. It argues that European strategies suffer most notably from political‐level conceptual weaknesses that cut across both civilian and military domains and that the incipient ESDP has yet to address.     

Negotiating Civil-Military Relations in Post-Authoritarian Argentina and Chile

This article invokes game theory to analyze civilian attempts to push back military influence in two countries where the armed forces have enjoyed strikingly dissimilar levels of power and privilege after the transition of democracy: Argentina and Chile. It finds that civilian governments in both countries have managed to make progress in challenging military prerogatives. But they have made relatively more progress in areas unrelated to human rights. While civilians have had to respect military immunity in the human rights sphere, they have anaged to erode other limitations on popular sovereignty that the officer corps imposed as a condition for leaving power. The resulting accommodation I describe reflects the pragmatic approach to politics that civilian and military leaders have assumed in post-authoritarian Latin America.     

International conflict,military rule,and violent authoritarian breakdown

ABSTRACT

Why do some transitions of power from military rule occur violently while others do not? What effect, if any, does the international security environment have on how violent breakdowns of authoritarian rule are? I argue a conflict-prone security environment ameliorates the commitment problem by ensuring an influential role for the military out of power. Therefore, when facing a domestic crisis in a threatening security environment, military leaders are more likely to peacefully cede power rather than wield violent measures to stay in office. Perhaps counter-intuitively, international conflicts thus lead to transitions of power from military rule that minimize violence and human costs. International conflicts do not have this moderating effect on other types of authoritarian rule.