The Global Era of National Policy and the Pan-Oceanic National Fleet

This article develops a framework for considering the future requirements for U.S. maritime power. It does so by proposing that these requirements must be considered within the context of an integrated National Fleet—the combined capabilities of the three “Sea Services”—the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard. It also would include their reserve components, as well as the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and the Maritime Administration's Ready Reserve Force (RRF)—the two organizations responsible for maintaining the nation's strategic sealift fleet.     

Command of the Sea with Chinese Characteristics

As globalization accelerates, U.S. foreign policy makers have become less convinced of the influence geopolitics and power politics have on international affairs. They now risk losing touch with rising competitors like China that continue to view the international system in geopolitical terms. Chinese geopolitical strategists have great influence with the country's defense policy makers, who are focusing increasingly on the need for China to establish command of the seas—a goal that threatens conflict between it and the United States throughout Asia. In order to prevent a return to a world dominated by aggressive, geopolitically driven actors, the United States cannot afford to assume that China shares its worldview and that geopolitics has disappeared from international relations.     

Complex Irregular Warfare: The Next Revolution in Military Affairs

At the time of the 9/11 attacks, Washington was embarking on a defense transformation emphasizing missile defense, space assets, precision weaponry, and information technology. This transformation proved irrelevant to the national security threats we now face, with the emergence of nontraditional adversaries pursuing “complex irregular warfare.” U.S. forces will have to assume a much more expeditionary character to successfully deal with Islamists’ complex irregular warfare. The March 2005 U.S. National Defense Strategy provides a balance to the longstanding American military emphasis on major-theater war, but it remains to be seen whether the military's new interest in operations other than conventional, major-combat operations will last or if it will diminish as soon as a new peer competitor rises, allowing the Pentagon to return to its more familiar paradigm.     

‘Hybrid Threats’: Neither Omnipotent Nor Unbeatable

Hybrid threats have now joined a growing suite of alternative concepts about the ever evolving character of modern conflict. Here and abroad, the hybrid threat construct has found traction in official policy circles despite its relative novelty. It has been cited by the U.S. Secretary of Defense in articles and speeches, and by policymakers now serving in the Pentagon. Heretofore, the rapidly growing hybrid threat literature has focused on the land warfare aspects of the threat. Modern hybrid threats, including Hezbollah and Iran, have demonstrated the ability to employ irregular tactics and advanced naval capabilities along with illegal or terrorist activity. Thus, the hybrid threat is applicable to naval forces and the U.S. Navy needs to dust off lessons learned from its last experience in the Persian Gulf in the late 1980s to better prepare for an even more challenging future.     

Chinese Military Power: What Vexes the United States and Why?

The enhancement of Chinese military power over the past decade is generating ample debate over its meaning and consequences for American security interests. China's characterization in larger conceptions of U.S. national security strategy has experienced repeated shifts over the decades. China is now an arrived major power according to virtually all relevant power criteria, without U.S. policy makers conclusively resolving the implications of China's military modernization for American security interests. Comparable uncertainties bedevil Chinese thinking about American military power. The latent elements of strategic rivalry (if not outright confrontation) are beyond dispute, and could readily take deeper root in the bureaucratic processes of both countries. Without leaders in both systems fully imparting and communicating to one another their respective strategic equities in Asia and the Pacific, the emergence of a reconfigured regional security order fully accepted by both states remains very uncertain.     

How the United States Lost the Naval War of 2015

Years of strategic missteps in oceans policy, naval strategy and a force structure in decline set the stage for U.S. defeat at sea in 2015. After decades of double-digit budget increases, the People's Liberation Army (Navy) was operating some of the most impressive systems in the world, including a medium-range ballistic missile that could hit a moving aircraft carrier and a super-quiet diesel electric submarine that was stealthier than U.S. nuclear submarines. Coupling this new asymmetric naval force to visionary maritime strategy and oceans policy, China ensured that all elements of national power promoted its goal of dominating the East China Sea. The United States, in contrast, had a declining naval force structured around 10 aircraft carriers spread thinly throughout the globe. With a maritime strategy focused on lower-order partnerships, and a national oceans policy that devalued strategic interests in freedom of navigation, the stage was set for defeat at sea. This article recounts how China destroyed the USS George Washington in the East China Sea in 2015. The political fallout from the disaster ended 75 years of U.S. dominance in the Pacific Ocean and cemented China's position as the Asian hegemon.     

A Maritime Conversation with America

Over the last century, the U.S. Navy has encountered critical moments when the emergence of new technologies and competitors cause paradigmatic shifts, undermining established operations and force structure. Today, the rise of an assertive China and its new anti-access and area-denial capabilities threaten the aircraft carrier-based maritime dominance of the U.S. Navy. Citizens and elected officials alike need to be conversant in the process to create the strategy, forces, and metrics needed to guarantee that the United States wins the emerging maritime competition in the Western Pacific. It is time to explain to the American public the enduring considerations and limitations that shape the operations of their global Navy.     

Structure and Perceptions: Explaining American Policy Toward China (1949–50)

American policy toward China during the early Cold War has long been considered as a prime anomaly to balance of power theory. Many realists have argued that domestic forces caused a confrontational policy, overriding structural imperative to accommodate China to balance the stronger Soviet power in Asia. Refuting the domestic explanation, I argue that balance of power consideration primarily determined the U.S. policy. Under the powerful pressure of bipolar competition, the Truman administration persistently pursued a realist policy of forming an alliance with Communist China, or at least neutralizing it, through accommodation in order to balance the Soviet Union in Asia. This policy was based on the assessment of Soviet superiority in Asia. However, my analysis of the power structure shows that there was little structural incentive for China to cooperate with the United States against the Soviet Union because the latter was in a somewhat disadvantageous position globally and had limited offensive capabilities in Asia. Further, Chinese leaders perceived the United States as the superior power in bipolarity. Consequently, China formed an alliance with the Soviet Union to check the United States according to its own balance of power logic.     

What Strategic Outlook Holds for America in Iraq?

Agreat controversy is stirring up the world opinion over the future direction of developments in Iraq, a matter affecting overall U.S. foreign policy and even the international power configuration as well. An accurate assessment, however, requires analyzing the relevance of the issue to U.S. vital interests, the results of its current policy over there and its ability to cope with further potential challenges. The author rules out U. S. giving up its cause in Iraq or the likelihood of any drastic modifications in its present policy. He also concedes its ability to achieve partial successful reconstruction in the war-torn country, albeit in a scaled-down version, far short of its original much-vaunted expectations. In sum, Washington will naturally make constant policy adjustments to meet challenges for realization of its dynamic phased goals and maintain its continued military presence there in a certain form so as to ensure its strategic interests in Iraq,the Greater Middle East and even the entire "arc of instability."     

Confronting a Powerful China with Western Characteristics

The rapid rise of Chinese economic and military power has produced the most fundamental change in the global system since the end of the Cold War, and it poses vital questions about China's future direction. Many Western analysts argue that China's great power will cause it to become more like the West, i.e., like Western great powers. Other Western analysts believe that China will continue to be the same, i.e., like the China of the past few decades. An alternative interpretation, however, is that China's new power will enable it to become even more Chinese than it is now, i.e., to become more like the traditional and imperial China that existed before the Western intrusions of the 19th century. This China was the “Central State” of a distinctive Chinese world order, operating with distinctive conceptions about diplomatic relations, military strategy, and economic exchange. However, the new China will be unlike the old China in at least two important ways. It will be a naval, and not just a land, power, and it will be a financial, and not just a trading, power. In other words, it will be a powerful China with Western characteristics. As a formidable naval and financial power, China will present fundamental challenges to the United States and to both the long-standing U.S. security order in the Western Pacific and the long-standing “Washington Consensus” about the global economic order.     

2011年美国外交面临的挑战

2011年国际局势中的许多事态对美国的中东外交政策形成新的挑战。西亚北非的动荡和变局可能导致中东地缘政治版图重新绘制,对美国未来的中东外交必将带来许多变数;美国一巴基斯坦之间发生的事态可能对奥巴马政府的反恐战略及南亚战略提出新的挑战;巴勒斯坦不顾美国阻挠申请加入联合国,使美国与穆斯林世界的关系面临新的考验。这些挑战今后有可能进一步发酵,对美国全球战略产生影响,其中包括对奥巴马政府＂-3前高调进行的“重返亚洲”形成牵制。     

去霸权化:海洋命运共同体叙事下新型海权的时代趋势

海洋命运共同体是中国倡导的一种海洋叙事。海洋叙事是塑造海洋秩序与海权及捍卫海洋权益的话语体系。中国的海洋叙事一直较为式微,特别是中国海权在世界海洋叙事体系内常常处于被西方海权"代表"的状态。这严重影响着中国对历史性海洋权益的维护。海洋命运共同体作为人类命运共同体的有机组成部分及其在海洋领域的发展,叙述着一种去霸权化的新型海权与新型海洋秩序,是海权从垄断走向共享、从传统走向新型的分水岭。在海洋命运共同体叙事下,中国海权的发展趋向是有别于传统海权的新型海权,是一种去霸权化的治海权,而非零和式海洋霸权。由于传统海权的惯性以及美国海洋霸权的主导,新型海权及其观念若要形成普适性共识,尚面临诸多挑战,但去霸权化的新型海权必将成为未来海权的时代趋势。     

Assessing a Decade of U.S. Military Strategy in Africa

The past decade has witnessed a sea change in U.S. military engagement in Africa. With the establishment of a new permanent command, significant increases in security assistance, and the pioneering of new tactics driven by technical innovations in intelligence analysis and drone warfare, the U.S. military has become an integral player in the continent's security. Nevertheless, there exist few assessments of the extent to which increased U.S. military engagement is paying dividends. This article examines how the current U.S. military strategy in Africa is different from those in the past and whether it is meeting the stated U.S. objectives of neutralizing transnational threats while contributing to the continent's political stability. It finds that U.S. performance is mixed, with recent successes at containing the spread of al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliated groups coming at the potential detriment of longer-term regional security. The article concludes with recommendations aimed at helping the armed forces of the U.S. and other regional actors better fight terrorism while managing political risks.     

The Foreign Policy Beliefs of Political Campaign Contributors

Since the Vietnam War, scholarly interest in public and elite opinion of U.S. foreign policy has grown. Because elites generally have greater access to policy makers and more consistent political views, most work on this topic has focused on elite opinions of foreign policy. Most research has defined the term elite broadly, often placing more emphasis on social status than political power. We will reexamine elite foreign policy beliefs using a different elite, presidential campaign contributors. We have two main goals in this article. First, we will assess the differences between the foreign policy outlooks of political campaign contributors and other elites. While many types of elites may influence policy, political contributors are particularly likely to gain access to policy makers. The second part of this research note offers some food for thought on the origins of these beliefs. We present evidence that foreign policy beliefs are related to the same ideological orientations that shape contributors' views on domestic issues. The origins of foreign and domestic policy views should probably be considered together.     

Power and Paradox: Asian Geopolitics and Sino-American Relations in the 21 Century

The pattern of Asian geopolitics can be examined by employing three analytical perspectives. The first employs East Asia and the vigorous debate over the meaning of the rise of China as an intellectual prism to observe the currents of geopolitical continuity and change that are currently abroad in the Asian region. The second explores the extent to which the interacting forces of geopolitics and military modernization foster the rise of new force projection capabilities that may affect the strategic environment in Asia—particularly in East Asia. Here, the focus is mainly on the arsenals of the three indigenous Asian giants, China, Japan and India, all of whom have developed, or are in the process of developing, significant air and maritime assets whose operations have the potential to intersect in East and South East Asia. Russia is not as much a presence because it no longer possesses its powerful Soviet-era Pacific Fleet and has, in essential respects, retreated to its traditional role as a Eurasian land power.¹ The third examines the future of Sino-American relations in Asia in the context of the debate over China's ascent and U. S. decline—a discussion that has intensified since the implosion of the U.S. financial system in 2008 and the onset of the worst global recession since the 1930s.     

试析2008年大选后的美国对外政策走向

美国总统大选在即，从候选人当前辩论的焦点看，两党政策主张既有一定差别，也有趋同迹象。从外交方面看，美国单边主义外交政策将会进一步收敛，对外（特别是同盟国）协商与合作将会得到加强。美国对华政策取决于其国家利益的需要，中美关系发展的内在动力将会主导双边关系的发展，不会因美国总统的更迭而发生逆转。     

U.S. Grand Strategy Following the George W. Bush Presidency

Debates over U.S. grand strategy have devoted a disproportionate level of attention to the War on Terror itself rather than the evolving strategic environment. Challenges including an impending shift in the balance of power, structural deficits, and divided public opinion will significantly impact the policy options available to government leaders, but they have not been adequately addressed. This article analyzes the options available for U.S. grand strategy following the George W. Bush presidency by relating key U.S. national interests with domestic and international policy constraints on the horizon. The analysis concludes that the United States must adopt a defensive grand strategy to rebuild popular consensus, to prevent further strain on the military, and to consolidate its gains in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, this strategy will require flexible coalitions, not formal international organizations, because of a significant divergence of security interests and capabilities with its European allies.     

美国农业保护制度的政治经济学分析

美国是世界上农业最发达的国家之一。在世界农产品贸易中,长期以来一直是世界农产品最大的进出口国,其农产品贸易政策对世界农产品贸易制度具有主要的影响。近年来,美国的农业保护制度不断完善和加强,不但与其他国家多边农业谈判的自由化主张背道而驰,也是多哈农业谈判久谈不决的主要原因之一。从政治经济学的角度分析,在未来,其农业补贴政策会有所减弱。但不可能完全消除,国内农业政策改革难度很大,非传统的隐蔽性更强的限制性措施将成为农产品市场准入中的主要措施。因此,美国在多哈农业谈判中不可能做出太大的让步。     

Negotiating At Cross-Purposes: Sino-American Ambassadorial Talks, 1961-68

Previous studies on the Sino-American ambassadorial talks have underestimated the efficacy of the negotiations from 1961 to 1968. New documentation from both U.S. and Chinese sources shows that both Washington and Beijing viewed the Warsaw channel as vitally important in managing the delicate relationship and made every effort to keep it going. Based on these new sources, this article analyzes the context of the Sino-American talks in the 1960s, the major issues discussed, maneuvers, rhetoric and follow-up actions. It concludes that the Warsaw channel was a useful facilitator for managing Sino-American relations in the turbulent 1960s, an important part of the mutual learning process, and it shortened the learning curve for the future policy makers.     

Negotiating At Cross-Purposes: Sino-American Ambassadorial Talks, 1961–68

Previous studies on the Sino-American ambassadorial talks have underestimated the efficacy of the negotiations from 1961 to 1968. New documentation from both U.S. and Chinese sources shows that both Washington and Beijing viewed the Warsaw channel as vitally important in managing the delicate relationship and made every effort to keep it going. Based on these new sources, this article analyzes the context of the Sino-American talks in the 1960s, the major issues discussed, maneuvers, rhetoric and follow-up actions. It concludes that the Warsaw channel was a useful facilitator for managing Sino-American relations in the turbulent 1960s, an important part of the mutual learning process, and it shortened the learning curve for the future policy makers.