Security and Solvency

The American defense establishment has come to think of itself as the victim of complex and demanding threats, political irresponsibility and public apathy. While true, such conditions are often the case in American history. “Don’t fight the problem” is a standard instruction in war games. The Department of Defense should adopt that approach with its budget and strategy: stop submitting budgets in excess of legislated limits and devise a strategy consistent with them. It should explore alternative ways to achieve policy objectives, develop a concrete means of assessing risk, and on that basis build greater support for its preferred strategy.     

America's Struggle Against the Wahhabi/Neo-Salafi Movement

One consequence of using labels such as the “global war on terrorism,” “the long war,” “the global struggle against violent extremism” or any name that dissociates the conflict from the Wahhabi/neo-Salafi movement is that Americans lack the necessary framework for assessing U.S. policies. Misconceptions concerning the war proliferate on both the Left and the Right because of the absence of an analytical framework to provide precise vocabulary identifying the origins and objectives of the enemy. The current war and the sources of Al Qaeda's conduct can only be understood by examining the complex history of Arabia, the U.S.-Saudi alliance, and a particular historical cycle of corruption, decadence, violent purification, and moral restoration that characterizes the Wahhabi/neo-Salafi narrative.     

‘Unlawful Combatants’: The West's Treatment of Irregular Fighters in the ‘War on Terror’

The West's treatment of irregular fighters in the “war on terror” was highly problematic. This article contends that we must look beyond the assumption that political and strategic considerations compromised the law and led to the “invention” of the category of the “unlawful combatant.” Rather, the law of armed conflict itself includes strong exclusionary mechanisms towards irregular fighters. These exclusionary strands in the law came to dominate the West's strategic decision-making on the treatment of irregular fighters. Moreover, the fact that irregular fighters became such a vital issue post-9/11 was not a result of the war on terror being a new kind of war, as has often been argued. Rather, this article suggests that it reflects an identity crisis of the West's regular armed forces at the start of the twenty-first century.     

Forging the Future of American Security with a Total Force Strategy

An intense debate now rages concerning whether the Army should be preparing and organizing to conduct more ambiguous, irregular operations or focus on maintaining its well honed edge in high-intensity warfare. The terms of the debate are clearly affected by the fact that United States is currently embroiled in perilous counterinsurgency and other irregular operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Should the Army recalibrate itself to wage counterinsurgency and other irregular operations more effectively, or does it need to keep doing what it does best with an eye to future conventional warfare? Given the impossibility of accurately predicting the character of future conflict, it is necessary for the Army to strike a balance between the extremes. But for the Army to effectively implement a policy of “balance,” it must be prepared to dramatically change the way it organizes itself and drop its opposition to specializing its forces for irregular and conventional warfare, respectively. The approach that the Army should take should be based upon a Total Force construct. By utilizing the entire Total Force portfolio, it should be possible to better optimize the mix of ground units prepared for conventional war, irregular war or peace operations to avoid a mis-match between national security strategy and military force. In this manner, it may be possible to stake our claim on the hard won lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan, yet hedge against the unknowable future.     

Reflections on the Iraq War: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy

Our foreign policy elites, the press, our elected representatives and the general public internalize “lessons” from each war, although the lessons may be wrong or misapplied. How we arrive at such consensus lessons is a mystery. It is too early to predict what lessons from Iraq will guide future U.S. decision-making. But on the situation as it now stands, it is possible to make some broad generalizations concerning what went right in Iraq and what went wrong.     

The American Way of Going to War: Mexico (1846) to Iraq (2003)

Prior to the Iraq War, there had been a long series of American wars in which U.S. leaders often maneuvered the other side into “firing the first shot.” This strategy of “passive defense” amounts to an American way of going to war, and it dates back at least to the U.S.-Mexican War. The United States thus retained the moral and legal legitimacy, an asset which is especially important in a democratic political system. The Iraq War represents a fundamental departure from this American way. It might be the worst crisis since Vietnam. but that war was just another entry in the U.S. playbook for how to go to war. The Iraq War not only contradicts longstanding practices in American foreign policy, but it has the potential to issue in far greater international disorder than the Vietnam War. This catastrophe may make future presidents more heedful of John Quincy Adams’ prophetic words: go not abroad in search of monsters to destroy.     

Parallels with the Past - How the Soviets Lost in Afghanistan, How the Americans are Losing

This article assesses seven startling and unsettling similarities between Soviet strategies and tactics in Afghanistan during their Afghan war of 1979-1989 and American coalition strategies and tactics in Afghanistan since October 2001. It concludes with the implications of this dynamic. In particular, the similarities between Soviet and U.S. approaches to Afghanistan that focus on key population centers, reconciliation/reintegration, and the development of “Afghan” solutions to a variety of security concerns are extremely disturbing and, we believe, should be the focus of national attention and debate.     

Non-Western Threats and the Social Sciences

As the Department of Defense strives to take the social sciences more seriously in the face of threats emanating from the non-West, it confronts several challenges. Among them, we Westerners cannot model non-Western minds. Nor can we devise a methodology that will accurately capture contingency. We may already be doing our “scientific” best with “pattern of life” targeting. Consequently, DoD should invest more heavily in individuals who already have an affinity for, and interest in, the non-West and who show promise as future commanders and talented analysts rather than spend large sums on trying to devise more comprehensive models, methodologies, and metrics.     

Dereliction of Duty Redux?: Post-Iraq American Civil-Military Relations

The protracted war in Iraq has exacerbated existing tensions and dysfunctional elements inherent in American civil-military relations. Many in the national security community were worried that civil-military relations were far from satisfactory well before the war.¹ For too long this dimension of “the American way of war” had been allowed to drift without resolution. The Iraq conflict could result in a further deterioration in this crucial component of strategic effectiveness due to mutual “scapegoating, blame-avoiding and willful institutional refusal to recognize and act on the sources of defeat.”² This essay explores the current precarious nature of civil-military relations in this country. It also explores the emergence of a “stab in the back” thesis among the military community, and various issues raised by the ongoing Long War. Based on this evaluation, the article concludes with some proposals to remedy or lessen the strains that exist today. These remedies seek to better define the compact and code of conduct that governs the overall relationship between the masters of policy and the dedicated servants we ask to carry out those policies.     

Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan

Afghanistan is in danger of capsizing in a perfect storm of insurgency that mimics operations and tactics witnessed in Iraq. This article assesses this insurgency and the re-emergent Taliban. The common view of the Taliban as simply a radical Afghan Islamist movement is overly simple, for that organization has been able to build on tribal kinship networks and a charismatic mullah phenomenon to mobilize a critical and dynamic rural base of support. This support, buttressed by Talib reinforcements from Pakistan's border areas, is enough to frustrate the U.S.-led Coalition's counterinsurgency strategy. At the operational level, the Taliban is fighting a classic “war of the flea,” while the Coalition continues to fight the war largely according to the Taliban “game plan.” This is resulting in its losing the war in Afghanistan one Pashtun village at a time.     

NGOs: A ‘New Class’ in International Relations

Nongovernmental organizations have attempted to take control of civil society, displacing traditional governing institutions. This serves the interests of the terrorists, warlords, and mafia dons, who benefit from weak central government, and hinders the West's ability to mobilize allies to participate in the war on terror. NGO leaders who are hostile to the nation-state itself seek to transform a voluntary system of participation in international organizations by sovereign member-states via a “power shift” to an unholy alliance of multinational corporations and NGOs. Since they do not possess the traditional sources of legitimacy enjoyed by nation-states, they seek to impose their will by financial or forceful means—for example, “sanctions” or “humanitarian intervention.” A new class of NGOs has thus emerged that is essentially opposed to the diplomatic, legal, and military measures required for dealing with civilizational conflict.     

Rereading Early Twentieth-Century IR Theory: Idealism Revisited

The article presents a “revisionist” synopsis of the thinking of some important early twentieth-century “Idealist” IR writers. I contend that these writers ground their interpretations of international relations on a shared paradigm that has hitherto gone largely unrecognised. Following a critique of certain widely held views of IR Idealism, I draw attention to a number of aspects or themes in this body of writing in an attempt to establish the underlying paradigm. I argue that the authors in question were familiar with the type of thinking that later came to be called Realist, but held that industrial modernisation rendered it increasingly anachronistic and dangerous. The crucial difference between Idealism and Realism is in their respective theories of history. In order to understand Idealist IR thinking, it is essential to realise the extent to which it relies on the notion, not so much of progress (as is usually asserted) as of an inescapable, directional historical process.     

Cheap Hawks, Cheap Doves, and the Pursuit of Strategy

The post-9/11 threats to American security require a complete revision of American national strategy. For too long, presidents have had to favor quick, cheap solutions to crises, unable to count on support from the “homebody” public for long, drawn-out conflicts. “Cheap hawks” among them have hoped that apocalyptic rhetoric will suffice when resources fall short; “cheap doves” hope that by ignoring the threat, it will go away. But with the war on terror, the revival of geopolitics, and ever-accelerating globalization, the U.S. tradition of bellicose rhetoric backed by underwhelming force is a recipe for failure. To effectively manage its threats, America needs a new catechism and to make sure its economic, energy, and military policies support this.     

Fighting the wimp image: Why calls for negotiation often fall on deaf ears

Conclusion Must calls for war always dominate pleas for more serious negotiation? Not necessarily. But, if negotiation is to prevail, its advocates have to recognize which elements of their rhetoric sound weak and timid to others.Right after the routing of the Iraqis from Kuwait, the conventional wisdom was that American voters would repudiate those members of Congress who had argued for more negotiation — the surrender lobby, one belligerent called them. Iraq would teach elected officials not to talk of negotiation in the future. Now, barely a year from the start of hostilities, the verdict is not quite so clear. With Saddam still in power and the establishment of President Bush's new world order yet to be proven, opinion polls suggest that a growing number of Americans now regard the war as only a partial success. Public awareness of the costs of war, as well as its seeming benefits, can only be to the good, but apostles of negotiation should be careful not to read such numbers as vindication of their views. Skepticism about war still must be matched by some well-founded confidence in its alternative. Michael Wheeler is Director of the Undergraduate Program, Department of Urban Studies and Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass. 02139. He is also Deputy Director of the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School.     

The Bush Doctrine: The Foreign Policy of Republican Empire

The dominant narrative concerning the Bush Doctrine maintains that it is a dangerous innovation, an anomaly that violates the principles of sound policy as articulated by the Founders. According to the conventional wisdom, the Bush Doctrine represents the exploitation of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, by a small group of ideologues—the “neoconservatives”—to gain control of national policy and lead the United States into the war in Iraq, a war that should never have been fought. But far from a being a neoconservative innovation, the Bush Doctrine is, in fact, well within the mainstream of U.S. foreign policy and very much in keeping with the vision of America's founding generation and the practice of the statesmen in the Early Republic. The Bush Doctrine is only the latest manifestation of the fact that U.S. national interest has always been concerned with more than simple security.     

Can We Win a War If We Have to Fight by Cosmopolitan Rules?

After months of bombing, NATO achieved only a stalemate in Libya. That disappointing result may reflect NATO's commitment to respect “international humanitarian law,” now understood to impose severe limits on military operations that might harm civilians. This body of rules is a departure from traditional understandings of the law of war. The embrace of these inhibiting rules raises serious questions about whether western nations are now prepared to fight and win actual wars.     

Grand Strategy of ‘Restrainment’

With the end of the Cold War, the subsequent global war on terror, the global economic recession, and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, one would think that the United States would have formulated a grand strategy for dealing with these problems. This, however, is not the case. This article advances a grand strategy of “restrainment,” as a guiding concept for our approach to international politics. It builds from the principle that U.S. policy must seek to restrain—individually and collectively—those forces, ideas, and movements in international politics that create instability, crises, and war.     

Rethinking the Battle of Ideas: How the United States Can Help Muslim Moderates

There is little disagreement in Washington that the United States is losing the so-called Battle of Ideas, and there is a surprising consensus on what needs to be done: “reach out” to Muslim moderates. Bolstering moderate voices in the Muslim world is indeed crucial to the fate of the War on Terror, but “reaching out” to them is no solution. In fact, it is the last thing Muslim moderates need, since it deepens their legitimacy problems. The West's criticism may do more to help Muslim moderates become a political force to be reckoned with than its love ever could. This “cruel to be kind” rhetorical strategy can, and should, be combined with open material support for Arab and Muslim civil society, but crucially without regard to political orientation. Such a policy has its drawbacks and it will be a difficult sell, but it is the only way to make progress in the Battle of Ideas.     

Bleak New World

Writing immediately after September 11, 2001, the author reflects on how America’s optimism was transformed to a “Bleak New World” and considers the significance of classifying the terrorists’ deeds as an act of war.     

Competitive Engagement: Upgrading America's Influence

America's instruments of foreign policy are weak. As a result, Washington depends much more on its military power than it should. The militarization of foreign policy is neither good for American interests nor sustainable, since many political, economic, and ideological outcomes are not attainable through the use of military force. Yet ongoing discussions about America's non- military power miss one important factor: in virtually every theater of the world, local, regional, and strategic competitions affect America's ability to exert influence through its aid and diplomacy. From Pakistan to the Middle East to Africa, ideas about how to develop economies, shape educational systems, administer health care programs, and build political institutions, are contested. Until the competitive nature of aid and diplomacy is deliberately and explicitly considered, Washington's ability to achieve outcomes using its non-military power—often called “soft” or “smart power”—will remain fundamentally limited.