Armed Conflict and Adolescents’ Early Transition to Childbearing

We estimate the effect of armed conflict on adolescents’ childbearing transition. Three types of models are estimated: models in origin, which determine the current effect of violence; context change models, which estimate the effect of decreased violence levels; and violence aftermath models, which indicate the groups that do not completely adapt to a peaceful context. Through multilevel logistic models, we find that the coefficient of violence depends on the municipality in where adolescents reside or resided. We conclude that violence promotes the transition to childbearing particularly among rural females. However, a reduction in violence levels reduces the probabilities of childbearing.     

Female Autonomy,Social Norms and Intimate Partner Violence against Women in Turkey

The theoretical literature asserts that intimate partner violence against women stems from inequalities within the relationship, and it strengthens both male power and control, and female subordination. Using Structural Equation Modelling, this paper addresses the two-way relationship between intimate partner violence and female autonomy in Turkey. Consistent with the theory, we find that (1) violence has a significant and negative effect on female autonomy; and (2) the incidence of violence decreases with the level of female autonomy. We also find that intimate partner violence is an increasing function of the strength of men’s commitment to social norms upholding traditional gender roles.     

Do Remittances Diminish Social Violence?

This paper represents the first attempt to formalise the relationship between remittances and social violence by developing a model that predicts that migrants’ remittances lead to the reduction of social violence in the recipient economy under the condition that remittances increase the average product of labour. Using homicide data as an indicator of social violence, we tested our model’s prediction. Controlling for the endogeneity problem with appropriate instruments, we found that remittances tend to reduce social violence. We performed sensitivity analysis on remittances in the empirical specification and found it robust with an unchanged negative sign.     

Containing Conflict or Instigating Unrest? A Test of the Effects of State Infrastructural Power on Civil Violence

Several scholars argue that state infrastructural power affects the likelihood of civil violence yet make competing claims. Some propose that states with high levels of infrastructural power instigate violence by reducing local autonomy, while others suggest infrastructural power endows states with the capacity to contain civil violence. We test these claims using both qualitative and quantitative methods. Through a pooled time-series analysis of 32 former British colonies, we find that infrastructural power is not significantly related to civil violence, suggesting either that infrastructural power has no effect or no net effect. Then, through case studies of Burma and Botswana, we investigate the impact of infrastructural power on civil violence, focusing on mechanisms and causal conditions. The case studies provide evidence that infrastructural power produces competing mechanisms that negate any net effect and that different conditions and policies affect whether a state’s level of infrastructural power contains conflict or instigates unrest.     

The Enemy of My Enemy is My Friend … The Dynamics of Self-Defense Forces in Irregular War: The Case of the Sons of Iraq

This article assesses the effect that leveraging civilian defense force militias has on the dynamics of violence in civil war. We argue that the delegation of security and combat roles to local civilians shifts the primary targets of insurgent violence toward civilians, in an attempt to deter future defections, and re-establish control over the local population. This argument is assessed through an analysis of the Sunni Awakening and ancillary Sons of Iraq paramilitary program. The results suggest that at least in the Al-Anbar province of Iraq, the utilization of the civilian population in counterinsurgent roles had significant implications for the targets of insurgent violence.     

Business and the Politics of Urban Violence in Colombia

What explains variation in local government policy responses to urban violence? Existing research on the politics of urban violence overlooks the pivotal role that private sector interests play in shaping the public provision of security in major developing world cities faced with conditions of intense violence. I argue that business is a pivotal political actor that mobilizes through powerful private sector institutions to shape policy responses to urban violence in ways that advance its economic interests and preserve its privileged status in local political arenas. The security policy preferences of business vary across economic sectors due to variation in relations to urban space and violence. This cross-sectoral variation in security policy preferences generates both opportunities and challenges for political and societal actors that seek to stem and prevent urban violence. Analysis of puzzling variation in policy responses across Colombia's three principal cities—Medellin, Cali, and Bogota—and over time within each shows that a focus on business can strengthen our understanding of the politics of urban violence and, more broadly, its implications for development.     

Conflict-Induced Displacement and Violence in Colombia

Recent work in the refugee literature finds that both insurgents hiding in camps and aid to refugees may increase violence. This article assesses whether this theory applies to Conflict Induced Displaced People (IDPs). Specifically, it asks if the arrival of IDPs increases leftist violence in Colombia. Colombia has high numbers of IDPs, significant insurgent violence, and available sub-national data to enable an examination of IDP flows on leftist violence. In the Colombian case, the arrival of conflict induced displaced people is not associated with increased leftist violence.     

Ethnicity and conflict severity: accounting for the effect of co-ethnic and non-ethnic militias on battlefield lethality

How does the presence of armed pro-regime groups affect conflict lethality? This study examines the relationship between ethnicity, militia violence and conflict lethality in civil wars. We emphasise that differences in whether pro-regime militias were recruited in accordance with their ethnicity or not are critical in their influence upon conflict lethality, which we estimate in battlefield deaths. To that end, we categorise militias into groups recruited on their ethnic basis (co-ethnic militias) and those recruited regardless of their ethnicity (non-ethnic militias). We hypothesise that conflicts are more lethal when non-ethnic militias are involved. We link higher number of battle-deaths in conflicts with non-ethnic militias with the militia use of one-sided violence against civilians. Co-ethnic militias – that is militias recruited from the same ethnicity as rebels – are deployed amongst their co-ethnics and therefore tend to target civilians less than non-ethnic militias. This militia–civilian relationship has direct impact on conflict severity. To test our hypotheses we conduct global statistical analysis of 84 intrastate conflicts from 1989 to 2014.     

Population Pressure,Horizontal Inequality and Political Violence: A Disaggregated Study of Indonesian Provinces, 1990–2003

All parts of a country are rarely equally affected by political violence. Yet statistical studies largely fail to address sub-national conflict dynamics. We address this gap studying variations in ‘routine’ and ‘episodic’ violence between Indonesian provinces from 1990 to 2003. Within a grievance framework, the article focuses on the violence potential of resource scarcity and population pressure, as well as inter-group dynamics related to polarisation and horizontal inequality. Demographic pressure and inequality seem to have little effect in isolation. However, in provinces where population growth is high, greater levels of inequality between religious groups appear to increase the violence risk.     

Paying for Violence? Spousal Abuse and Son Preference in India

We find a puzzling correlation in the data on domestic violence and children’s outcomes in India. Using the 2005–2006 National Family and Health Survey, we see that girls in families experiencing spousal violence are less worse off than boys when only fathers report a son preference while the gender bias reverses when only mothers report having a son preference. To shed light on the puzzle in the data, we present a non-cooperative theoretical framework based in economic theories of domestic violence, whereby differing parental son preference and bargaining over investments in girl and boy children potentially explains the observed relationship.     

Receptivity to Violence in Ethnically Divided Societies: A Micro-Level Mechanism of Perceived Horizontal Inequalities

Although past scholarship shows that group inequalities in economic and political power (“Horizontal Inequalities”) correlate with dissent, violence, and civil wars, there is no direct empirical test of the perceptual explanation for this relationship at the individual level. Such explanation is vital to understanding how integration, inclusion in power-sharing agreements, and exclusion from political power filter down to mass publics. Moreover, subjective perceptions of group conditions do not always correspond to objective group realities. We hypothesize subjective perceptions attenuate the effect of objective exclusion on support for violence in ethnically divided societies. Cross-national comparative multilevel analyses of the 2005/6 Afrobarometer dataset (N = 19,278) confirm that subjective perceptions both amplify the effect of exclusion on acceptance of violence and alter the readiness of included groups to dissent. These findings carry implications for research, state-building, and conflict management.     

Shining light into dark shadows of violence and learned helplessness: peace education in South Korean schools

The paper illustrates how a culture of violence is perpetuated and reproduced in South Korea through schooling and argues that peace education could help transform a culture of violence to a culture of peace. Critical ethnographic methods and a framework of peace education were applied to a sample of secondary schools in South Korea to argue that a disturbing culture of violence and learned helplessness were present; this comprises themes of direct and indirect violence through iljin (a group of students who are considered key perpetrators of school violence); a colonized false ideology and resistance to social justice. More positively, findings are also used to generate possibilities for pedagogical change based on peace education – an approach that proves useful both as an analytical frame for examining peace-violence relations in education and society and as an essential pedagogy for progressing towards peace in South Korean schools.     

What Terrorist Leaders Want: A Content Analysis of Terrorist Propaganda Videos

In recent years, a growing body of empirical research suggests that indiscriminate violence against civilian targets tends to carry substantial political risks compared to more selective violence against military targets. To better understand why terrorist groups sometimes attack politically suboptimal targets, scholars are increasingly adopting a principal-agent framework where the leaders of terrorist groups are understood as principals and lower level members as agents. According to this framework, terrorist leaders are thought to behave as essentially rational political actors, whereas lower level members are believed to harbor stronger non-political incentives for harming civilians, often in defiance of leadership preferences. We test this proposition with an original content analysis of terrorist propaganda videos. Consistent with the principal–agent framework, our analysis demonstrates statistically that terrorist leaders tend to favor significantly less indiscriminate violence than their operatives actually commit, providing unprecedented insight into the incentive structure of terrorist leaders relative to the rank-and-file.     

Understanding conflict resolution philosophically in a school setting: three different kinds of violence and dialogue

According to Galtung, violence can be divided into two kinds: (i) direct violence, which is always physical in a wider sense (e.g. bodily harm or verbal abuse) or (ii) indirect violence that is either structural (i.e. the institution is structurally violent because it is organised so to privilege a group over others; e.g. a strict pyramidal organisational structure) or cultural (i.e. the institution is culturally violent because it encourages or fails to deal with cultural aspects that either privileges or is demeaning towards certain groups; e.g. institutionalised racism or misogyny). Galtung’s theory provides us with three levels of violence, leading us to three different potential forms of conflict. In response to this, I propose a philosophical discussion centred on three distinct kinds of dialogue, each of which explaining forms of conflict resolution dealing with these three kinds of violence identified by Galtung. That is, Buber’s, Levinas’ and Arendt’s conceptions of dialogue, dealing, respectively, with physical, cultural and structural violence. Given that violence has become a growing problem within the education context and that various strategies of conflict resolution have been tried and are being pursued, my discussion will enable those involved in these ventures to gain a better understanding of the problem and of its possible solutions.     

Violence and ordering of the Third World: an introduction

Abstract

The decisive role violence has played in the ordering of the Third World cannot be ignored or consigned to the past. Accordingly, we argue for a more systematic and determined attention to the connections between the devastation unleashed by colonialism, imperialism, and other forms of large-scale violence in the post-independence periods. In contradistinction to situating violence in and against the Third World as a backdrop of incomplete modernization, we recognize that its proper location is in the larger dynamics of racialized and colonial international relations. The articles in this volume address these dynamics of violence.     

The nexus between vulnerabilities and violence in the Caribbean*

Abstract

This article analyses the nexus between the Caribbean’s manifold vulnerabilities and the direct and structural violence evident throughout the region’s history. It argues that Caribbean states are threatened not only by direct violence but also by the structural violence permeating in impoverished and marginalised sectors of the state–society complex. Both forms of violence are attributable to the historical legacy of colonisation, to US paternalism and hegemonic dominance in the post-colonial era, and to the persistence of the coloniality of power, even after Caribbean states won their independence from European imperial powers. Today, the region is, per capita, one of the most violent areas on the globe. Evidence of concatenated violence is growing across this region, demonstrating the difficulty small underdeveloped states have in addressing threats to their security, independence, economic viability, and continued existence in the intermestic environment within which they operate.     

Neo-Orientalism and the new barbarism thesis: Aspects of symbolic violence in the Middle East conflict(s)

Imaginaries of 'terrorism' and 'Arab mind' backwardness can be seen as closely connected: the latter explains the former as irrational--violence thus becomes the product of backward cultures. I regard this way of representing the violence of peripheralised peoples as a specific expression of symbolic violence: new barbarism. The 'new barbarism' thesis implies explanations of political violence that omit political and economic interests and contexts when describing violence, and presents violence as a result of traits embedded in local cultures. New barbarism and neo-Orientalist imaginaries may serve as hegemonic strategies when the production of enemy imaginaries contributes to legitimise continuous colonial economic or political projects, as can be witnessed in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.     

The political economy of the cycles of violence and non-violence in the Sikh struggle for identity and political power: implications for Indian federalism

This paper presents a critique of the essentialist notions of any community as a pacifist or militant community by examining the long history of the cycles of violence and non-violence in the evolution of the Sikh community in the Indian subcontinent. The theoretical premise of the paper is that communities' resort to violence and non-violence is determined by their strategic perspectives to achieve their politico-economic goals and not from any doctrinal adherence to violence or non-violence. The paper attempts a panoramic view of over 500 years of Sikh history (1469 – 2006) and offers a reinterpretation of that history by locating cycles of violence and non-violence in their historical context. It then provides a politico-economic perspective on violence and non-violence in their struggle for identity and political power. It focuses more on an analysis of the recent political conflict between Sikh militants and the Indian state, and concludes by drawing out the policy implications of that analysis for the politics of the modern Indian state regarding the Sikhs of Punjab. It identifies federal arrangements and human rights as issues of key importance in the political economy of this relationship.     

Labour standards,global markets and non-state initiatives: Colombia's and Ecuador's flower industries in comparative perspective

Political violence in Algeria has often been accounted for only by recourse to caricatures of a society supposedly ‘intensely violent’ by nature, or else rationalised as the product of a peculiar political culture and national historical experience. Departing from both approaches, this article suggests that different occurrences of both state and non-state violence must be understood as particular, distinct moments in both the recomposition and breakdown of inherently conflictual social relations. While Algerian history (including colonial history) provides many examples of the non-violent negotiation of social and political tensions, the social production and experience of violence have been written into dominant historiographies and public culture in complex ways. These complexities of the successive ways in which different moments of violence have been encoded belie both theories of the inescapable reproduction of cyclical violence as a pattern of political behaviour, and less sophisticated, but enduring, clichés of ‘Algerian savagery’.     

Psychological Barriers to a Peaceful Resolution: Longitudinal Evidence from the Middle East and Northern Ireland

Does individual-level exposure to political violence prompt conciliatory attitudes? Does the answer vary by phase of conflict? The study uses longitudinal primary datasets to test the hypothesis that conflict-related experiences impact conciliation. Data were collected from Israeli Jews, Palestinians, and Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland. Across both contexts, and among both parties to each conflict, psychological distress and threat perceptions had a polarizing effect on conciliatory preferences. The study highlights that experiences of political violence are potentially a crucial source of psychological distress, and consequently, a continuing barrier to peace. This has implications in peacemaking, implying that alongside removing the real threat of violence, peacemakers must also work toward the social and political inclusion of those most affected by previous violence.