Curbing Corruption in Government Procurement in Southeast Asia: Challenges and Constraints

Corruption in the government procurement of goods, services and public works has been commonplace in Southeast Asian states (with the exception of Singapore) over many years. It has affected the provision of vital services and infrastructure and has been a key factor in undermining standards of governance. In recent years, reforms have been introduced in the region to combat corruption in the procurement process. However, to date their impact in many of the states has been at best limited. The article will consider the nature, types and extent of corruption in government procurement in the various states of Southeast Asia, following which it will discuss the reforms that have been introduced to address the problem. The article will then assess the limited impact of the reforms, and discuss the two reasons for this. The first reason was that the reforms were not sufficiently comprehensive and precise in tackling the entire spectrum of corruption in procurement and in creating the necessary legal powers for watchdog and enforcement bodies when dealing with such practices. Second, there were serious weaknesses in the implementation of these reforms, especially in translating legal provisions into everyday practice. Of particular importance are the limited capacity and status of watchdog and enforcement bodies, and the extent to which they are also compromised through corruption. The conclusion will consider the lessons to be learnt in tackling procurement corruption from the experience of the states of Southeast Asia and the challenges they face in pursuing further reform in the future.     

Executive-Led Governance or Executive Power ‘Hollowed-Out’—The Political Quagmire of Hong Kong

New Zealand has long enjoyed a reputation as a country with a corruption‐free state sector. However, social change and the state sector reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, have rendered that status less secure. While hard‐core corruption does not yet appear to be a major problem, what constitutes corruption can be a function of changing public perceptions and attitudes. Four main types of behaviour of public officials are identified, all of which have a bearing on how corruption is perceived. In New Zealand, there is casual evidence that hard‐core corruption might be more common today than in the past, but the official attitude to the possibility of it increasing seems to be overly sanguine, partly as a result of a very narrow definition of corruption. Vigilance could be enhanced by a stronger role for Parliament's agency, the Office of the Controller and Auditor‐General.     

Seeing through African protest logics: a longitudinal review of continuity and change in protests in Ghana

Protests in Africa have a long history. Yet, for many years, western misconceptions in protest studies have hindered our understanding of the particularities and commonalities of African protests. In this study, we scrutinize the historical continuity and discontinuity of protests in Africa, using Ghana as a case. We situate a longitudinal analysis of protests in Ghana within the theoretical model of protest logics, using the institutional-analytical method. The study finds historical continuity largely in terms of proletarian (high cost of living, dispossession and inadequate infrastructure), republican (participatory governance and corruption) and corporatist (working conditions and unemployment) mobilisation themes in Ghana. These themes are underpinned by the processes of class struggle, accumulation by (urban) dispossession, neoliberalism, splintered urbanism, gentrification and corruption. The implication of this study is that contemporary protests in Africa would be influenced by issues such as high cost of living, participatory governance, erratic power supply, unemployment, poor road infrastructure and corruption. These issues should be prioritized in the agenda of African governments in order to avert spontaneous protests.     

Is Corruption Really Bad for Inequality? Evidence from Latin America

This article presents new evidence on the relationship between corruption and income inequality. Using a panel data methodology, we find that lower corruption is associated with higher income inequality in Latin America. This result is in contrast to other empirical studies but it makes sense in Latin America for a number of reasons. The finding of an inverse relationship between inequality and corruption suggests that institutional reform policies by themselves may be misguided.     

Corruption and anti-corruption in reform China

During the transition period, the extent of corruption in China is higher than before. Meanwhile the forms and characters of Chinese corruption are also different in many important aspects from those of its past and of other countries. This paper explores the causes, consequences of corruption and anti-corruption campaigns of the Chinese government. The major conclusion of this paper is that further political reform toward democracy should be the direction of future anti-corruption efforts.     

The birth of corruption and the politics of anti-corruption in Albania, 1991–2005

This paper analyzes the transformation of the signifier “corruption” in the Albanian public sphere during the period 1991–2005 from a discourse analysis approach. The aim is not to trace corruption in its presence and consequences, but to show how different articulations of corruption supported different agendas. More specifically, this paper aims to show how the corruption discourse that dominated Albanian public discussion during the period 1998–2005 served to legitimize a neoliberal order by articulating corruption as inherent to the public sector and to state intervention in the economy. This meant that corruption could be eliminated through neoliberal policies such as privatization and deregulation. Through a discourse analysis of corruption it is possible to politicize the concept of corruption instead of reducing it to a static and inherent feature of Albanian culture and society.     

Corruption networks as a sphere of investment activities in modern Russia

This paper studies a new phenomenon, the ‘top to bottom’ corruption networks of organized crime, law enforcement and Government officials in Russia. We examine the Soviet roots of corruption and its transformation during transitional period. By focusing on contemporary Russian corruption networks this paper explores the complex of state-run oligarchic structure with established rates, well organized inter-institutional groups incorporated by common ideas of extracting profits. The danger is in the existence of extensive and stable corruption networks, which not only profit by their illegal activities between Organized Crime groups and Law Enforcements, but invest in further corrupt developments to control the government. We argue that corruption in Russia, for a long time, has been imbedded in the system of social relations and, by the majority of citizens, was not considered to be a crime. Presenting arguments against existing simplified understanding of corruption, this study elucidates corruption networks as an expansion of Organized Crime in all spheres of post-totalitarian Russia. It also shows that a magic circle of corruption closely intertwines with the inefficiency of power and the inefficiency of rule of law.     

Constraints or Complaints? Business Climate and Firm Performance Perceptions in Uganda

This paper identifies the business constraints that are most binding for firm performance. Using panel methods on novel quarterly Ugandan business climate data, we exploit perceived changes in business climate constraints to account for changes in firm performance. Not all identified constraints are binding for firm performance. Macroeconomic instability, demand stability, access to finance, corruption/bribery, and weather variability are found to be binding constraints. Firms’ expectations about future performance outcomes are associated with current perceptions about these constraints, alleviating endogeneity concerns to some extent. While taxation constraints are usually highly ranked, we do not find evidence linking them to firm performance.     

Weep for the One Who Descends? African Democracies,Politics of Stomach Infrastructure,and Homology of Corruption

This article discusses contemporary African democratic practices vis-à-vis politics of stomach infrastructure that debilitates sustainable infrastructural development in the region. In this article, clarifications are articulated within four interlinked phenomena: the enthusiasm for democracy, its collapse, and the resurgence of hybrid-democratic order that metamorphosed into politics of stomach infrastructure that facilitates corruption in African postcolonial state. It unravels the existing democratic prototype against ideal democratic order. The article considered the prevailing democratic inclination moseyed through citizens and political elite’s armistice that presage democratic peril. The article argued that unscrupulous political collaboration and democratic debauchery that exist between the political elites and the electorates craft an opportunity for institutionalized corruption in the region. Finally, the article found homogenous paradigms of corruption in the selected African states, including South Africa, Tanzania, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Nigeria.     

Social contracts and authoritarian projects in post-Soviet space: The use of administrative resource

Drawing on evidence from Ukraine and other post-Soviet states, this article analyses the use of a tool of political coercion known in the post-communist world as adminresurs, or administrative resource. Administrative resource is characterized by the pre-election capture of bureaucratic hierarchies by an incumbent regime in order to secure electoral success at the margins. In contrast to other forms of political corruption, administrative resource fundamentally rewrites existing social contracts. It redefines access to settled entitlements—public infrastructure, social services, and labor compensation—as rewards for political support. It is thus explicitly negative for publics, who stand to lose access to existing entitlements if they do not support incumbents. The geography of its success in post-communist states suggests that this tool of authoritarian capacity building could be deployed anywhere two conditions are present: where there are economically vulnerable populations, and where economic and political spheres of life overlap.     

The Effects of Corruption on Satisfaction with Local and National Governments. Does Corruption ‘Grease the Wheels’?

Abstract

A causal association was found between higher levels of corruption and lower levels of satisfaction with local and national governments. However, interaction term analysis provides suggestive evidence that: first, as public service satisfaction increases, the effects of corruption change from negative values to positive values for both local and national governments; second, as political situations improve, the negative effects of corruption diminish for both local and national governments; and, third, as the economic situation improves, the negative effects of corruption diminish for local, but not for national governments.     

A Micro-Level Study of the Relationship Between Experienced Corruption and Subjective Wellbeing in Africa

The economic consequences of corruption have been widely studied. A growing number of studies exists on the relationship between corruption and subjective wellbeing. However, very few studies have examined how individual experiences of corruption are correlated with subjective wellbeing. In this paper, we explore whether, and to what extent, paying a bribe, giving a gift, or doing a favour for a government official to obtain a document or service influences wellbeing. In addition, we test whether being at the receiving end of corrupt practices affects the individual’s wellbeing. We find that experienced corruption undermines individual wellbeing for both bribe victims and recipients.     

Will REDD+ Safeguards Mitigate Corruption? Qualitative Evidence from Southeast Asia

High levels of faith and finance are being invested in REDD+ as a promising global climate change mitigation policy. Since its inception in 2007, corruption has been viewed as a potential impediment to the achievement of REDD+ goals, partly motivating ‘safeguards’ rolled out as part of national REDD+ readiness activities. We compare corruption mitigation measures adopted as part of REDD+ safeguards, drawing on qualitative case evidence from three Southeast Asian countries that have recently piloted the scheme: Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. We find that while REDD+ safeguards adopt a conventional principal-agent approach to tackling corruption in the schemes, our case evidence confirms our theoretical expectation that REDD+ corruption risks are perceived to arise not only from principal-agent type problems: they are also linked to embedded pro-corruption social norms. This implies that REDD+ safeguards are likely to be at best partially effective against corruption, and at worst will not mitigate corruption at all.     

Natural resources and corruption in post-war transitions: matters of trust

Many ‘post-conflict’ countries face difficulties in reaping the full benefits of their natural resource wealth for reconstruction and development purposes. This is a major issue given these countries’ needs and the risk of seeing ‘mismanaged’ primary sectors undermine a transition to peace. Bringing together debates about the ‘inequality-mistrust-corruption’ trap and relationships between natural resources and corruption, this paper suggest that some resource sectors may be more likely to foster inequalities, and thereby increase corruption and distrust, while others are less likely to do so. Reviewing arguments and empirical evidence, I point to the relative importance of transition contexts, stakeholder incentives and resource sector characteristics, and suggest how resource-related corruption may be better understood in relation to trust-building and reconciliation processes.     

Corruption,the power of state and big business in Soviet and post-Soviet regimes

The growth of corruption after 1991 was probably unavoidable. The privatization of the state economy created favorable conditions for corruption, which did not exist before. The feudalization of a society, with its weakening of the state and the high autonomy of its office holders, was another major factor behind the outburst of corruption. However, while these “objective” factors account for a great part of corruption's growth, the transformation of the leaders of the country to people who encouraged corruption for their own benefit—one of the major elements of feudalization—also played an extremely large role in spreading corruption inside the country.Corruption poses greater concerns to society in the long term. Russian corruption undermines labor ethics, particularly among younger generations. Russian youths firmly believe that bribes and connections are the best and perhaps only way to become successful. Widespread corruption creates a parallel, semi-feudal chain of command that competes with the official hierarchy. The weakness of law enforcement agencies, as well as the army—now almost totally demoralized—is, to a great extent, the product of corruption.     

Gender and Corruption in Business

Are firms with female owners or managers less corrupt than other firms? We test this question using firm-level data on corruption, ownership, and management. We find that women in positions of influence are associated with less corruption: female owners are associated with a lower incidence of bribery and report smaller levels of bribery. Moreover, corruption is seen as less of an obstacle in companies where women are represented in top management. By providing evidence that women are associated with lower levels of corruption in business our research contributes to the literature on development, gender equality, and corruption.     

Anti-corruption or accountability? International efforts in post-conflict Liberia

This paper analyses anti-corruption efforts in post-conflict Liberia. It highlights citizens’ views on the definition of corruption and argues that, in the past, anti-corruption efforts have often focused on institution building and formal justice mechanisms without sufficient understanding of accountability dynamics on the ground. Anti-corruption approaches in Liberia have only nominally examined whether there is a shared understanding of what ‘corruption’ is and why it is regarded as a problem. The paper examines the social norms and perceptions that underlie understandings of the term corruption. It argues that the international community may have overlooked the fact that ‘corruption’ has become an all-encompassing term that masks a myriad of differing priorities and concerns. The authors posit that ‘accountability’ may be a more useful lens for those actors hoping to improve governance in these contexts.     

Can elite corruption be a legitimate Machiavellian tool in an unruly world? The case of post-conflict Cambodia

Elite corruption may have a significant role in ending conflicts and shaping post-conflict development. This article enquires into the legitimacy accorded to such corruption. It reviews literature on post-conflict Cambodia, seeking evidence that academic commentaries, public opinion or elites themselves regard elite corruption as a legitimate Machiavellian tool for achieving other ends. Corruption has been an element of the style of government adopted by the dominant party in Cambodia, shaping both the achievement of peace and the uneven economic development that followed. Academic commentaries provide some implicit and explicit legitimation of corruption as a means to secure peace and to resist neoliberal policy settings by affording government discretionary resources and power. Meanwhile, public dissatisfaction with elite corruption appears to the most likely source of renewed violent conflict in Cambodia. How elite actors rationalise and legitimise corrupt behaviour remains poorly understood, and is deserving of more attention.     

Governmental Corruption and Social Change in New Zealand: Using Scenarios, 1950–2020

New Zealand has long enjoyed a reputation as a country with a corruption-free state sector, and ranks very highly on the Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (meaning its corruption levels are perceived to be extremely low). However, there is prima facie evidence to suggest that this situation may be changing, not dramatically but significantly. While the state sector changes of the 1980s and early 1990s may be having some impact on this shift, it also has to be understood in the context of wider societal changes, which are probably more decisive. After some brief conceptual clarification, the article presents three scenarios sketching past (1950s/1960s), present (1990s–2006) and future (2006–2020) social and governmental conditions thought to be relevant to corruption levels.     

Protesting Putin or protecting rights? Media reflections on reflective student activism

This paper considers new challenges for Russian universities and the state, including flourishing and widespread corruption, politicization and state pressure, and student activism, and hypothesizes on how these three may be linked. To do so, this paper uses systematic research of media accounts from 2007 to 2012 in order to investigate student activism and its possible links with corruption and university politicization. This paper develops a theoretical extension that explains the corruption and coercion mechanism as applied to student activism, and places emphasis on higher education corruption and state pressure applied to universities. This study concludes that students are more interested in fighting for their economic rights and fulfilment of contractual obligations by the universities, while remaining politically inactive. This is normal for modern Russian society, where market reforms in higher education gain momentum, while democratic changes in the country remain very slow.