Population and development: fact,fancy and politics

Massive population growth is an accepted fact in developing countries at a time when developed, Western countries, i.e., the U.S., have become increasingly disenchanted with foreign aid. The gap between the very rich and very poor becomes wider and sharper. Most people live either in countries where the per capita income is below $320 or above $1,280. Lowering fertility rates would be favorable to economic conditions in the long run but with little short-run effect, population control is not a high priority government activity. The theme of the 1974 Bucharest Conference was that if development were encouraged, fertility would take care of itself. Programs which directly influence fertility rates are needed to improve development. Family planning programs are low cost compared to other development policies, and they improve maternal and child health. Women cannot be educated or employed unless they have the freedom of choice not to have children or when to have children. Western enthusiasm for fertility control has been met with suspicion in many devleoping areas. Western attitudes should be balanced by restructuring world trade and constructing relationships which would hasten economic development.     

The world population situation

Population experts appear to be reaching a consensus that there has been a perceptible decline over the last decade in the growth of the world's population. The decline is accounted for by the "new demographic transition" in the less developed countries (LDCs). The decline in fertility rates began in the 1950s in some LDCs and became more widespread during the 1970s. The process has not yet begun in many of the LDCs. During the 1960s it was observed that the declines in birth rates (to levels of 30 of less per 1000) were occurring mostly in small countries. Many of these countries were islands with levels of social and economic development above the developing country average. The key question is whether the recent downward trend in fertility in LDCs will continue, stabilize at the current level, or rise again. A primary concern about the future is that the poorer and less developed countries will end up with an increasing share of the world's population, with the share of the developed countries declining from 34% to 22% over the 1950-2000 period. Considerable differential exists in demographic growth patterns among various regions. The 12 largest LDCs (China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria, Mexico, Vietnam, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey) contain 55% of the current world population, and the fertility decline of these nations is expected to have the maximum impact. 7 of these countries have had fertility declines of 14-35%. The force of the "population momentum" must also be considered. Most developing country populations have a young age distribution with considerable potential for population growth even after the fertility level reaches a replacement level and the net reproduction rate equals 1.     

The analysis of social interest rate in Trinidad and Tobago

In this article a Social Interest Rate (SIR) is derived for Trinidad and Tobago on the basis of an individualistic, independent and multi‐period consumption utility function. The component parameters of this rate are: a mortality‐based pure time discount rate, the growth rate of per capita real consumption and the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption. The final result is 6.2 per cent which is plausible and thus can be readily used by economic planners in various resource allocation policies in that country.     

Level of living and fertility among a rural population of the Philippines

This study examines the issue of whether the relationship of fertility to measures of economic resources is different at lower income levels than at higher levels. Testing was done in a rural Philippine setting in 1978-79. 3 measures of economic resources were utilized -- income, quality of housing, and provision of schooling for children. The data were drawn from a survey of rural families residing in 5 muncipalities of Iloilo province, on Panay Island in the central Philippines. In the study design, villages (or barangays) were selected from the 5 municipalities to obtain equal numbers of 3 agricultural types -- upland, rainfed lowland, and irrigated lowland farms. Interviews were conducted during a 4-month period in late 1978 and early 1979. Completed interviews of 1077 married women were obtained from 1066 households in 46 villages. These women were under age 50. The number of children ever born was used as the measure of fertility. To derive household income for the families in the survey both farm production and nonfarm income were converted into Philippine pesos. For a measure of housing quality, an index was formed based on 7 household items which could be considered amenities for the family and on the reported construction materials for 5 parts of the dwelling. This sample of households in the rural villages of Iloilo Province exhibited evidence of a threshold in the relationship between housing quality and fertility and between per capita income and fertility. For those families with per capita income less than 200 pesos per year, there was a strong positive relationship between 2 of the economic resource measures and fertility. This threshold for families of very low income showed support for the presence of limiting factors other than contraception. When the contracepting women of low income were removed from the analysis, the slope below the threshold became steeper. The poor nutrition and poor health that are associated with very low income can result in lower fecundity, thus biologically or nonvolitionally limiting fertility from what it could be with conditions of good health and nutrition. Among the families with higher per capita income, there was a negative relationship between per capita income and fertility. Housing quality yielded the strongest evidence of the threshold effect. Education of the children was not related to fertility in this model. Study findings indicate that for about 1/3 of this rural population initial increases in their economic level or living standard could result in increasing fertility up to a threshold level.     

Is there a long‐run relationship between population growth and living standards? The case of India

This note examines the existence of a long‐run, cointegrating relationship between population and per capita GDP in India for 1950–93. Unit root tests show that per capita GDP is integrated of order one while population is integrated of order zero; further, estimation of the bi‐variate relationship using the cointegration procedure of Johansen shows that no long‐run relationship exists. Thus, population growth neither causes per capita income growth nor is caused by it. A corollary is that population growth neither stimulates per capita income growth nor detracts from it.     

The "Kerala model" of development: development and sustainability in the Third World

The Indian state of Kerala with a population of 29 million has made the transition to a society with low infant mortality rate, low population growth, and a low crude death rate in less than 30 years. The average life expectancy for women is 74 years (vs. 60 years for India as a whole) and 71 years for men (vs. 59 years for India), the infant mortality rate is 16.5/1000 live births (vs. 91/1000 for India), and literacy is almost universal. The population growth rate fell from 44/1000 in the 1950s to 18/1000 in 1991. By 1985 the population growth rate had stabilized to a demographic replacement level net reproduction rate. Kerala's female/male ratio is 1.04:1 as opposed to the Indian average of 0.93:1 and China's 0.94:1. All this was achieved without coercion by democratically elected state governments. In the late 1970s Kerala ranked number one in 15 out of 21 Indian states with respect to selected infrastructural and basic services. This development came about despite a low per capita income. In 1991-92 the state of Punjab, with more than twice the per capita income of Kerala, had 33 PQLI (Physical Quality of Life Index) points less than Kerala. In addition, the HDI (Human Development Index) of Kerala was more than twice the national average. The HDI was 0.925 for the US in 1994 vs. 0.775 for Kerala, where the per capita income was one-hundredth of the US per capita income. This progress was accomplished by the elimination of absentee landlords and the return of the land to the tiller; and large amounts of funds spent on education, health care, infrastructure, agricultural credits, and housing. Staples were made available to the poor at subsidized prices. The Kerala model may be taken as an early prototype of sustainable development because of improvements in the quality of life, environmental stability, social and economic equality, and the decline in political strife.     

Economic development and population

Conclusion Neo-Malthusian analysis that high and increasing population density hinders economic development and results in poverty has been demonstrated to be false. The two major structural variables negatively associated with rate of population increase are wealth and socialism, and the major determinants of economic growth are level of economic development and economic organization. If our analysis is correct the various campaigns supported by AID, the major U.S. foundations and other groups to discourage population growth in Third World countries in order to increase their rate of economic growth are misguided. Every baby born is not only a new mouth to feed, but also within a few years two more hands to work. There are great potentialities for economic growth in the Third World that await only the proper economic organization to be realized. That is, if the two hands are used efficiently, they will more than feed themselves. Attempts to reduce the birth rate by propaganda and making contraceptives readily available, ignore the structural causes of high fertility and so are not likely to succeed in reducing the birth rate. Our data suggest that only when the structural causes of high fertility—the poverty and economic insecurity associated with capitalism—are removed is the birth rate likely to fall significantly.     

Higher education and economic growth in Africa

This paper uses panel data over the 1960–2000 period, a modified neoclassical growth equation, and a dynamic panel estimator to investigate the effect of higher education human capital on economic growth in African countries. We find that all levels of education human capital, including higher education human capital, have positive and statistically significant effect on the growth rate of per capita income in African counties. Our result differs from those of earlier research that find no significant relationship between higher education human capital and income growth. We estimate the growth elasticity of higher education human capital to be about 0.09, an estimate that is twice as large as the growth impact of physical capital investment. While this is likely to be an overestimate of the growth impact of higher education, it is robust to different specifications and points to the need for African countries to effectively use higher education human capital in growth policies.     

Comparative growth in India and the people’s Republic of China 1950–1988: A reappraisal

Growth records have been employed to argue that authoritarian forms of government are more efficient at achieving economic growth, welfare, and equity than democracies. This assessment is based on imperfect data; World Bank data on rates of growth of GNP in India and China fail to agree with World Bank data on their achievements in terms of per capita GNP. This article, considers the nature of this anomaly and its implications for current assessments of the relative efficiency of these forms of political and economic organization. The comparative records of China and India during 1950–88 are examined within the context of the growth-democray incompatibility hypothesis while focusing on an aberration in the data employed: the contradiction between the high rates of growth experienced by China and the equality of its per capita GNP with that of the supposedly slower growing India. In attempting to resolve this discrepancy, data on standards of living and degree of structural change are analyzed in order to verify either hypothesis regarding these two economies. Overall, the secondary data fail to suggest that both countries performed poorly. There is no evidence supporting equality of per capita incomes; there is an abundance of evidence confirming the higher growth rates reported for China. The overriding conclusion, however, is that the data are flawed and it is premature to employ them for assessing the efficiency of authoritarian governments at achieving growth, equity, and welfare. Vibha Kapuria-Foreman is an assistant professor of economics at The Colorado College and holds a doctorate from the University of Pittsburgh. Her research interests include the history of economic thought, economic development, and economic history. She is currently examining the nature of causality between population growth and economic development.     

Fertility,development, and family planning, 1970–1980: An analysis of cases weighted by population

A series of related studies (Freedman and Berelson, 1976; Mauldin and Berelson, 1978; and Tsui and Bogue, 1978) have presented empirical findings based on multiple regression analysis which indicated that family planning program effort (FP), as measured by an index developed by Lapham and Mauldin (1972), was the single most important predictor of (or influence on) fertility reduction in less-developed countries (LDCs). The basic results have been confirmed repeatedly. A more extensive data set was used to extend the analysis to a comparison of results of corss-sectional models circa 1970 and 1980. The study builds upon the results of past studies yet differs from them in several ways. All the variables in the present study were measured at 2 points in time: circa 1970 and circa 1980, allowing a comparison between cross-sectional models for 1970 and 1980. Among the cases included in this multivariate analysis was China, a country usually excluded for lack of data. The analysis was extend to 85 countries. Cases were weighted by population, having the effect of increasing the impact of larger countries such as India and China on the outcome of the analysis. Total fertility rate (TFR) was used as an indicator of fertility. For 1970, family planning program effort had the strongest direct influence on fertility (a result consistent with previous studies). Life expectancy at birth was the other direct influence. The direct influence of life expectancy at birth was less than that of family planning, but the total influence was greater. After life expectancy and family planning, school enrollment and relative educational status of women had the strongest indirect and total influences. The other variables all had a positive influence on fertility. When the total variance attributable was considered, directly and indirectly to each of the independent variables, urbanization, carlorie supply, and per capita gross national product all accounted for less than 5% of the variance in fertility, all of it indirect. Life expectancy, family planning, and school enrollment each explained (directly plus indirectly) more than 10% of the variance in fertility. The pattern differed somewhat for 1980. Calorie supply, per capita gross national product, and relative educational status of women had no influence, direct or indirect on fertility. Also for 1980, life expectancy had a stronger direct influence on fertility than family planning. Overall, life expectancy at birth, family planning program effort, and total school enrollment emerged as the principal influences on fertility.     

From population control to "reproductive rights": ideological influences in population policy

The author examines some of the ideological influences which have shaped population control policy in recent decades and considers the growing critique of what is now regarded as a narrowly focused policy, one which is based upon a simplistic definition and analysis of population growth in the less developed world. Focus is given to the important role of professional demographers in the US, who tailored their theories to provide a respectable justification for questionable policy intervention. The emergence of a population establishment in the US, based upon interconnected networks of foundations, private population organizations, and university population centers is outlined. These institutions provide a willing conduit for US government funding through the US Agency for International Development. Relevant interdisciplinary literature has raised concerns over issues such as the outside intervention in national sovereignty, ethical aspects associated with the implementation of fertility control programs, the exclusion of Third World scholars from research programs conducted in their own countries, and the unwillingness of programs to consider complex social and cultural dimensions of high fertility.     

Sociological explanations of economic growth

Even if questions of how resources aredistributed within and between societies are our main concern, we must continue to grapple with the issue of the causes of economic growth because economic growth and level of development continue to be among the most important causes of inequality, poverty, unemployment, and the quality of life. This paper’s dependent variable is the economic growth rate of 55 less developed countries (LDCs) during two time periods—1970–78 and 1965–84. The causal model consists of control variables—level of development and domestic investment in 1965—and a variety of independent variables drawn from major sociological theories of economic growth published during the last three decades. Multiple regression analysis shows that, net of the effects of the two control variables, the variables that have the strongest effect on economic growth rates are: (1) direct foreign investment, which has a negative effect; (2) the proportion of the population in military service; and (3) the primary school enrollment ratio, both of which have positive effects of economic, growth. On the other hand, variables drawn from some theories receive no empirical suport. The mass media of communications, ethno-linguistic heterogeneity, democracy and human rights, income inequality, and state-centric theory’s key variable—state strength—all fail to show any significant impact on economic growth rates when the control variables and the significant independent variables are held constant. The theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.     

Population growth and foreign policy

Australian foreign policy is examined in light of the population issue and its relationships to its developing Asian neighbors. Rapid population growth has been a 20th-century phenomenon. In the ESCAP region, almost all governments are anxious to reduce growth rates and welcome international assistance for population programs. The motivation of these governments seems to be both political and economic. Asian countries do not share the view expressed at Bucharest by Latin American and African representatives that high population growth rates are not a problem. Results of national family planning programs in 16 developing Asian countries are assessed. Major fertility decline has only occurred so far in the most prosperous of these countries. Future fertility trends are hard to predict. Present inadequate knowledge of the determinants of human fertility and limited knowledge regarding fertility limitation techniques hamper progress in population reduction. Australia has aided these countries in demographic training and data collection. For both economic and humanitarian reasons, this aid should be extended to program implementation.     

An Exploratory Analysis of Fertility Differentials in India

The association between improving economic conditions and declining growth of population has led economists and demographers to hypothesise a direct relationship between indicators of economic development and fertility rates. Using recent National Family Health Survey data and the 1991 Census to explore factors contributing to fertility rates in India, we found that economic variables explain 70 per cent of the interstate variations in India's fertility rates. However, several non-economic variables explain an even greater proportion, for example, indicators of female autonomy explain 84 per cent of the variations. Our analysis demonstrates that to successfully explain Indian fertility rates, models must rely heavily on non-economic variables.     

Population growth and development in the third world: The neocolonial context

Less developed countries (LDCs) that were colonies of other nations continued operating under the same social and political structures set up by the former ruling nations. The small minority of elites in the LDCs held on to the power acquired during colonial times. In order to preserve their political and financial status after independence, they maintained their close linkages to the capitalist nations and their multinational corporations (MNCs). The elites did not generally have popular support, however. These capitalist nations and their commercial interests continue to dictate most LDCs development process which supports the financial interests of the MNCs and the local elites and not those of the majority, the poor. The poor realize that they are trapped and unable to break away from the economic and political structures, therefore, to assure some form of security, they have many children which exacerbates their poverty. Yet population control policies based on Malthusian theory and those that rely on such undimensional, technical approaches as family planning alone cannot cure the multidimensional social problems of high population growth and poverty. Neither the Malthusian nor Marxist theories totally explain the situation in the LDCs or even provide workable solutions. Research on population and development in LDCs needs to address both the Malthusian concern for the problems posed by high growth rates and the Marxist critique of class struggle in development trends. To eliminate the trap of poverty and dependent economies, each country must design its own remedies based on its history, culture, and geography and alter the prevailing social, economic, and political power structures in favor of the poor. 6 propositions that must be modified to each nation's particular problems and needs are presented to guide LDCs in formulating or reformulating policies to alleviate the problems of population and poverty.     

Economic growth,income inequality and poverty in china under economic reforms

China's gross domestic product (GDP) more than quadrupled between 1978 and 1996 under economic reforms. Per capita disposable incomes more than tripled in the cities and almost quadrupled in the rural areas. However, rapid economic growth brought about large income inequality which slowed down poverty reduction. In 1995, there were still 70–170 million people living in poverty. This article aims to assess the relationship between economic growth, income inequality and poverty using both secondary and household survey data. The main findings are (1) urban/rural divide and spatial inequality are two major factors accounting for overall income inequality; (2) non‐wage and non‐farm incomes are more unequally distributed than wage and farm incomes; and (3) the incidence of poverty is very sensitive to the changes in per capita income and inequality.     

Questioning Women's Solidarity: The Case of Land Rights,Santal Parganas,Jharkhand, India

This paper examines the impact of foreign aid on economic development in the context of a neoclassical growth model. Its conclusion is that foreign aid, whether in the form of capital goods or consumer goods, has a purely transitory effect on an underdeveloped country's per capita consumption (which is used as the welfare criterion) in the context of the usual neoclassical growth model; when, however, alternative assumptions (which may be more appropriate to an underdeveloped country) about the rate of population growth and the propensity to save are grafted into this model, foreign aid, in the form of capital goods or consumer goods, does have a permanent effect on an underdeveloped country's per capita consumption, if the aid exceeds a critical minimum.

Section I develops the properties of a simple neoclassical growth model that are essential to the analysis; section II analyses the impact of foreign aid in this context; in section III, appropriate modifications are made to the simple model and the impact of foreign aid is then re‐analyzed.     

Electoral Cycles And Local Government Debt Management

The literature provides both theories and empirical assessments that link national electoral cycles and opportunistic incumbents' behaviour. However, at the subnational level the literature is scarce. Using a panel of 238 Spanish municipalities over the period 1992–2005, this paper investigates for the first time in Spain whether electoral events contribute to shape municipal debt policies. We show that the electoral cycle influences the municipal debt per capita. Furthermore, both weak (no-majority) and wealthier municipal governments have higher levels of debt per capita. Finally, our data show that the 2001 Spanish Budgetary Stability Law (stemming from the European Stability and Growth Pact) appears to have reduced the electoral effect on municipal debt per capita.     

The relationship between competition and efficiency of waste-collection services in the Czech Republic

This paper examines the role of the competition on the waste-collection market. Based on the case study of the Czech Republic, we evaluate the influence of competition intensity on supply side of the market on efficiency of waste-collection services. The rate of competition was approximated by the number of submitted bids to public tenders and efficiency was measured by per capita expenditures for municipal waste-collection services. We developed two regression models – the first model verified a competitive effect on the public procurement market for the provision of waste-collection services; the second model identified factors that affected municipal expenditures for waste-collection services per capita. We concluded that the competition in the waste-collection market increases by organising open tenders for suppliers at regular intervals, by adapting the duration of contracts to economic life of fixed assets, by sustaining pressure on service providers through a change in suppliers or the distribution of contracts among jurisdictions.     

Population and income: Is there a puzzle?

Abstract

This note presents wide evidence on the relationship between population and income for 125 countries for which data was available for the period 1950–2000. The main result is that there is a weak but negative relationship between population growth and per capita GDP, as income increases population expands at a slower rate. This relationship appears to be stronger for African countries and for Asian countries before 1970.