Epidemiological accountability: philanthropists,global health and the audit of saving lives

Abstract

There have been concerns about the recent private turn and re-emergence of philanthropies in world health, with many worrying about philanthropies’ perceived lack of transparency and accountability. In contrast, I argue that while the private turn might have led to a decline in democratic or public accountability, it did not bring an end to all forms of accountability. Specifically, I suggest that philanthropists’ involvement in global health has led to the spread of another, new form of accountability: epidemiological accountability. The latter is a combination of two regimes of expertise and practices hitherto kept separate: audit and epidemiology. To substantiate this argument, I draw on my research on the Bloomberg Initiative – a global effort to reduce tobacco use spearheaded by the Bloomberg and Gates foundations.     

Matching as Nonparametric Preprocessing for Reducing Model Dependence in Parametric Causal Inference

Kosuke Imai Department of Politics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544 e-mail: kimai{at}princeton.edu Gary King Department of Government, Harvard University, 1737 Cambridge Street, Cambridge, MA 02138 Elizabeth A. Stuart Departments of Mental Health and Biostatistics, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, 624 North Broadway, Room 804, Baltimore, MD 21205 e-mail: estuart{at}jhsph.edu e-mail: king{at}harvard.edu (corresponding author) Although published works rarely include causal estimates frommore than a few model specifications, authors usually choosethe presented estimates from numerous trial runs readers neversee. Given the often large variation in estimates across choicesof control variables, functional forms, and other modeling assumptions,how can researchers ensure that the few estimates presentedare accurate or representative? How do readers know that publicationsare not merely demonstrations that it is possible to find aspecification that fits the author's favorite hypothesis? Andhow do we evaluate or even define statistical properties likeunbiasedness or mean squared error when no unique model or estimatoreven exists? Matching methods, which offer the promise of causalinference with fewer assumptions, constitute one possible wayforward, but crucial results in this fast-growing methodologicalliterature are often grossly misinterpreted. We explain howto avoid these misinterpretations and propose a unified approachthat makes it possible for researchers to preprocess data withmatching (such as with the easy-to-use software we offer) andthen to apply the best parametric techniques they would haveused anyway. This procedure makes parametric models producemore accurate and considerably less model-dependent causal inferences. Authors' note: Our thanks to Dan Carpenter and Jeff Koch fordata; Alberto Abadie, Neal Beck, Sam Cook, Alexis Diamond, BenHansen, Guido Imbens, Olivia Lau, Gabe Lenz, Paul Rosenbaum,Don Rubin, and Jas Sekhon for many helpful comments; and theNational Institutes of Aging (P01 AG17625-01), the NationalInstitute of Mental Health (MH066247), the National ScienceFoundation (SES-0318275, IIS-9874747, SES-0550873), and thePrinceton University Committee on Research in the Humanitiesand Social Sciences for research support. Software to implementthe methods in this paper is available at http://GKing.Harvard.edu/matchitand a replication data file is available as Ho et al. (2006).     

Environmental Stressors and Food Security in China

This article considers the immediate forces influencing China’s food system and food security. By immediate is meant events of the reform period, from the late 1970s to 2008. It begins by asking the question that has preoccupied specialists since the publication of Lester Brown’s Who Will Feed China? in 1995: How much arable land does China have? Is that land area sufficient to insure grain sufficiency? To insure food security? The article focuses on the human pressures on the food production environment, and then treats the effects of socioeconomic change: land, air, and water degradation. The core of the article examines six responses of the state to both perceived and actual environmental stressors: policy restricting arable land conversion, China’s one-child policy, investment in irrigation systems, the South–North Water Diversion Project, large-scale afforestation and reforestation campaigns, and the program to convert marginal agricultural lands to forests and grasslands.     

Does the world agree about standards of electoral integrity? Evidence for the diffusion of global norms

Drawing upon theories of the diffusion of global norms, this study addresses two issues: is there a shared consensus among experts about standards of electoral integrity? And do evaluations by elites reflect ‘Western/American’ values, or do they coincide with the judgments of ordinary people living in diverse cultures, suggesting the existence of internalized global norms?     

Does corporate governance affect CEO compensation in Indian manufacturing firms?

This study examines the effects of (a) chief executive officers (CEO) pay dynamics, (b) corporate governance characteristics, and (c) the impact of environmental, social, and governance disclosure practices on CEO compensation. Data of 282 Indian manufacturing firms were collected from Bloomberg database from 2013–14 to 2018–19. This study uses Generalized Method of Moments estimation technique to assess the impact of corporate governance on CEO compensation. The empirical estimates reveal that increase in board size, board independence, women director in board, CEO duality, and institutional holdings reduced CEO compensation. Furthermore, the environmental, social, and governance disclosure confirmed that higher firm disclosures help to streamline CEO compensation. It has also been found that CEOs' current compensation is affected by their previous pay. This study corroborates the objectives of Companies Act 2013 to streamline the governance practices for optimizing CEO compensation.     

Autocracy and coups d’etat

In this paper I first briefly survey Tullock’s contributions to the study of autocracy and coups d’etat. Tullock’s analysis of the coup d’etat is insightful. He suggested that those at the top could control those at the bottom with a proper system of incentive payments. Here I expand on that idea by asking the reverse question, not what keeps those at the bottom from rebelling, but what keeps those at the top from looting the regime? I begin by noting that shareholders of the modern widely held corporation face a similar problem: what keeps the CEO from looting the company when the market for corporate control is flawed, shareholders are too weak to exercise discipline, and the board is in the CEO’s pocket? I suggest the answer is provided by “internal governance”: the old need the young for good performance. I explain the financial crisis of 2008 as in part the result of the failure of this mechanism. I also explain the success of modern China this way: The Communist Party facilitates growth because its structure provides a way for superiors (the “old”) to trade with subordinates (the “young”). I have also expanded on Tullock’s analysis to ask what conditions might prevent the dictator from implementing his solution to the coup d’etat problem, thus explaining why coups d’etats actually occur. The basic reason is the weakness of the state. Japanese history provides two interesting illustrations of this: first the Tokugawa regime, where the people were over-controlled, and second, the Meiji constitution, implemented after the fall of the Tokugawa state. The Japanese problem after Meiji was that the military (the young) had no incentive to offer their loyalty to the old (the civilian regime), so the young acted on their own. The problem was the reverse of the Tokugawa regime’s: the Meiji constitution left the bottom with too much control over the top. There was no formal coup d’etat but a number of coup attempts were made and de facto the military increasingly constituted a state within a state. This reversal of authority apparently continued down the chain of command, ultimately with tragic consequences, most notably the invasion of Pearl Harbor.     

Passions and interests revisited: the psychological foundations of economics and politics

Homo Politicus, Homo Oeconomicus. Can these two abstract human types meaningfully be distinguished? Is there a characteristic set of motivations that drive human beings in so far as they are political actors and a different set that drive their economic lives? What are the psychological foundations of economics and politics? The answers to these questions have significant implications both for the study and the practice of economics and politics. If homo politicus is essentially identical to homo oeconomicus, it is safe to generalize from the study of economic behavior to political phenomena. If not, such a procedure will distort our understanding of politics. Similarly, if we design political institutions and public policies assuming that people will behave as they do when they confront economic choices, we may find our intentions thwarted if we have neglected the distinctive motivations characteristic of political action.     

Strategic fiscal interaction among OECD countries

This paper investigates whether OECD countries compete with each other for mobile factors by using various fiscal (tax-spending) policy instruments. We use a panel dataset of 20 OECD countries over the 1982?C2000 period. Results reveal evidence that international capital inflows (FDI) are affected by fiscal policy at home and abroad. Also, there is evidence that domestic capital tax rates react: (i) positively to changes in capital tax rates in neighboring countries, and (ii) negatively to changes in public investment spending in neighboring countries. In contrast, strategic interdependence over public investment spending decisions is not established.     

One-dimensionality and stability in legislative voting

The widespread use in legislative studies of the one-dimensional model and its median-stability consequence raises a question: Do stability and one-dimensionality rest on evidence drawn from observed votes? They do not and cannot. I prove that every possible legislative history is compatible with a transitive majority preference (hence stability), and except in very special circumstances with a cyclic majority preference (hence instability) as well: observed votes can never refute and almost never confirm stability. One-dimensionality fares worse: any legislative history is compatible with the one-dimensional model if it includes no two votes with overlapping pairs of alternatives, but otherwise, I show, it is almost certainly incompatible with the model, even in those rare cases that ensure transitivity. Voting evidence aside, the one-dimensional model is unduly restrictive, and arguments in its defense do not survive scrutiny.     

The Smallpox Eradication Game

Why did the world succeed in eradicating smallpox? Though eradication is a global public good, theory suggests that it should not have been vulnerable to free riding. Some countries, however, lacked the capacity to eliminate smallpox. Success thus depended on the other countries providing assistance. Theory suggests that this public good also should not have been vulnerable to free riding. However, financing proved challenging, even though the global benefit-cost ratio for eradication exceeded 400:1. Contrary to what theory suggests, what may have been the greatest achievement of international cooperation ever was not inevitable. Indeed, it very nearly failed.     

Running off empty: Run-off point systems

One form of the multistage election system is the run-off system, whereby an initial set of candidates is reduced by eliminating from consideration the lowest ranking alternatives at each stage of the process. This paper investigates three run-off systems: the plurality run-off, the Nanson system, and the Coombs system, with respect to five criteria including Partial Non-manipulability, the Uniform Majority Principle, Independence from Individual Orderings, Voter Adaptability, and Inverse Condorcet.     

Among the Energy Tribes: A cultural framework for the analysis and design of energy policy

My four years at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) have provided the opportunity for some participant observation among the Energy Tribes. The uncertainties that envelop trends in energy supply and demand are so wide that the exploratory mode (asking “What would you like the facts to be?”) turns out to be more rewarding than the adversary mode (asking “What are the facts?”). The three Energy Tribes are distinguished by their three contradictory scenarios: “Business as Usual,” “Middle of the Road” and “Radical Change Now.” Each scenario sets very different bounds on what is credible and incredible, possible and impossible, sensible and foolish, rational and irrational. More often than not, the name of any particular tribe turns out to mean simply “the people” in the language of that tribe. Each tribe, seeing itself as the repository of everything that is human, consigns all the others to a sort of unmenschionable limbo. That, in essence, is what has happened in energy policy analysis.     

The composition and interests of Russia’s business lobbies: testing Olson’s hypothesis of the “encompassing organization”

Why are some business lobbies less benign in their external effects than others? In The rise and decline of nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), Mancur Olson proposed that less-encompassing groups—i.e., those whose constituents collectively represent a relatively narrow range of interests—have a greater interest in seeking the types of subsidies, tariffs, tax loopholes, and competition-limiting regulations that, while benefiting their members, impose costs on the rest of society. By drawing on a unique pair of surveys—one targeted to managers of Russian regional lobbies, and the other addressed to managers of Russian industrial enterprises—we provide what we believe to be the most direct test of this hypothesis to date. The pattern of responses is striking. Managers of both the less encompassing lobbies and the enterprises belonging to those types of organizations display stronger preferences for narrowly targeted policy interventions. Our results, that is, strongly support Olson’s hypothesis.     

Utility testing for urban and regional models

The basic question posed is: How can a model of a major urban and/or regional subsystem (e.g. housing, health, education or transportation) be developed to maximize its utility for public policymakers? A technique to be used in the evaluation of the utility of such a model is presented. The proposed technique involves the construction of autility evaluation matrix. In constructing this matrix it is necessary to identify the following: (a) the potential users of the model, (b) the actions open to these users, and (c) the consequences which are considered by the users when evaluating alternative actions. Utility testing should become as commonplace and important as validity testing. The utility evaluation technique described in this paper is hardly the required test, but at least it can be viewed as a step in the right direction.     

Short term forces and changing partisanship

This research stemmed from the growing realization that party ID is not purely the long-term force originally conceptualized. The current conception is that it is a combination of a standing decision and responses to political events. The research addresses two questions: For what proportion of partisan changers is party ID a lagging, stable attachment to be changed only after a period of disaffection from one's party? What is the relative power of the various time 1 short term forces to alter party ID time 2? Among the short term forces, time 1voting behavior showed the strongest relationship to future change in ID. Criteria were established to identify changers whose change was based in past attitudes or behavior. For these criteria a typology was created to categorize the possible time 1 reasons and motivations for changing partisanship. The distribution of changers among categories illustrated that past voting behavior is the major instrument of partisan change. Only a small percentage were motivated by attitudes alone. Thus, overall the distribution confirmed the conception of party ID as lagging and stable. However, a substantial minority, 31 percent, showed no prior signs of partisan change.     

Public responses to the presidential use of military force: A panel analysis

How do citizens respond to dramatic uses of military force? While we know a great deal about the conditions that driveaggregate changes in presidential popularity in response to a president's use of military force, we know surprisingly little about howindividuals respond to such events. What types of individuals operating under what types of conditions are more likely to support such actions? And to what extent does approval of the use of force affect subsequent changes, not only in presidential popularity, but also in more general foreign policy attitudes? We use panel survey data collected before and after the U.S. bombing of Libya in 1986 to investigate the individual-level dynamics of opinion change in response to this dramatic event. Because our study neatly brackets the Libyan air strikes, we are able to examine in some detail the antecedents and consequences of individuals' reactions to a president's use of military force. We find that watching President Reagan's dramatic televised speech had an unmistakable impact in moving respondents to support the bombing. We also find that support for the Libyan air strikes appeared to precipitate greater approval for a range of more “hard-line” military responses toward terrorism, thus creating opportunities for similar-or even broader—presidential initiatives in the future. Finally, because the bombing was the only significant event occurring between the waves of the panel, our quasi-experimental design ties approval of the bombing clearly to an upsurge in presidential approval. Implications for various perspectives on presidential leadership of public opinion in foreign affairs are discussed.     

Dual ballot effects on French presidential vote choice

Relatively little is known about how voters behave under dual ballot voting systems. Do voters follow different decision rules at each ballot? Do they weigh relevant considerations differently on the second ballot, as compared to the first ballot? Does political sophistication condition the way people vote on the first and second ballots? Using survey data from five French presidential elections, we examine these questions and find that voters in France do indeed treat first and second ballots differently. More precisely, we find that both partisanship and ideology matter more on the second ballot. Demographics, socioeconomic status, and political issues, on the other hand, weigh more heavily in the first round. Political sophistication, for its part, does not condition nor reinforce these effects.     

Voter preferences,simple electoral games,and equilibria in two-candidate contests

The fundamental assumption of spatial models of party competition is that voters possess cardinal utility functions defined on all combinations of issue positions which candidates may adopt. Furthermore, spatial theorists usually assume that utility functions have a shape common to all voters and that voters' most preferred positions are distributed in some regular manner. Employing these and attendant assumptions, the spatial theorist seeks to ascertain what deductions can be made about candidate strategies, i.e., the positions which vote or plurality-maximizing candidates should adopt in an election. It has been found that, in many situations, convergence to an opponent's positions and/or adoption of the median/mean of the most preferred positions of all voters is an important candidate strategy. In this context, two main problems have arisen: (1) difficulties of empirical or statistical analysis; (2) the abovementioned candidate strategy is generally not applicable to elections in so-called ‘plural’ societies. One path out of this latter problem has been formulated by Rabushka and Shepsle (1972). This article explores another potential solution by addressing the following question: If voters arenot characterized by cardinal utility functions, but some other type, what are the consequences for candidate strategies? The alternate assumption employed is that voters are characterized bylexicographic utility functions. The consequences for candidate strategies of this assumption are then determined for two plurality-maximizing candidates in some one- and two-dimensional, three-, five-, and seven-voter electoral games.     

Lament as Transitional Justice

Works of human rights literature help to ground the formal rights system in an informal rights ethos. Writers have developed four major modes of human rights literature as follows: protest, testimony, lament, and laughter. Through interpretations of poetry in Carolyn Forché’s anthology, Against Forgetting, and novels from Rwanda, the US, and Bosnia, I focus on the mode of lament, the literature of mourning. Lament is a social and ritualized form, the purposes of which are congruent with the aims of transitional justice institutions. Both laments and truth commissions employ grieving narratives to help survivors of human rights trauma bequeath to the ghosts of the past the justice of a monument while renewing the survivors’ capacity for rebuilding civil society in the future. Human rights scholars need a broader, extrajuridical meaning for “transitional justice” if we hope to capture its power.