财产性利益盗窃的客观构造

利益盗窃与有体物盗窃共享“财产静态控制关系”的保护法益,其解释论不能突破“盗窃”的语义边界,这是形塑其客观构造的前提。套用占有理论的解释论忽视了利益变动与有体物转移的区别,具有片面性。立足利益盗窃与有体物盗窃的共性,结合财产性利益的特质,利益盗窃的客观构造应为“侵入权利人控制领域-打破权利人控制-取得财产性利益”。这一构造既契合盗窃罪财产静态控制关系的保护法益,也未突破“盗窃”的语义边界。由于利益变动的抽象性,须通过行为要素互补等精细化解释,确保利益盗窃客观构造的明确性。“侵入权利人控制领域”对利益盗窃的成立必不可少;“打破权利人控制”包括了转移、消灭、设定义务三种行为方式;“取得”的认定应注意素材的“同一性”与“同质性”之别,并强调终局性要求。     

Grant's Application: it's time for a new approach to a "public interest" exclusion from patentability

This article reviews the recent IP Australia decision in Grant's Application [2004] APO 11 about an innovation patent for a way of protecting assets against a loss of ownership as a result of a legal liability. The significance of this decision was to expose the tortured reasoning necessary to exclude from patentability an invention that was arguably contrary to the "public interest". The article asserts that the effect of the decision revoking the patent was correct, but that the reasoning points to a need to reconsider the "public interest" limits on patentability. The article then considers the approach that should be adopted in formalising a "public interest" exemption from patentability that is practical and generally applicable.     

关于“公共利益”的界定模式

宪法关于“公共利益”的规定,需要在国家权力运行活动中具体化。如何将“公共利益”具体化呢?学界和实务界提出了三种基本模式。第一种是人大以“一事一议”方式界定“公共利益”,第二种是由司法承担对“公共利益”的最终界定,第三种是人大以列举式立法模式将“公共利益”具体化、固置化。第一种模式正确认识到界定“公共利益”属于权力机关的权限,但具体方式却不可行;第二种司法决定模式既缺乏实质合法性,又没有技术可行性;第三种模式在立法上虽有一定困难,但也有其他国家和地区成功经验可资,是实现宪法“公共利益”规定对公民权利保护和对国家权力制约的惟一现实可行之路。要在国家权力运行上界定“公共利益”,还必须解决目前我国“公共利益”泛化掩盖下的许多具体矛盾。     

“双服务”理念:行政观念与制度

在兼顾公私益的“双服务”理念下 ,既有行政观念及其制度暴露出诸多欠缺。为适应既要服务于公益又要服务于私益的现实需要 ,现代行政观念应当是服务观念、公私益兼顾观念和行政能动性观念的整合 ;在制度建构上 ,行政目标立体化、行政手段科技化、权力行使分散化、行政活动民主化和行政方式多样化应当成为制度的转型趋向     

利益不是权利——从我国《宪法》第51条说起

利益不是权利而只是权利的要素之一,他人可能维护你的利益,但不能代替你享有权利。我国《宪法》第51条关于“利益”与“权利”的区分对宪法理论和宪政实践都有着极为重要的意义。公民权利不可能与国家的、社会的、集体的“权利”而只可能与其“利益”发生冲突,权利只存在于平行主体之间（如国家与国家之间、集体与集体之间、集体与集体外的个人之间、个人与个人之间）或非平行关系中的“弱势”一方（如国家与集体关系中的集体、集体与个人关系中的个人、国家与个人关系中的个人）。公民权利也并非都会对国家的、社会的、集体的“利益”构成威胁,有些权利不可能损害其利益,如信仰、思想、良心自由;与其利益冲突的主要是个人权利中具有明显利益成分的权利,如财产权、社会保障权等;国家的、社会的、集体的利益一般不能成为剥夺人身权（如生命权、健康权）的理由。国家的、社会的、集体的利益亦有别于“公共利益”。     

Brief for 885 law professors in support of maintaining adherence to the Roe decision

This brief opposes the overturn of "Roe v. Wade" and resists weakening "Roe's central holding" that would allow states to overturn legal abortion. The brief was written for 885 law professors. "Roe" was not a "constitutional aberration," or "an exercise of raw, judicial power." Some members of the Supreme Court seem to think that the state has "an overriding interest" in protecting fetal life. Some Court members have questioned "Roe's" trimester framework. A person's decision to abort should be done privately. If women are not free to choose abortion, they will not have equality. There is an absence of "express rights of privacy and procreational freedom" in the Constitution. "Roe" was 1 instance of the Court's recognition of constitutional rights that are not named explicitly. Historical materials are drawn on to show the link between trends in society and the "judicial recognition of unenumerated rights." The most serious questions about "Roe" deal with its trimester framework. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion said that the 1st trimester of pregnancy was personal. "Roe" said that abortions created a medical risk at the beginning of the 2nd trimester. Therefore, the government was more interested in the health of the mother at that time. The state could then regulate abortion "in ways that are reasonable related to maternal health." The start of the 3rd trimester was when the fetus was viable. The right of a woman to end her pregnancy "offends powerful moral forces." Some of "Roe's" critics had their scientific facts wrong. Medical authorities think Justice O'Connor is mistaken when she says that "Roe" is "on a collision course with itself." The 23rd to 24th week of pregnancies where the fetal organs can "sustain life outside the womb." This has not changed since "Roe" was decided in 1973, nor is it likely to in the future. Some "amici" believe that the state can never have an interest in the fetus. The state can not have an interest in the fetus distinct from the woman who will give birth to it. During previability, restricting a woman's procreational rights would not be scientifically supportable. The state does have an interest in "upholding the value of human life." "Roe" is "within the mainstream" of constitutional jurisprudence and should be reaffirmed.     

“公共利益”的困境与出路——美国公用征收条款的宪法解释及其对中国的启示

本文从美国政府征收权的渊源以及联邦宪法第五修正案征收条款的原始意义出发,探讨了“公共用途”的宪法概念在美国判例史上的嬗变及其最近的发展趋势。文章指出,由于“公共用途”或“公共利益”是极难界定的概念,法院难以发展出可操作的判断标准。在美国,对征收的公共利益之保障主要在于立法控制而非司法限制。根据民主原则,法院高度尊重立法判断,凡是议会决定符合公共用途的征收一律被认为合宪。在这个意义上,议会是一个“公益机器”,通过民主代议自动产生代表公共利益的法律和决定。文章最后建议,中国应该将注意力从“公共利益”的理论界定转移到制度建设,让全国和地方人大及其常委会在征收和补偿方案的决定中发挥更大的作用。     

解读“规范出发型”诉讼理念——以具体个案为基点

“规范出发型”和“事实出发型”是分别作为代表罗马法系和日尔曼法系诉讼理念的关键词;在中国这一有着悠久成文法传统的国度,裁判案件应在“规范出发型”理念下指导下进行。一般来说,实体法保护的权利仅限于自身框架之内,避免以虚构权利的方式达到保护利益的目的,特别是在该利益可以通过实体法上本来就具有的权利予以保护之时。在适用上,外部的基准应是民事实体法,而不应是宪法;内部的基准应是以规则为主体,只在个别情况下适用原则予以矫正或弥补。     

尊重个人利益是衡量制度设计是否科学的关键

曼德维尔在<蜜蜂的寓言>中提出了"私人恶德即公共利益"的思想,他通过寓言得出结论:国家的繁荣和人民的普遍幸福,只有顺应人的利己本性才能得到实现.因此,在进行制度设计时必须充分认识和评价个人利益的积极作用.就公私两种行为而言,制度是针对人的利己主义行为的,尊重个人利益是衡量制度设计是否科学的关键.制度的主要功能是调动人的积极性,而要做到这些就必须解决"个人利益"与"公共利益"之间的关系,即如何能够使人人像关心个人利益一样关心公共利益,这就是私利公益问题.制度设计的目标是实现私利公益,而只有建立在尊重个人利益基础上的制度设计才能实现社会公益的目标.     

Investment sensitivity to interest rates in an uncertain context: is a positive relationship possible?

This paper shows a non-linear relationship between investment and interest rates under uncertainty. Since the interest rate’s variance is positively related to the investment’s value (through the discount factor) and, generally, is also positively related to the interest rate’s level, then, at the same time, a negative (classical) and a positive (through the interest rate’s variance) relationship links interest rates to investment. Hence, an ultimate and even positive relationship between investment and interest rates’ (expected) level may occur. A specific model is proposed and the conditions upon which the positive effect occurs are derived. Some estimates are also proposed.

Pleading the Fifth: Media Economics,Free Air Time and the Fifth Amendment

Some public interest groups use the concept of "free air time"-regulation compelling television stations to provide free advertising time for federal candidates-to advance the cause of campaign finance reform. The purpose of this article is not to rehash arguments over whether the First Amendment prohibits such legislation but rather to examine a newer direction of inquiry through the Fifth Amendment "takings" clause. Although takings arguments have been dismissed by many due to the "public interest" standard to which broadcasters are held and public ownership of the spectrum, this article uses tenets of media economic theory to show that free air time could indeed constitute a "taking." What is at issue is not the use of the spectrum, but rather access to an audience: economic property created and sold by broadcasters.     

惩罚性赔偿消费公益诉讼研究

通过个别诉讼行使惩罚性赔偿请求权,难以对经营者形成足够的威慑力,消费者协会、检察机关提起惩罚性赔偿消费公益诉讼的必要性客观存在。即使将消费者协会提起公益诉讼的"公益性职责"与检察机关提起公益诉讼的"职权"勉强解释为立法者赋予消费者协会、检察机关以形式性惩罚性赔偿请求权,以该请求权为基础的惩罚性赔偿消费公益诉讼也只是受害消费者享有的惩罚性赔偿请求权的集中行使方式。除非立法机关为消费者协会、检察机关另行创设实质性惩罚性赔偿请求权,惩罚性赔偿消费公益诉讼注定与特定受害消费者存在密切联系,无法从根本上破解惩罚性赔偿金的计算及其发放难题。因而,惩罚性赔偿消费公益诉讼对行政处罚与刑事罚金仅构成补充,在完善惩罚性赔偿消费公益诉讼制度的同时,应当强化惩罚性赔偿消费公益诉讼与其他消费者权益保护手段之间的协作机制。     

从人格利益到人格要素——人格权法律关系客体之界定

在将人格视为人之根本的人文主义理想与权利客体理论矛盾的背景下,为了实现对人格的全面保护,我国学者采用了"人格利益"这一抽象概念作为人格权与人格权法律关系之客体.虽然这在一定程度上实现了通过权利模式对于人格的保护,但是由于"人格利益"概念本身的模糊性和对于人格理论的依赖性,人格利益作为人格权法律关系之客体具有根本性的缺陷.无论从当代法学之哲理基础还是从社会历史发展的现实来看,人格要素都是独立于法律上的主体的,因此人格要素作为人格权、人格权法律关系之客体,不仅不存在障碍,而且具有重大的理论与现实意义.     

Roe v. Wade is constitutionally unprincipled and logically incoherent: a brief in support of judicial restraint

This "amicus curiae" brief was submitted by the Center for Judicial Studies and 56 members of Congress. They were concerned that "Roe" expands powers that belong to Congress and the states into the realm of federal government. Part I of the brief dealt with Missouri's claim that the laws that were at issue in "Webster" were permitted under "Roe" and shouldn't have been made invalid by lower courts. Most of the brief was in Part II. The thrust of it was that "Roe" was not based on any principle and is incoherent internally; "Roe" said that a privacy right existed under the US constitution. However, "Roe" didn't define this right of personal privacy. "Roe" cited a "line of decisions" to prove this point. However, none of the cases that "Roe" cited pretended to be based on the "right to privacy." They dealt with other issues. "Botsford" was said to be the beginning of the constitutional privacy right. It dealt with a "common law rule of evidence," not a right that was in the constitution. Therefore, it did not define the privacy right. "The process by which "Roe" moved from privacy to abortion was unfounded by judicial fiat." "Roe" said that it was protected by "the compelling interest standard," but did not give a reason why this was so. In "Roe," the woman';s interest in getting an abortion was analyzed in medical terms. But when talking about the State's interest in protecting potential human life, medical considerations were not controlling. Part III of the brief asked that "Roe" be overturned because it said that "a privacy right to abortion" was "devoid of any linkage to the text or history of the constitution." "Roe" should be abandoned because its "inadequacies" are "basic".     

信用权之反思与重构

对信用权问题的解答必须回归到对作为客体的信用本身的认识。信用的理论界定和实践表达证明,信用是关于主体客观上的履约能力和主观上的履约品质的综合评价。从评价性人格权客体的外在性出发,信用作为与被评价人相分离的外在之物,作为一种“评价的他者”,与被评价人的人格利益并没有必然联系。正确的逻辑应当是剥离人格与财产,将原本属于名誉的人格利益的部分交还给名誉,信用只剩下财产利益部分。信用所蕴含的财产利益能否成为一项单独的财产权利,视各国法政策要素与法律科学要素间博弈的不同情况结果会有不同,但至少德国民法典第824条的分析表明,该“信用”条款所保护的不是一项特定化的权利,而应归属于一般化财产利益或纯粹经济损失范畴。     

“双服务”理念下现代行政之变革——服务行政的解读和提升

现代行政应是在“双服务”理念支配下的有效行政。所谓“双服务”理念是一种对秩序行政、服务行政和依法行政加以整合的理念。它在目标层面上表现为两种利益观的整合———既服务于公益又服务于私益 ,在工具层面上表现为在依法行政框架下多元化行政手段的综合运用。“双服务”理念为解决复杂的行政问题提供了一种整合、兼顾的思路 ,其解决复杂行政问题的强大功能在实践中已初见端倪。     

Amicus Curiae and the Public Interest: A Search for a Standard1

Despite the widespread and influential presence of an increasingly partisan amicus curiae brief, the role of the "friend of the court" brief remains controversial. Changing rules of access and diverging recommendations for its behavior are associated with two distinct views of jurisprudence. A traditional understanding of adversarial proceedings emphasizes the individual interests of the litigants, and correspondingly excludes consideration of non-parties and the general public. An alternative to the traditional, individual-based, liberal jurisprudence (and its skepticism toward public interest arguments) is a recognition of the need to integrate individual and public interests and to find a coherence between them.
The skeptical view of the public interest can be avoided by adopting a post-empiricist view, which recognizes a plurality of interpretations of the public interest. The amicus curiae role, if given wide access, can serve as a tool of inclusive pluralism, which recognizes a diversity of views regarding the public interest and the impact of legal decisions on the public.     

法人与公司制度融合风险的法律控制——兼论实现国家公司公益性的法人制度支持

现代民法上的法人制度包含了为公司制度发展量身定做的"完人化"标准。公司制度借与法人制度融合获得了广义财产与基本权利,扭转了公司在传统社会组织身份格局中的不利地位,形成了对其他企业类型的制度竞争优势,但也带来巨大风险:公司异化为新身份格局中的"公司帝国"。法人制度在我国具有主要服务国有企业改革的功能狭隘性,加之官商传统潜移默化,产生了更为复杂的"官商公司帝国",妨碍了国有企业实现公共利益。针对性地而言,应祛除法人制度的极端功利主义成分,重建国有企业承载公共利益的法人制度支持。     

Special report on reimbursement. The safe harbor for small investment interests: where do joint ventures go from here?

There is no specific federal self-referral legislation presently proposed or in effect that statutorily prohibits providers from referring Medicare or other patients to entities in which the referrers have an investment interest, except for existing "Stark" legislation, which applies only to clinical laboratory services, effective January 1, 1992. (See Newsletter, Vol. 6, No. 1, January 1991, at 3.) Thus, health care joint ventures are not per se illegal. The publication of the Safe Harbor Regulations does nothing to change this fundamental fact, and it should not cause providers to abandon existing joint ventures, or planned ones, in a "knee-jerk" fashion, without careful analysis. Of course, there is no guarantee that expanded "Stark" legislation, or some other new self-referral legislation, will not be enacted in the future to prohibit providers from referring patients to entities in which they have an investment interest. Because of this uncertainty, all health care joint ventures should contain "unwinding" provisions to govern the rights and obligations of investors in the event that the venture is required to, or the participants voluntarily elect to, dissolve. Any new venture being contemplated should plan for dissolution, and existing ventures should undertake an internal review of their charter documents to assess whether the rights and duties of all participants upon dissolution are properly spelled out. If not, amendments should be made now, while all participants are on good terms. A failure to agree in advance upon such important issues is an invitation to discord, and possibly even litigation.     

The Initiative Process and its Declining Agenda-setting Value

California adopted the initiative process in 1911 as a means to allow the electorate to enact laws or amend the state constitution without acting through representatives. The process was instituted in reaction to an unresponsive legislature dominated heavily by well-financed and professional special interest groups.
Since 1978, however, there has been a clear trend toward the "professionalization" of the initiative process in California. What was once a valuable agenda-setting mechanism for citizens has increasingly become a tool of professional special interest groups. A survey of expenditures made in solely the qualification phase of statewide initiatives over time shows a growing dichotomy between those initiatives that qualify for the ballot and those that fail to qualify. Not only are dramatically more funds spent on behalf of successful qualification efforts, but these funds also are more likely to be spent on enlisting professional signature-gathering services. The era of the "popular initiative" is coming to a close unless steps are taken to reduce the professionalization of its agenda-setting function.