Towards conflict or cooperation? The Ukraine crisis and EU-Russia relations

The Ukraine crisis and Russia’s contribution to it have raised numerous concerns regarding the possible emergence of a new ‘Cold War’ in Europe. At the same time, Ukraine’s popular choice and enthusiasm for European integration expressed clearly on the streets of Kyiv seem to have caused Russia to adopt a (neo)revisionist attitude. In this context, relations between Russia and the EU (and the West for that matter) have been limited, frozen and directed on path towards conflict. This article analyses how the traditional dichotomy between conflict and cooperation in EU–Russia relations was replaced by conflict in the context of the Ukraine crisis. The article contends that the breakdown of the symbolic and peaceful cohabitation between the EU and Russia has been influenced by the fact that both actors have chosen to ignore key tensions that characterized their post-Cold War interactions. The article identifies three such tensions: the first emphasizes divisions between EU member states and their impact on coagulating a common EU approach towards Russia; the second (geopolitical) tension highlights the almost mutually exclusive way in which the EU and Russia’s security interests have developed in the post-Soviet space; finally, the third contends that a clash of values and worldviews between the EU and Russia makes conflict virtually unavoidable.     

Regime type versus patronal politics: a comparison of “ardent democrats” in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan

Kazakhstan is home to the longest serving ruler in post-Soviet Eurasia while Kyrgyzstan is among the region’s most competitive polities. Do these regime differences correspond to divergence in political attitudes, as an extensive body of literature posits? Are Kyrgyzstanis more likely to strongly support democratic ideals? Are Kazakhstanis less likely? Contrary to expectations, data reveal the two populations to be attitudinally indistinguishable when it comes to strong support for practices associated with democracy. Whatever country differences we find are minor or statistically insignificant. We explain this convergence by shifting focus away from the political features that distinguish the two nascent democracy versus consolidated authoritarianism to those that they hold in common. Notwithstanding major constitutional reform in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, politics there, as in Kazakhstan, remains fundamentally patronal, or patronage- based. Mass attitudes, we argue, align in many ways with the countries’ shared patronal politics, rather than with their contrasting regime types.     

Public councils in Kazakhstan: a case of emergent participative democracy?

As Kazakhstan aims to become one of the top 30 developed countries by 2050, it is increasingly turning to ways which will improve its governance, one of which is greater participation by its citizens in the decision-making processes of state agencies. A new initiative aimed at doing just that, the establishment of public councils, received legal backing in January 2016. The aim of public councils is to ‘strengthen democracy and the quality and responsiveness of public polices’ through the ‘public expression of matters of concern to Kazakh citizens’. This article offers a formative evaluation of the role performed by public councils and questions the extent to which they have achieved this aim. It draws on primary data from public officials, non-governmental organizations, ministries, and non-participant observation of public councils in Kazakhstan. It finds limited evidence of their effectiveness to date.     

The electoral logic of governor rotations in Ukraine: rulers’ authority,party strength,and regional polarization

How and under what conditions do authoritarian rulers use the state apparatus to help ensure victory? To answer this question, this paper examines electoral mobilization as a rationale for the appointment of governors in hybrid regimes. Given their absolute authority to use administrative resources, autocratic rulers prefer governors who can perform well in mobilizing the electorate in their favor. However, several circumstances make this strategy suboptimal or impossible. To provide empirical evidence supporting this argument, this study conducts a survival analysis using an original dataset of gubernatorial appointments and dismissals in Ukraine from 1996 to 2017. The results confirm that electoral performance was the primary driver of governor appointments during the presidency of Leonid Kuchma. In addition, it is demonstrated that various institutional conditions, such as party strength, the weak authority of the ruler within the central government, and regional polarization resulted in the adoption of different appointment strategies by subsequent presidents.     

Labour Unrest in Vietnam and China: Insurgency or Contained Contention?

This article reviews three recent books on labour politics in Vietnam and China: Angie Tran’s Ties That Bind: Cultural Identity, Class and Law in Vietnam’s Labor Resistance; Jeffrey Becker’s Social Ties, Resources and Migrant Labor Contention in Contemporary China: From Peasants to Protesters, and Eli Friedman’s Insurgency Trap: Labor Politics in Post-Socialist China. These three books capture the changing patterns of labour unrest and labour institutions in Vietnam and China, which are accounted for by the social foundation of resistance as well as the political economy of capitalist development. Their main contribution to the existing literature is that they draw out the new dynamics and new venues within the state that can both enable and constrain labour resistance and struggle in these countries. However, this article also argues that these works have not adequately theorised the nature of change within the state and the role of the law in labour resistance. It therefore suggests that bringing in the law to socio-political institutions is essential to a research agenda that explores continuity and change in labour politics in Vietnam and China as transitional economies.     

The rise and fall of “Novorossiya”: examining support for a separatist geopolitical imaginary in southeast Ukraine

In the spring of 2014, some anti-Maidan protestors in southeast Ukraine, in alliance with activists from Russia, agitated for the creation of a large separatist entity on Ukrainian territory. These efforts sought to revive a historic region called Novorossiya (“New Russia”) on the northern shores of the Black Sea that was created by Russian imperial colonizers. In public remarks, Vladimir Putin cited Novorossiya as a historic and contemporary home of a two-part interest group, ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking Ukrainians, supposedly under threat in Ukraine. Anti-Maidan agitation in Ukraine gave way to outright secession in April 2014, as armed rebel groups established the Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhans’k People’s Republic on parts of the eponymous Ukrainian oblasts. Rebel leaders aspired to create a renewed Novorossiya that incorporated all of eastern and southern Ukraine from Kharkiv to Odesa oblasts. To examine the level of support for this secessionist imaginary in the targeted oblasts, our large scientific poll in December 2014 revealed the Novorossiya project had minority support, between 20 and 25% of the population. About half of the sample believed that the concept of Novorossiya was a “historical myth” and that its resuscitation and promotion was the result of “Russian political technologies.” Analysis of the responses by socio-demographic categories indicated that for ethnic Russians, residents of the oblasts of Kharkiv and Odesa, for older and poorer residents, and especially for those who retain a nostalgic positive opinion about the Soviet Union, the motivations and aims of the Novorossiya project had significant support.     

Payoffs,Parties, or Policies: “Money Politics” and Electoral Authoritarian Resilience

A key part of what sustains electoral authoritarianism over the long term is genuine popular support. Dominant parties, particularly in a developmental context (the primary setting for such regimes), and especially where elections are more than minimally meaningful, curry performance legitimacy and loyalty not just through skewed rules and coercion, but through material incentives: “money politics.” If challengers can find a way to de-emphasize support based on material inducements, they stand a chance of securing gains via elections, rather than relying on economic downturns to shrink patronage coffers. Drawing on extensive original ethnographic and survey data from electoral-authoritarian Malaysia, I explore campaign finance and distributions on both sides in the latest, most regime-threatening general election, which was held on May 5, 2013. Evidence suggests that it was by disentangling clientelist networks from the patronage they so often serve to disseminate, allowing a focus on more programmatic than particularistic appeals, that the opposition Pakatan Rakyat alliance so nearly bested the long-dominant Barisan Nasional regime. Persona – being known and seen among the electorate – still matters as much as before, but relies less consistently than in the past on targeted patronage as a premise for loyalty.     

Mauritania, August 2005: Justice and democracy, or just another coup?

A military coup abruptly ended Ould Taya’s authoritarianregime in Mauritania, one of the longest-running regimes inWest Africa. The bloodless coup broke a dangerous politicalimpasse and stopped what seemed to be a slide towards breakdownand violence. Using the democratization literature, this articleexplains its root causes and evaluates the prospects for theestablishment of a genuine democracy after two decades of arepressive military and then quasi-military regime. It arguesthat several variables combined to seal the regime’s fate.These are essentially the deeply flawed, tribally based, make-believedemocracy, Ould Taya’s own troubled personality, and finally,the security apparatus’s withdrawal of its backing. Thearticle also argues that the new military junta’s firstdecisions appear encouraging enough but that its determinationto keep a tight control over the transition process and avoidthe fundamental aspects of Mauritania’s malaise may jeopardizegenuine long-term democratization. ^1. Julius O. Ihonvbere, ‘A balance sheet of Africa’stransition to democratic governance’, in John Mbaku andJulius O. Ihonvbere (eds), The Transition to Democratic Governancein Africa (Praeger, Westport, CT, 2003), p. 51. ^2. On Mali, see Zeric K. Smith, ‘Mali’s decade of democracy’,Journal of Democracy 12, 3 (2001), pp. 73–9; for the Ivorianexperiment under General Guéï, see Boubacar N’Diaye,‘Not a miracle after all ... Côte d’Ivoire’sdownfall: flawed civil-military relations and missed opportunities’,Scientia Militaria 33, 1 (2005), pp. 89–118. ^3. Alfred Stepan, ‘Paths toward redemocratisation: theoreticaland comparative considerations’, in Guillermo O’Donnell,Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (eds), Transitionsfrom Authoritarian Rule (The Johns Hopkins University Press,Baltimore, MD, 1988), pp. 64–84. ^4. One of the very few Anglophone specialists on Mauritania, AnthonyPazzanita, thought that the prospects for democracy for Mauritaniaafter 1992 were ‘bright’, but apparently never revisitedthe issue. See Anthony Pazzanita, ‘The origin and evolutionof Mauritania’s second republic’, Journal of ModernAfrican Studies 34, 4 (1996), pp. 575–96. ^5. For an authoritative discussion of the subject, see PhilippeMarchesin, Tribus, ethnies et pouvoir en Mauritanie (Khartala,Paris, 1992). ^6. See Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh, ‘Des voix dans le désert:sur les élections de l’ère pluraliste’,Politique Africaine 55 (1994), pp. 31–9. ^7. There are no official statistics on the ethno-cultural make-upof the country. At independence, it was assumed that the Beydane(including the Haratines) made up 75 percent of the population.However, in the late 1970s, the government kept under seal theresults of the national census, prompting allegations that thiswas done to conceal the demographic shift in favour of blacks,who have a higher birth rate. Unspoken quotas seem to stilluse 75:25 percent of Beydane and Negro-Mauritanians, respectively.However, there is a growing consensus that the general breakdowngiven here, although a rough estimate, is closest to the demographicreality of Mauritania today. ^8. ‘El Hor’ means freeman. It is a semi-recognizedpolitical movement set up by the Haratine elites to fight themanifestations and legacy of slavery. SOS-Esclaves is (untilrecently non-recognized) a human rights organization set upto monitor the issue of slavery and assist slaves to attainfreedom. ^9. See Human Rights Watch/Africa, Mauritania’s Campaign ofTerror: State sponsored repression of black Africans (HumanRights Watch, New York, 1994); Janet Fleishman, ‘Ethniccleansing’, Africa Report 39 (1994), p. 45. ^10. The chairman of the junta has publicly stated that the fearof a complete breakdown of the state is what prompted the militaryto act. As I argue, other less lofty considerations, such aspersonal survival, cannot be discounted. ^11. The International Crisis Group, in particular, issued a reportthat exposed Ould Taya’s attempts to delegitimize thelegal opposition, including moderate Islamists, by assimilatingthem to fundamentalist terrorists, warning that the whole schemecould very well backfire. See International Crisis Group, L’Islamismeen Afrique du nord IV: Contestation islamiste en Mauritanie:Menace ou bouc émissaire? (Rapport Moyen-Orient/Afriquedu Nord No. 41, Brussels, 2005). ^12. After his November 2003 electoral victory, which the US governmentmust have known to be fraudulent, he received a glowing messageof congratulations from President Bush. This support to oneof the most repressive regimes in West Africa was bitterly resentedby many democratic activists. Initially, the Bush administrationwas the only government to demand the return of Ould Taya topower, who was called, in the early hours of the coup, by theUS ambassador in Nouakchott, as the US State Department dailybriefings of 4 August 2005 indicate. ^13. The chairman of the military council made this statement threedays after the coup when he addressed the assembled leadersof political parties. For the text of the statement, see http://ufpweb.org/transition/ce385/interv/alloc_eli.htm,4 December 2006. ^14. Author’s interviews with Mohamed Vall Ould Oumere, editorialdirector of La Tribune, Nouackchott, May 2004. ^15. Mahamadou Sy, L’enfer d’inal (L’Harmattan,Paris, 2000). ^16. The best-known members of this financial and political network:Ahmed Ould Taya (Ould Taya’s brother), Abdallahi OuldNoueguet, Sejad Ould Abeidna (both Smasside), Mohamed Ould Bouamattou(an Oulad Bousbaa), and Abdou Ould Maham (an Idewaali). ^17. See Africa Research Bulletin (15 November 1987), p. 8674. ^18. See Philippe Marchesin, ‘Origine et évolution despartis et groupes politiques’, Politique Africaine 55(1994), p. 27. ^19. Stepan, ‘Paths’, p. 76. ^20. See ‘Petit coup d’Etat entre amis’, La Lettredu Continent (Paris), 25 August 2005. ^21. Boubacar N’Diaye, ‘Mauritania’s stalled democratisation’,Journal of Democracy 12, 3 (2001), p. 93. ^22. Peter Da Costa, ‘Democracy in doubt’, Africa Report37, 3 (1992), p. 60. ^23. Boubacar N’Diaye, Abdoulaye Saine, and Matturin Houngnikpo,‘Not Yet Democracy’: West Africa’s slow farewellto authoritarianism (Carolina Academic Press, Durham, NC, 2005),pp. 107–37. ^24. Cedric Jourde, ‘"The President is coming to visit!" Dramasand the hijack of democratisation in the Islamic Republic ofMauritania’, Comparative Politics 38 (2005), pp. 421–40. ^25. Boubacar N’Diaye, ‘The effect of Mauritania’s"human rights deficit": the case against "to forgive and forget"’,African Journal of Policy Studies 8, 1 (2002), pp. 17–35. ^26. N’Diaye et al., ‘Not Yet’, p. 193. ^27. The coup leaders made a point to signal the transitory natureof military regime and their willingness to usher in a politicalsystem that was completely different from the one they overthrew.See ‘Nouakchott calm, but new "colonels’ regime"faces outside political pressure’ (http://journals.aol.com/mfg917/Lilithharp17/entries/2378,5 April 2006). ^28. Marina Ottaway, Democracy Challenged: The rise of semi-authoritarianism(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC,2003), pp. 3–27. Up to August 2005, Mauritania seemedto fit approximately Ottaway’s ’semi-authoritarianismof decay’ category, pp. 21–3. ^29. William Case, ‘New uncertainties for an old pseudo-democracy’,Comparative Politics 37, 1 (2004), pp. 83–104. ^30. N’Diaye et al., ‘Not Yet’, pp. 122–6. ^31. Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa:Prince, autocrat, prophet, tyrant (University of CaliforniaPress, Berkeley, 1982). ^32. Jennifer Widner, ‘Two leadership styles and patterns ofpolitical liberalisation’, African Studies Review 37,1 (1994), pp. 151–74; Larry Diamond, ‘Beyond authoritarianism:strategies for democratisation’, in Brad Roberts (ed.),The New Democracies, Global Change and U.S. Policy (MIT Press,Cambridge, MA, 1995); also Juan J. Linz, ‘Crisis, breakdownand re-equilibration’, in Juan Linz and A. Stepan (eds),The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Johns Hopkins UniversityPress, Baltimore, MD, 1978), pp. 4–5. ^33. Mohamed Nassirou Athie, ‘Il y a onze ans, le 16 mars’,Al Beyane 14 (1996), p. 8. ^34. Since the 1978 coup, there has been a proliferation of Arabnationalist groups in the Mauritanian army. See Anthony Pazzanita,‘Mauritania’s foreign policy: in search of protection’,Journal of Modern African Studies 30, 3 (1992), pp. 288–300.For example, the military council’s No. 2, Mohamed OuldAbdel Aziz, is said to be one of the leaders of the Nasseristmovement, a pan-Arab nationalist group. ^35. See for example, Mohamed Fall Ould Oumère, ‘Ilévite le face à face’, Al Beyane 5 (1992),p. 1. ^36. Habib Ould Mahfoudh, ‘La tension’, Al Beyane 6 (1992)(Supplement), p. 2. ^37. Ibid, p. 1; see also François Soudan, ‘MaaouiyaOuld Taya: "Le Sénégal nous veut du mal"’,Jeune Afrique 1513 (1990), pp. 34–7. ^38. Pierre-Robert Baudel, ‘La Mauritanie dans l’ordreinternational’, Politique Africaine 55 (1994), pp. 11–19. ^39. Peace and Security Council of the African Union, 37th meeting,‘Report of the Chairperson of the commission on the situationin the Islamic Republic of Mauritania’ (African Union,Addis Ababa, 8 September 2005), p. 7. ^40. Ibid, p. 10. ^41. N‘Diaye, ‘Not a miracle’, p. 105. ^42. Stepan, ‘Paths’, pp. 77–8. ^43. See Amnesty International, ‘Mauritania: a future freeof slavery?’, 17 November 2002 (http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engAFR380032002!Open,17 August 2005). ^44. World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2005 (The World Bank,Washington, DC, 2005), p. 23. ^45. According to the same World Bank report (Ibid, p. 73), in 2000,the top 10 percent of Mauritanians enjoyed nearly 30 percentof national ‘income or consumption’, whereas thelowest 30 percent share less than 9 percent. ^46. Moussa Diop, ‘Quand Ely se fâche, les fauteuilstremblent!’, L’éveil-hebdo 613 (2005), pp.1, 3. ^47. The IMF statement is available at http://www.imf.org/external/country/mrt/index.htm,10 January 2005. ^48. See Nicole Ball and Kayode Fayemi (eds), Security Sector Governancein Africa: A handbook (Centre for Democracy and Development,Lagos, 2004). ^49. For a population of less than three million, Mauritania hasnearly twice the number of men in the security forces as eitherMali or Senegal. The population of each of these states is atleast three times that of Mauritania. See International Institutefor Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2002–2003(International Strategic Studies, London, 2002), pp. 207–11. ^50. Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitionsfrom Authoritarian Rule: Tentative conclusions about uncertaindemocracies (The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore,MD, 1989), p. 66. ^51. The UN Office for West Africa has finally identified this situationas a major cause of coups and instability in the sub-region.The author has collaborated in the drafting of a report to callattention to this issue and how to address it. ^52. Peace and Security Council of the African Union, 37th meeting,‘Report of the Chairperson’, pp. 10–11.     

Consociationalism and Centripetalism: Friends or Foes?

Two schools dominate the literature on democracy in divided societies: consociationalism and centripetalism. The first advocates group representation and power sharing while the second recommends institutions that promote multi‐ethnic parties. Although often presented as mutually exclusive choices, in reality many new democracies display a mix. Drawing on the experiences of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Fiji, Lebanon, Malaysia, and Northern Ireland, this article examines the empirical and theoretical relationship between centripetalism and consociationalism. The aim is to explore the conditions under which they reinforce each other (friends) or work at cross‐purposes (foes). A better understanding of the interaction between consociational and centripetal elements in post‐conflict societies not only yields a more nuanced picture of institutional dynamics, but also holds lessons for institutional design.     

Identity and political preferences in Ukraine – before and after the Euromaidan

Abstract

Taking advantage of a panel survey in Ukraine before and after the Euromaidan, we analyze the relationship between ethnicity, language practice, and civic identities on the one hand and political attitudes on the other. We find that while ethnic identities and language practices change little on the aggregate level over the period, there has been a significant increase in the proportion of people thinking of Ukraine as their homeland. There has also been a large fall in support for a close political and economic relationship with Russia and some increase in support for joining the European Union. Nevertheless, we find that identities in general, and language practice in particular, remain powerful predictors of political attitudes and that people are more likely to shift attitudes to reflect their identities rather than modify their identities to match their politics.     

The War in Ukraine: Risks and Opportunities For the ‘Post-Soviet South’

The invasion of Ukraine sent shock waves through the South Caucasus and Central Asia, subjecting the eight countries of the post-Soviet area to economic, political, and social challenges. Refusing to support Russia in circumventing sanctions or taking a stand against the invasion could expose these countries to retaliatory measures. But aligning with Moscow could lead to international isolation and the imposition of secondary sanctions. This article explores the ways these countries are navigating the new geopolitics, with Azerbaijan gaining but Armenia seeking new allies. It then examines the economic benefits to these countries of Russia's desperation, though this leaves them vulnerable to US and European penalties. It concludes with an analysis of how these states are dealing with the tensions caused by migration out of Russia. In all of these areas, the post-Soviet South must weigh the risks of aligning with the weakening great power or the West.     

“China in South America: Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela”

The growing presence of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in South America highlights its domestic priorities. On the economic side, high levels of development, source of political stability and international recognition, exacerbate the need of importing natural resources and exporting manufactured products. Politically, the policy of national reunification, which is also an important provider of stability drawn from nationalism, demand strengthening relations with countries in areas attracted by Taiwan, isolating the island in the international arena. Beijing is actively working to increase its political leverage and shape the agenda of international politics giving South-South cooperation a strategic dimension well beyond mutual development. This fits South American objectives, namely the ones of Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela, that aim at diversifying international partnerships and perceive China as an alternative to the traditional orientation towards Latin America, the US and Europe. Positioning itself as a stakeholder, China creates the basis for an alternative international order using persuasion. The Chinese soft power in South America may be a drop of water in a much broader strategy.     

Germans and ‘others’: Racism,xenophobia, or ‘legitimate conservatism'?

Drawing on data from various sources, the article assesses the extent of xenophobia and the potential support base for right‐wing extremism in the united Germany. The data shows that West Germany displayed a considerable level of xenophobia before unification, and that at present, Germans in east and west display strikingly similar patterns of hostility towards foreigners. In comparison to their European neighbours, however, the Germans are not markedly different. In addition to levels of education, and placement on a Left‐Right scale, the driving force behind xenophobic attitudes ‐ both in Germany and in other European Community states ‐ are economic and social fears and a perception of relative deprivation.