Desperately Seeking ‘Justice’ in Classical Chinese: On the Meanings of Yi

This essay sets out to search for an equivalent Chinese word to the English word ‘justice’ in classical Chinese language, through ancient Chinese philosophical texts, imperial codes and idioms. The study found that there does not seem to be a linguistic sign for ‘justice’ in classical Chinese, and further, yi resembles ‘justice’ in some ways and has been used sometimes to translate  ‘justice’, but yi is a complex concept in traditional Chinese philosophy with multiple meanings and it is dissimilar to ‘justice’ in their semantic and pragmatic meanings in Chinese and English legal culture. While ‘justice’ is a keyword and fundamental to Western law, yi is not a legal word or concept in classical Chinese in traditional China. Given its complexity, yi does not have a one-to-one equivalent in English. It sometimes carries a sense of ‘righteousness’ and occasionally ‘justice’, but yi and ‘justice’ are not equivalent. In view of these, it becomes understandable that the translations of yi in contemporary Chinese usage vary ranging from ‘friendship and justice’ to ‘greater good’, among others. The meaning of yi is still uncertain and context sensitive as it was two thousand years ago.

     

Stray bullets and “mushrooms”: Random shootings of bystanders in four cities, 1977–1988

Bystanders killed by bullets not specifically intended for them have long been a very small part of the homicide problem. But the frequency of press accounts of such killings and woundings has apparently increased nationally in recent years. To test this impression, we compiled all shootings of bystanders hit at random and reported in the published indexes of theNew York Times, theLos Angeles Times, and theWashington Post for 1977–1988, as well as a key word computer search of stories in theBoston Globe. We found a rapid increase in both bystander woundings and killings since 1985 in all four cities. The base rate was quite low, and total bystander deaths appear to comprise less than 1% of all homicides in these cities. Nonetheless, the numbers were large enough to show that most bystanders reported shot in New York and Los Angeles are victims of random shootings into crowds, rather than single stray bullets striking a lone individual mushroom. The reverse was true in Boston and Washington, with the effect of much lower rates of bystanders reported shot in those cities.     

Securities laws ‘facilitating’ private enforcement

La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (J Financ 61:1–32, 2006) (LLS) have undertaken an empirical analysis, making a critical but somewhat provocative proposition that “securities laws ‘facilitating’ private enforcement, rather than providing for public enforcement, benefit the securities market.” After briefly providing a theoretical connection to the existing law and economics literature, I attempt to empirically advance this LLS proposition two-fold, particularly on the ‘joint use of regulation and the liability rule,’ by exploring the most meaningful word ‘facilitate’ therein. Firstly, I explore the cross-country LLS data associated with the specific case of an initial public offering to seek possibly more solid evidence on the facilitating effect. Secondly, motivated by LLS, I pursue a within-country positive analysis, regarding the major determinants of the joint use, but across overall harmful activities covered in the Korean Securities Law. The major tenet underscoring this second empirical exploration was the clear message from the existing theoretical literature that the joint use should be adopted in a selective manner even within a single substantive statute, because it usually governs vastly different harmful activities. Finally, I call for some essential research agenda, prior to approving the ineffectiveness of public enforcement claimed in the second part of the LLS proposition.

A cognitive-based indicator of deviant sexual interest: Concurrent validation of the Stroop task

ABSTRACT

One of the strongest predictors of sexual recidivism is sexual deviance [Hanson, R. K., & Bussière, M. T. (1998). Predicting relapse: A meta-analysis of sexual offender recidivism studies. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 66, 348–362. doi:10.1037/0022-006X.66.2.348]. Phallometric testing, the most commonly used method of assessing sexual deviance, has elicited methodological and ethical criticisms, while self-report is vulnerable to social desirability and poor insight. To overcome these limitations, researchers have utilised cognitive measures, including a modified Stroop task, to measure deviant sexual interests among sex offenders using victim selection as a comparison measure. However, the results have been inconclusive. The current study explored the validity of the modified Stroop task as a measure of deviant sexual interest among a non-offending sample of 570 females and 223 male participants, using self-report as the comparison measure. The results indicated a significant gender difference in concurrent validity; there was a significant relationship between self-reported deviance and deviant word Stroop performance for male but not for female respondents, suggesting the Stroop is a viable option for assessing sexual deviance among males. Implications of these findings are discussed relative to sexual recidivism risk assessment.     

A Semantic Profile of Early Sanskrit “<Emphasis Type="Italic">buddhi</Emphasis>”

The word buddhi is an important term of Indian philosophical discourse, but some aspects of its use have caused confusion and continue to occasion difficulties. This paper undertakes a survey of the usage of the word buddhi (“intellect”) in general Sanskrit literature from its earliest late Vedic occurrences up to the middle of the first millennium CE. Signifying fundamentally “awareness (of something),” the word “buddhi” is shown to refer often to a being’s persisting capacity or faculty of awareness (“attentiveness, mind, intelligence,” etc.) and also, often, to the content of a being’s awareness (“idea, notion, thought, disposition, resolution,” etc.). There are also instances where it is hard to determine which of these two kinds of reference are intended in our written sources, and there are other instances where both senses seem present simultaneously. Various examples attest to the use of the word to refer to an affective and volitional capacity in a being—and to affective and volitional content—as well as to a cognitive faculty and cognitive content. One feature that occurs frequently in the word’s use is that this faculty and, or, its content, regularly describe alterations of a subject’s knowledge of the surrounding situation, the transformation of surrounding complexity or multiplicity into a simpler and more manageable mental construct—an understanding, an interpretation, a decision, a plan, etc. As the word buddhi is related to the primary Sanskrit word-family used to describe the concrete experience of awakening—moving from no (or little, or muddled) awareness to clear awareness—it is not surprising that its more abstract usage would often incorporate a similar dynamic, a transition from less clear to more clear knowledge, a rendering of early knowledge to better and more useful knowledge, in short, a faculty of “intellect” that produces refined decisions, resolutions, and determinations. It is suggested that this element of its semantic profile contributed to the word’s eventually becoming the preferred word for the most important of the mental functions of beings in one of the most widespread philosophical psychologies of ancient India, that which ultimately became formally enshrined in the philosophical system “Sā?khya.”     

Dr Bonham's Case and ‘void’ statutes

There are two opinions on Coke's remarks in Dr Bonham's Case concerning ‘void’ statutes. Firstly that Coke was assuming a power to declare statutes void as incompatible with some form of higher order law; secondly that Coke was merely asserting a power to interpret statutes. This article suggests that the range of meanings of the word ‘void’ in early-modern English law undermines the foundations of the first position, and that there is no good evidence suggesting a natural law position. Coke's method of statutory interpretation is then explored, showing that his report accords with contemporary jurisprudence on grants of judicial power and parliamentary affirmations of earlier acts, and that the word ‘void’, in this context, had a purely inter partes meaning.     

Has clarity been brought to the diamond sector? A survey into AML and TF risk mitigation by diamond traders and their financiers

The international diamond trade always has been a somewhat closed world in which different rules applied compared to other sectors. The myths and mystic surrounding diamonds as the most precious material on earth are in sharp contract with the contemporary demand for transparency. The clarity of a diamond, one of its four valuables, is not reflected in the ways of the diamond industry. However, recent initiatives, such as the Kimberly Process, which attempts to put a ban on blood and terror diamonds and a handful of banking scandals, have brought a wind of change. This wind of change is to some extent a mere side-wind fanned by the hurricane of the global anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing movement. Banks financing the diamond trade, assurance companies providing insurances to the sector and the diamond traders and retailers have all become subject to AML and CFT legislation. Compliance has become the magic word in the world of financing, along with transparency, but the diamond sector proved to be a slack student in this respect. This paper explores the different aspects of compliance by diamond sector market players and examines whether the extension of the regulatory framework to these players have brought a shift in responsibility, away from the financial institutions financing the diamond sector. In addition it addresses the question whether the regulatory framework and regulatory practice are sufficiently developed to enable effective supervision by the authorities. The author is Senior Intelligence Advisor at ABN AMRO Bank NV. The views expressed in this paper are the author’s private views and not necessarily represent the views of the ABN AMRO Bank NV.

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Classical Sāṁkhya on the Relationship between a Word and Its Meaning

The aim of this article is to reconstruct the classical Sā?khya view on the relationship between a word and its meaning. The study embraces all the extant texts of classical Sā?khya, but it is based mainly on the Yuktidīpikā, since this commentary contains most of the fragments which are directly related to the topic of our research. The textual analysis has led me to the following conclusion. It is possible to reconstruct two different and conflicting views on the relationship between a word and its meaning from the classical Sā?khya texts. The first view, the source of which is the Yuktidīpikā, is that all words are conventional in their origin. It resembles the Nyāya-Vai?e?ika theory of the primary linguistic convention and the conventional origin of all words. The second view, which is the implication of the Sā?khya idea of the authorless Vedas we can reconstruct on the basis of the majority of the classical Sā?khya commentaries (including the Yuktidīpikā), is that the relationship between a word and its meaning is natural. This view is probably influenced by Mīmā?sā. Both of these views are hardly compatible with the Sā?khya teaching. It seems like classical Sā?khya, not having created its own detailed theory, oscillated between different conceptions.     

To Our Readers

After sending this issue to the press, the editorial team passed a resolution to establish the journal Svobodnaia mysl'. The name Kommunist will appear on the cover one last time because, for technical reasons, it was printed in advance and could no longer be changed. We are not changing one word in the material in the issue, which was prepared earlier. In subsequent issues of the journal, we plan a serious discussion of what is taking place in the country. The editorial team asks the readers to support the theoretical and political journal Svobodnaia mysl', an open tribune of the left-wing democratic forces.     

Contracts,promises and meaning the question of intent

Conclusion In this article, I have argued against an intentionalistic theory of promises, such as the theory of Searle, and of others inspired by him. Such a theory leads to a one sided approach, and is unable to account for all the phenomena that count as promises. I have argued that in contract law both the promissor and the promissee play a role of importance, but also that the influence of their intentions is rather limited. I have then extrapolated my argument to extralegal promises.In the last section, I have offered some conjectures as to what may have contributed to the intentionalistic aspect of Searle's theory. My last conjecture was that the ambiguity of the word meaning may play a role. Let me end, in all modesty, by offering a suggestion that might help English philosophers in solving the problems of linguistics, and their translators in interpreting their solutions: the introduction of the word speaning for speaker's meaning!     

Some Reflections on the Term <Emphasis Type="Italic">Sautrāntika</Emphasis> in Vinaya Context: <Emphasis Type="Italic">vinayadharaḥ sautrāntikaḥ</Emphasis> in the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra</Emphasis>

The word sautrāntika is known to designate one of the philosophical schools in later documents, but its earlier phase remains uncertain. The discovery of this term in the Mahāparinirvā?a-mahāsūtra thus brings forward new evidence essential for solving the problem of sautrāntika. In this paper, I will attempt to establish the interpretation of the context, in which the phrase vinayadhara? sautrāntika? appears.     

How Can the Word “Cow” Exclude Non-cows? Description of Meaning in Dignāga’s Theory of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Apoha</Emphasis>

Dignāga’s theory of semantics called the “theory of apoha (exclusion)” has been criticized by those who state that it may lead to a circular argument wherein “exclusion of others” (anyāpoha) is understood as mere double negation. Dignāga, however, does not intend mere double negation by anyāpoha. In his view, the word “cow” for instance, excludes those that do not have the set of features such as a dewlap, horns, and so on, by applying the semantic method called componential analysis. The present paper aims to prove this by referring to the fragments quoted by Jinendrabuddhi and Siddhasenaga?i. Dignāga logically proves that the denotation of the referent Q by the word “P” cannot be derived from the joint presence (anvaya) of “P” with Q. Instead, he derives it from the joint absence (vyatireka) of “P” with the nonexistence of Q. Anyāpoha is nothing but verbal vyatireka. Componential analysis is used for describing what is to be excluded. Dignāga draws taxonomic hierarchies of words based on their customary use, and assumes componential analysis to operate in the background of the hierarchies formed in semantic fields, stating that a general term is restricted to having the same reference with one of its specific terms insofar as the former is connected (yukta) with the characteristics of the latter’s referent. Moreover, he states that a proper name also denotes its referent by excluding those that do not have the cluster of a certain number of qualities.     

Egocentric bias in perceived fairness: Is it observed in Japan?

Experiment 1 was a Japanese replication of the studies reported by Messicket al. (1985) and Liebrandet al. (1986). Subjects were asked to write down fair or unfair behaviors that they or others did, giving as many examples as possible in 5 min. As in the previous studies, the subjects began more fair behaviors with the word I than with others. Likewise, they began more unfair behaviors with the word others than with I. In Experiment 2, 80 examples of behaviors (40 fair and 40 unfair) were selected randomly from the results of Experiment 1. The difference between the number of frequent behaviors sorted into the fair/I category and that sorted into the unfair/I category was greater than that between the number of behaviors sorted into the fair/others and that sorted to be unfair/others. Salient behaviors were more likely to be sorted into the category of unfair than into fair, and more likely to be sorted into others than I. On the whole, the egocentric bias of fairness was confirmed in Japan as well as in the Netherlands and the United States. However, in both experiments, gender differences were found; women, compared to men, recalled more others' behavior than their own and were likely to attribute fair and/or unfair behavior to others rather than to themselves.     

The interlingual interpreter — Cypher or intelligent participant?

Conclusion The final question that arises here is whether interpreters' behaviour—in adding a word here or deleting a word there, as in the examples given above — actually justifies the suspicion of legal participants that they are not being told literally what the witness is saying. Interpreters argue that a literal rendering may confuse or mislead. Legal figures accuse interpreters of using their own words.Legal etiquette frequently precludes interpreters from identifying cultural or linguistic factors that are generating miscommunication, such as in the example given above of designating a particular winter. The mechanical, non-participatory role ascribed to interpreters in the lega setting further leads the legal professionals to denigrate the standing of the individuals performing language-switching. Failure to treat interpreters as participants, e.g. by supplying them with all documentation, including photographic material, leads to inaccuracies. The mechanical view of interpreters frequently precludes them from participating at their own initiative, either to request clarification of unclear material or to provide clarification where speakers' referents are based on different worlds of knowledge. I suggest that it is high time that the legal profession re-examined its attitudes towards foreign-language interpreters, and towards their product — interlingual interpretation.     

Attempts at drug control in Colombia,Peru and Bolivia

The paper analyzes as part of a broader study the drug-control policy of the cocacocaine producing countries of Colombia, Perú and Bolivia, beginning with a short introduction of the political framework. The legal and political emphasis of this policy lies in the area of control and repression, which therefore is analysed in more detail. One can recognize a (substantial) tendency towards overcriminalisation linked to easier (procedural) possibilities of criminal prosecution and punishment (II). However, this questionable policy, when examined from a civil rights standpoint, proves to be of limited efficacy: given the continuing flow of cocaine to the US and the expanding trade to Europe, the policy can hardly pass a qualitative test considering the quantitative evidence (III). There are basically two alternatives from the viewpoint of the producing countries: the international commercialisation of coca and alternative development; from the viewpoint of the consumer countries the controlled legalisation (IV).This article is based on criminological research about the drug policies of Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, which was accepted at the end of 1992 as a doctoral thesis by the Law Faculty of the University of Munich. It attempts to summarize the substantial results of this research but is compelled, due to its limited scope, to frequently refer to previous publications (Ambos, 1993, 1994).This article was published in an earlier German version in Monatsschrift für Kriminologie und Strafrechtsreform, vol. 76, No. 4/1993, pp. 206–226, in a Spanish version in: Cuadernos de Política Criminal (Madrid) No. 53 (1994) pp. 629–667 and Revista dela Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Politicas, No. 98 (1996), Universidad Central de Venezuela, Caracas, pp. 343–390. — I am indebted to Prof. Daniel Nesereko, University of Botswana for refining the English version and critial comments.     

Political Interests and Their Realization in the USSR

In the Documents of the Twenty-Fourth Congress of the CPSU it is noted that the Party has constantly conducted and is conducting major and quite diverse work to improve the entire political organization of Soviet society. The principal direction in this activity has been and remains the further development of socialist democracy. "The Party manifests unflagging concern that our socialist democracy undergo constant development, that each individual feel himself a citizen in the fullest meaning of the word, concerned with the affairs of the people as a whole and bearing his share of the responsibility for them." (1)     

A Śaiva Theory of Meaning

The Pauṣkara briefly discusses the meaning-expressing nature of śabda (constituted of phonemes, varṇa) and the means to the cognition of word and sentence meaning. According to this dualistic Śaiva Tantra, meaning is denoted by nāda, a capacity of varṇas. Varṇas also are the means to the cognition of meaning through a capacity (saṃskāra) manifested in them. Although the meaning-denoting capacity is natural to varṇas, the relation of words (which are nothing but groups of varṇas) with objects is fixed by convention. This article translates and analyzes the relevant passages from the sixth and eighth chapters. Certain arguments of plagiarism levelled against the eighth chapter of the Pauṣkara are examined in the concluding part of the article.     

The five khandhas: Their theatment in the nikāyas and early abhidhamma

Conclusion To explain the khandhas as the Buddhist analysis of man, as has been the tendency of contemporary scholars, may not be incorrect as far as it goes, yet it is to fix upon one facet of the treatment of the khandhas at the expense of others. Thus A. B. Keith could write, By a division which ... has certainly no merit, logical or psychological, the individual is divided into five aggregates or groups. However, the five khandhas, as treated in the nikyas and early abhidhamma, do not exactly take on the character of a formal theory of the nature of man. The concern is not so much the presentation of an analysis of man as object, but rather the understanding of the nature of conditioned existence from the point of view of the experiencing subject. Thus at the most general level rpa, vedan, sañña, and are presented as five aspects of an individual being's experience of the world; each khandha is seen as representing a complex class of phenomena that is continuously arising and falling away in response to processes of consciousness based on the six spheres of sense. They thus become the five updnakkhandhas, encompassing both grasping and all that is grasped. As the updnakkhandhas these five classes of states acquire a momentum, and continue to manifest and come together at the level of individual being from one existence to the next. For any given individual there are, then, only these five updnakkhandhas — they define the limits of his world, they are his world. This subjective orientation of the khandhas seems to arise out of the simple fact that, for the nikyas, this is how the world is experienced; that is to say, it is not seen primarily as having metaphysical significance.Accounts of experience and the phenomena of existence are complex in the early Buddhist texts; the subject is one that is tackled from different angles and perspectives. The treatment of rpa, vedan, saññ, and represents one perspective, the treatment of the six spheres of sense is another. As we have seen, in the nikya formulae the two merge, complementing each other in the task of exposing the complex network of conditions that is, for the nikyas, existence. In the early abhidhamma texts khandha, yatana and dhtu equally become complementary methods of analysing, in detail, the nature of conditioned existence.The approach adopted above has been to consider the treatment of the five khandhas in the nikyas and early abhidhamma texts as a more or less coherent whole. This has incidentally revealed something of the underlying structure and dynamic of early Buddhist teaching — an aspect of the texts that has not, it seems, either been clearly appreciated or properly understood, and one that warrants further consideration.     

Can a Member of Parliament be ‘Genuinely and Properly’ Interested in Court Records?

If there was ever a case where the factual substratum could not have ever been foreseen, McCully v Whangamata Marina Society Inc & Anor ¹ 1 [2006] NZCA 209. (McCully) was one. The case is an unexpected by‐product of the substantive underlying case of Whangamata Marina Society Inc v Attorney‐General ² 2 HC WN CIV 2006, 485–789. (Whangamata) where the member of Parliament (MP) was not a party. The McCully case is unusual because: (1) it is, in law, a civil procedure case that matures into a significant constitutional law case; and (2) it is not the ruling alone, but the factual substratum particularly, that touches on the very heart of constitutional law. This article is limited to a cross‐analysis of the separation of powers, the sub judice rule, and ministerial decision‐making.